Surveillance Law in Africa: a Review of Six Countries by Roberts, Tony et al.
Surveillance 
Law in Africa: 
a review of six 
countries
Tony Roberts (editor)
Authors: Tony Roberts, Abrar Mohamed  Ali,
Mohamed Farahat, Ridwan Oloyede and Grace Mutung’u. 
2Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) delivers world-class research, learning and teaching 
that transforms the knowledge, action and leadership needed for more equitable and sustainable 
development globally.
For more information visit: www.ids.ac.uk
© Institute of Development Studies 2021
Research Report
Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countries
Editor: Tony Roberts
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in October 2021
Suggested citation:
Roberts, T.; Mohamed Ali, A.; Farahat, M.; Oloyede, R. and Mutung’u, G. (2021) Surveillance Law in Africa: 
a review of six countries, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.059
ISBN: 978-1-78118-865-1
DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.059 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library  
This is an Open Access report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any 
modifications or adaptations are indicated.
Funding acknowledgements
This paper is supported by funding from Omidyar Network. The creation of the African Digital Rights 
Network (ADRN) was funded by the Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF). The network brings 
together activists, analysts and researchers from seven African countries. Network members share 
a commitment to opening online democratic space and to enabling citizens to freely exercise their 
digital rights including the rights to privacy and to freedom of opinion and speech. Members of ADRN, 
funded by Omidyar Network, have worked together on this paper to analyse surveillance law in African 
countries.
Other acknowledgements
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge reviewer feedback from, Karishma Banga, Tanja 
Bosch, Becky Faith, Jo Howard, George Karekwaivanane, Pedro Prieto Martin, Nanjala Nyabola, Sam 
Phiri and Anand Sheombar.
Copy-editor: James Middleton; Kathryn O’Neill; Rosalind Cook
Designer: Blossom Carrasco
Proofreader: Karen Stubbs
Brighton, BN1 9RE, United Kingdom
+44 (0)1273 915637 
ids.ac.uk
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England 
Charity Registration Number 306371 
Charitable Company Number 877338
3Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Contents
Executive summary     4
1. Introduction     7
2. Background     9
Privacy rights     9
Surveillance law     10
3. Methodology      12
4. Analytical approach     15
The International Principles   15
The UN Draft Legal Instrument   17
The African Declaration    17
The Principles     19
5. Country report summaries    21
6. Findings      35
7. Conclusion      41
Recommendations      45
Bibliography      46
Egypt Country Report     48
Kenya Country Report     72
Nigeria Country Report     102
Senegal Country Report     136
South Africa Country Report    162
Sudan Country Report     186
4Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Executive summary
An expansion of state surveillance is underway that involves violations 
of citizens’ privacy rights. This is happening despite explicit guarantees 
of these privacy rights in African constitutions, international human rights 
conventions and domestic laws. Governments are making large investments 
in new surveillance technologies, passing laws that expand their legal 
surveillance powers, and conducting illegal surveillance  of journalists, judges, 
business rivals and opposition leaders.
Illegal state surveillance is being carried out with impunity. Among other 
examples, this report includes evidence of illegitimate state surveillance: of 
journalists and academics in Egypt; of business rivals and politicians in South 
Africa; of activists and lawyers in Sudan. The impunity of those conducting 
illegal surveillance, is evidenced by the absence of any prosecutions of those 
acting outside of the law to violate citizens’ constitutional privacy rights.
Surveillance law attempts to balance privacy rights with the need to enable 
legal surveillance of individuals suspected of committing the most serious 
crimes. Surveillance law provides a means to ensure that surveillance is 
narrowly targeted, while protecting citizens’ rights by defining in law privacy 
and due process safeguards, transparency and independent oversight 
mechanisms. However, little research currently exists about what legal 
provisions are in place across Africa and how legal frameworks compare with 
each other and with available guidelines.
This review provides the first comparative analysis of African legal 
surveillance frameworks. The study identifies nine core principles derived 
from existing guidelines as an analytical framework to identify opportunities 
to strengthen privacy protection, while narrowly targeting surveillance on 
the most serious crimes. Six detailed country reports are synthesised in this 
comparative analysis to produce a series of actionable recommendations 
for policy, practice and further research.
This report finds that existing surveillance law is failing to protect privacy 
rights, which are currently being eroded by six factors: 
1. The introduction of new laws that expand state surveillance powers.
2. Lack of legal precision and privacy safeguards in existing surveillance 
legislation.
3. Increased supply of new surveillance technologies that enable illegitimate 
surveillance.
4. State agencies regularly conducting surveillance outside of what is 
permitted in law.
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5. Impunity for those committing illegitimate acts of surveillance.
6. Insufficient capacity in civil society to hold the state fully accountable in 
law.
This report finds state violation of privacy rights occurs in all countries 
studied and that impunity exists for those conducting illegitimate 
surveillance. No prosecutions were recorded in any country for those state 
employees conducting illegitimate surveillance of citizens. Civil society 
activists are alarmed about evidence of surveillance creep, the normalisation 
of illicit surveillance and what they fear is a slow descent into digital 
authoritarianism. 
How to improve surveillance legislation is clear. There is a high degree 
of consensus among scholars and international bodies about how to 
significantly improve existing surveillance law. This review recommends 
establishing a single surveillance law in each country. Surveillance law 
should require an independent judge to test all surveillance applications 
for reasonable grounds, legitimate aims, necessity and proportionality. 
Legislation must provide legal precision and define mechanisms for 
notification, transparency, oversight and legal punishments for illegitimate 
surveillance. 
Legislation alone is insufficient. Unless the state adheres to the law, it has 
limited relevance. Our country reports suggest that holding governments 
accountable in law depends on a strong and active civil society. Raising 
public awareness about privacy rights and surveillance practices is a 
necessary precondition to mobilising the political will that is necessary 
for reform of the law and the ending of impunity. This requires sustained 
capacity building and coordinated action with journalists, lawyers, human 
rights activists, policymakers and other stakeholders. A systematic approach 
is necessary that includes – but goes beyond – reform of legislation.
Figure 1.1 provides a visual summary of the provisions of surveillance law in 
each country studied. This table is derived from the more comprehensive 
analysis contained in each of the full country reports included in this 
publication. Each of the full country reports contains sections addressing a 
specific area of privacy rights and that country’s surveillance law framework.
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Figure 1.1 Privacy Protections Provided 
in Surveillance Legislation
Figure 1.1 provides a visual summary of the provisions of surveillance law in 
each country studied. This table is derived from the more comprehensive 
analysis contained in each of the full country reports included in this 
publication. Each of the full country reports contains sections addressing a 
specific area of privacy rights and that country’s surveillance law framework.
* Although Egyptian law provides some partial protections the Emergency Law in 
place since 2017 removes all of these protections
** South Africa’s RICA law provides most protections but parts of the law have been 
suspended by the constitutional court to add new protections
*** Although some protections are provided in Sudanese law the current National 
Securty law enables state agencies to override the protections
EG* KE NG SG SA** SD***
Competent judicial authority: a judge knowledgeable in digital 
technologies and human rights to assess and authorise requests to 
conduct surveillance from investigating agencies of the state.
Legality: surveillance carried out only within parameters and by 
agencies specified in the legislation. The legislation criminalises all other 
surveillance and specifies penalties.
Legitimate aim: law closely defines the only legitimate aims of 
surveillance e.g. prevention of terrorism or serious crime with a legal 
punishment of 10 or more years in jail.
Reasonable grounds: judge must test whether there is a high degree of 
threat and a high probability that surveillance will produce evidence that 
removes the threat to a legitimate aim. 
Necessary: judge must test whether surveillance is necessary to secure 
the evidence and that no other less invasive method is available to 
address legitimate aim.
Proportionality: judge must test whether proposed surveillance is limited 
in scope, and that the duration is in proportion to the evidence needed 
to remove the threat.
Notification: at the earliest appropriate time the subject of surveillance 
should be notified of the occurrence to provide opportunity for legal 
appeal and due process.
  
Transparency: annual transparency reports should publicise number of 
requests, grounds, and authorisations to enable public accountability of 
process and public officials. 
Independent oversight: public oversight mechanisms should be 




No provision in legislation
KEY
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1. Introduction
The right to privacy and to private communications is a fundamental 
human right that is enshrined in African constitutions, international human 
rights conventions and domestic laws. All surveillance is a violation of these 
privacy rights. States argue that on occasion it is necessary to violate privacy 
rights to prevent serious crimes such as terrorist attacks. The large power 
imbalance between the state and citizens and the secretive nature of 
surveillance creates the risk of abuse. Examples in this study show that states 
use surveillance powers to spy on journalists, business rivals, opposition 
politicians and activists in ways that threaten open democracy. 
Surveillance law can provide a mechanism to protect privacy rights, 
while enabling the state to conduct narrowly targeted surveillance on 
those suspected of the most serious crimes. Protections can be built into 
law to protect against arbitrary or mass surveillance. The intention is to 
narrowly target surveillance so that citizens’ fundamental human rights are 
infringed as little as possible. Surveillance law can, for example, require prior 
authorisation of surveillance by a judge and require specific safeguards, 
transparency and oversight mechanisms to prevent inconsistent application 
of the law or any abuse of surveillance powers.
State surveillance is not new but has dramatically expanded in the digital 
era. Colonial powers used surveillance to enable extraction of taxes 
and to monitor the struggle for independence. In recent years, analogue 
surveillance has been digitalised and automated, making mass surveillance 
possible. This has happened against a backdrop of 15 consecutive years 
of reductions in democratic freedoms worldwide (Freedom House 2021) 
and shrinking civic space globally (CIVICUS 2020). The violation of human 
rights occurs in many countries, but the threat is arguably greatest in 
fragile democracies: those with weak legal and regulatory oversight, poor 
institutional protections and where levels of awareness about privacy rights 
and surveillance practices are lowest. There are relatively few studies on new 
surveillance technologies and practices in Africa (Roberts and Mohamed 
Ali 2021). This report examines existing surveillance law and practice in six 
African countries and assesses them against international law. It identifies 
opportunities to better balance the protection of citizens’ privacy with the 
state’s need to conduct narrowly targeted surveillance. This is the first such 
comparative analysis of African legal surveillance frameworks.
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The Cambridge Analytica scandal, Snowden revelations and Pegasus 
spyware cases have provided copious evidence that governments regularly 
conduct surveillance on citizens (Ekdale and Tully 2020; Courage Foundation 
2015; Amnesty 2021). Our study evidences a rapid expansion in the sale of 
new surveillance technologies to African countries by companies from the 
US, China, Europe and Israel (Duncan 2018; Feldstein 2019; Jili 2020; Amnesty 
2021; Roberts 2021). The expansion of the technical means to conduct mass 
surveillance alongside the contraction of democratic space has raised 
concerns about what Freedom House (2018) has called a descent into ‘digital 
authoritarianism’. There has been no systematic attempt to document 
which companies are providing what surveillance technologies to African 
governments and with what effect (Roberts and Mohamed Ali 2021). This 
report is one of the first attempts to document this expansion of surveillance 
technologies across Africa. Further research is needed in this area if actions 
to mitigate and curtail illegitimate surveillance are to be successful.
This report reviews the existing legal frameworks for surveillance in Egypt, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Sudan. The countries selected 
as case studies include examples from four main regions and three main 
language groups. The six country reports summarise the existing legislation, 
safeguards and practice in each country and compare this against three 
international frameworks. The frameworks used are the International 
Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance (EFF 2013), the UN Draft Instrument on Government-led 
Surveillance and Privacy (UNHCHR 2018a) and the African Commission (2019) 
Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information 
in Africa. These three guiding documents are complementary and are 
referred to collectively in this review as ‘the Principles’. 
The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 provides essential 
background on privacy rights and surveillance law before the 
methodological approach is outlined in section 3; section 4 reviews existing 
literature on underlying principles to guide surveillance law to produce 
the framework of analysis used in this review; section 5 provides brief 
visual summaries of the six fully detailed reports included at the end of 
this publication; section 6 highlights the main findings of the research by 
analysing the six country reports using this framework, before presenting a 
set of conclusions and recommendations in section 7. This is followed by the 
full country reports from Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and 
Sudan.
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2. Background 
Privacy rights
Citizens have reason to value privacy in their own homes, in their business 
correspondence and personal communications. Reflecting the high value 
that societies generally attach to it, the right to privacy is enshrined in the 
constitution of many countries, guaranteed in international conventions and 
explicitly protected in many domestic laws. This universal human right to 
privacy applies whether a person is alone or with others, in a private home or 
a public place, corresponding by any medium, and whether they are online 
or offline (Privacy International 2019).
Privacy itself is a fundamental right, but it is also instrumental in securing 
other rights including the rights to freedom of speech, opinion, affiliation 
and assembly (Bernal 2016). Without privacy it is often not practical or 
safe to organise political opposition, compete commercially or otherwise 
develop alternatives to existing policies, dominant narratives or experienced 
injustice. As such, the right to privacy is central to democracy and is explicitly 
recognised in international human rights law including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (UN 1966) and the Declaration of Principles of Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information in Africa, hereafter referred to in this 
report as the ‘African Declaration’ (African Commission 2019). 
The right to privacy of communication is a universal right guaranteed to 
all in international law. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that: ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks’ (UN 1948). This was reinforced by Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966), which 
requires states to protect and promote the right to privacy for all individuals 
without discrimination. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
(Islamic Conference 1990) goes further by specifically mentioning surveillance, 
saying, ‘It is not permitted to spy on him [sic.], to place him under surveillance’ 
and requiring that ‘The State shall protect him from arbitrary interference’. 
More recently the UN Human Rights Council has passed resolutions on ‘The 
Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet’ (UN 
2016) and the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (UNHCHR 2018a), which 
add clarity around the need to limit surveillance in order to protect the 
fundamental human right to privacy.  
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The African Commission (2019) Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information explicitly prohibits surveillance except 
as authorised in legislation. The Declaration specifies the right to anonymity 
online and explicitly prohibits surveillance outside of a legal framework. The 
African Declaration requires prior authorisation of any surveillance by an 
impartial and independent court. Surveillance is only allowed to secure a 
‘legitimate aim’, where there is ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a serious crime has 
been or is about to be committed. The African Declaration also stipulates the 
need to put in place appropriate safeguards against arbitrary surveillance 
by requiring the authorising judge to assess whether the scope and time 
frame of proposed surveillance is ‘legal, necessary, and proportionate’ to the 
legitimate aim. These principles and protections are discussed in more detail 
in the sections that follow. 
Surveillance law 
Although guaranteed in law, the right to privacy is not absolute. Although 
conventions may ‘guarantee’ privacy and constitutions make it ‘inviolable’, 
states argue there are circumstances when it is necessary to violate one 
person’s rights in order to protect the rights of others. A government might, 
for example, give itself the power to violate a suspected terrorist’s right to 
privacy in order to prevent a terrorist attack that threatens the lives of many. 
However, as this report will show, the danger exists that a present or future 
government might use surveillance powers granted in order to protect 
against terrorism to spy on political opponents, gain commercial advantage, 
or stifle progressive social or political change. Surveillance law attempts to 
provide checks and balances to enable narrowly targeted surveillance, while 
protecting against arbitrary or mass surveillance. 
State surveillance is defined in this report as any observing, listening, 
monitoring or recording by a state or its agents to track citizen’s movements, 
activities, conversations, communications or correspondence, including the 
recording of metadata.
Surveillance is always a relationship of power in which the watcher covertly 
gains advantage at the expense of the fundamental rights of those being 
watched. The covert nature of surveillance and the imbalance of power 
between the watcher and the watched provide significant opportunity for 
the abuse of power with impunity. Therefore, safeguards are necessary to 
limit the potential for arbitrary and illegitimate use of surveillance, to make its 
use transparent and power holders accountable. Introducing clear limits and 
transparent safeguarding mechanisms into the text of surveillance legislation 
is one potential means to curb arbitrary surveillance and balance citizens’ 
right to privacy with the need for narrowly targeted surveillance. 
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Artificial intelligence and automated algorithmic searching of digital 
communications increase the potential scale and speed of covert 
monitoring, making mass surveillance practically possible. Until relatively 
recently, the scope of surveillance was practically limited by resource 
constraints. Communications interception was a labour-intensive analogue 
process. Several people were required to track, intercept, monitor and 
analyse each surveillance target. It is now possible to monitor citizens’ 
internet and mobile communications digitally by searching for keywords in 
ways that make mass surveillance more efficient and affordable. 
African governments are making major investments in a wide range of 
surveillance technologies. This report documents that African governments 
are creating laws that force mobile and internet companies to capture and 
store all citizen’s communications for analysis by state agencies. In some 
countries, all banking and electronic financial transactions are similarly 
available to the state. In all countries studied, mobile phone SIM card 
registration is mandatory. Compulsory digital identification (ID) systems 
are being introduced in some countries and major investments are being 
made in closed circuit television (CCTV), car licence plate and facial 
recognition systems. Being able to track an individual’s real-time movements, 
transactions, email, voice and social media communications provides a 
powerful basic infrastructure for state surveillance. This report is one of the 
first attempts to document this expansion of surveillance technologies across 
Africa, but more research is necessary in this area. 
Privacy rights advocates argue that the expansion of mass surveillance by 
states is not lawful and that it is neither necessary nor proportionate to the 
legitimate aim of preventing serious crime. Following revelations in 2013 by 
US National Security Agency whistle-blower Edward Snowden that the US 
and UK governments were conducting mass surveillance of citizens, courts in 
both countries upheld that the practices were illegal and unconstitutional. 
Yet these technologies are now being exported to African states. Globally, 
there has been broad agreement that there is a need to tighten surveillance 
laws to reflect the new digital environment, protect fundamental privacy 
rights and make possible targeted surveillance that minimises privacy 
violation. This review contributes actionable recommendations towards 
meeting those aims.
The report details existing legal surveillance frameworks in six African 
countries and measures them against available guidance for best practice 
in surveillance law (these guidance documents are analysed in section 4). 
The next section explains the methodology adopted in this study.
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3. Methodology 
This research provides the first comparative analysis of African legal 
surveillance frameworks. The study uses nine core elements from existing 
international principles as a framework to identify opportunities to 
strengthen privacy protection and narrowly target surveillance. The guiding 
research question was: ‘What legal provisions exist to protect privacy and 
ensure narrowly targeted surveillance in six African countries?’ The objective 
was to understand existing strengths, identify improvement opportunities 
and produce recommendations for policy, practice and further research. This 
section explains the research approach adopted.
Six countries were selected to represent a variety of geographical regions 
and language groups. We sought to include countries that provide some 
contrast of surveillance practices and legal frameworks. On a practical level, 
the selection also included the funder’s focal countries in the region. The final 
decision was pragmatically influenced by our ability to identify and secure 
the services of legal scholars with relevant expertise within the timeframe 
and budget available.
The researchers were legal and digital scholars based in five African 
countries and the UK. The research was carried out between April and 
August 2021. Due to resource and Covid-19 pandemic restrictions, the study 
was entirely desk-based qualitative analysis of primary legislation and 
secondary sources. Each country report author was required to answer the 
same 12 research questions in order to provide the basis for cross-country 
comparison. These 12 questions provide the structure for the six full country 
reports included in this publication. 
The analytical framework was based on agreed international principles. 
The country report authors were originally asked to compare domestic 
surveillance laws in six African countries with those existing in countries 
in Europe, the UK and the US. Ultimately, comparison with existing legal 
frameworks in other countries did not prove to be as useful analytically as 
comparison with the available Principles (detailed in section 4). The existing 
frameworks for surveillance law in the Europe, the UK and the US were 
themselves problematic in both their content and application. These issues 
are summarised in the remaining paragraphs in this section. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the US rushed through legislation 
giving the state extensive new surveillance powers. In the US, The 
USA Patriot Act was hastily introduced within 45 days of 9/11 making it 
legal for the US government to spy on its own citizens and globally. The 
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availability of new technologies provided the opportunity to automate 
some communications interception tasks using artificial intelligence to 
algorithmically search and analyse part of the surveillance process, making 
mass surveillance possible. Although the case for new surveillance powers 
was premised on the need to prevent terrorism, in fact the overwhelming 
majority of convictions secured with PATRIOT Act surveillance have been 
unrelated to terrorism (ACLU 2021). This has raised concerns that surveillance 
powers ushered in using the justification of national security are put to other 
uses. 
The Snowden revelations in 2013 provided copious evidence that the US 
and UK governments were routinely carrying out mass surveillance that 
far exceeded their legal powers (Snowden 2015). Following public outcry at 
the mass surveillance of citizens by the state, and court cases in both the 
UK and US ruling that the state had acted illegally (Crocker 2015), new laws 
were promised to remedy the situation. In the US, the USA Freedom Act was 
originally intended to correct the weaknesses of the Patriot Act and prevent 
the kind of illegal mass surveillance revealed by Snowden. However, the 
Freedom Act was watered down as it passed through the legislative process 
and civil rights organisations have lamented that the final legislation failed 
to introduce any meaningful restraints on surveillance powers and actually 
extended and legitimated some forms of mass surveillance (Bradford Franklin 
2019). 
A similar pattern occurred in the UK. Public shock at the Snowden 
revelations and the ensuing media furore created momentum for new legal 
protections. However, the much-amended final legislation (Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016) was ‘one of the most extreme surveillance laws ever 
introduced in a democratic country’ according to lawyers and human rights 
organisation Article 19 (2019). The Investigatory Powers Act – dubbed the 
‘Snooper’s Charter’ by privacy campaigners – ‘legitimizes mass surveillance. 
It is the most intrusive and least accountable surveillance regime in the West’ 
(Snowden 2015). 
For these reasons, our researchers did not find US or UK law a useful 
reference point for assessing African surveillance law. The legal framework 
for surveillance is arguably better in some European countries than the US 
and UK. For example, the main surveillance law in Germany, called the G10 
Act, makes mass surveillance illegal due to the threat that it presents to 
journalists, lawyers and their clients. The same law also protects the right 
to anonymity prohibiting the state from breaking encryption (Gerhold et 
al. 2017). The German legislation is not perfect – with deficiencies around 
transparency and proportionality – but a strong civil society, and relatively 
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independent media and courts, mean that such limitations can be legally 
challenged and reformed. 
Our research team was resistant to the idea that African law should always 
be compared against US and European laws. This was especially the case 
given the problematic nature of the examples of the US and UK. Ultimately, 
report authors found that the International Principles, UN Draft Instrument 
and African Declaration were more useful frameworks for analysing 
surveillance law in the six countries studied. These three documents are 
grounded in the same human rights language as is found in their national 
constitutions and domestic law. As such, the researchers found that the 
documents provided a solid ethical and contextually relevant basis for 
assessing the strengths of existing legal frameworks in their respective 
countries. These Principles are discussed in detail in the next section.
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4. Analytical approach 
This section outlines a series of guidance documents and principles for 
surveillance law that have been developed and agreed by a wide group 
of stakeholders and which are used to support countries aiming to balance 
privacy rights and the need for narrowly targeted surveillance. 
The International Principles
In 2013, civil society organisations concerned about the threat to 
human rights posed by digital surveillance collectively authored a 
set of International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance (EFF 2014). Privacy International, the Open 
Rights Group, Electronic Frontier Foundation and Association of Progressive 
Communications were among those coordinating the drafting, with over 
600 organisations signing the International Principles.1 The International 
Principles outline among other things the importance of prior authorisation 
of surveillance by a competent judicial authority; the testing of applications 
by a judge for legitimate aims, reasonable grounds, legality, necessity and 
proportionality; and the importance of subject notification, transparency 
reports and independent oversight (as illustrated in Figure 1.2).
1  https://necessaryandproportionate.org/principles/ 
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Figure 1.2 Principles of surveillance law
Competent Judicial 
Authority: a judge 
knowledgeable in 
digital technologies 
and human rights to 
assess and authorise 
requests to conduct 
surveillance from 
investigating agencies 
of the state 
Legality: surveillance 
carried out only within 
parameters and by 
agencies specified 
in the legislation. The 
legislation criminalises 
all other surveillance 
and specifies penalties 
Legitimate Aim: law 
closely defines the 
only legitimate aims 
of surveillance e.g. 
prevention of terrorism 
or serious crime with a 
legal punishment of 10 
or more years in jail
Reasonable Grounds: 
judge must test 
whether there is a 
high degree of threat 
evidence needed to 
remove the threat.
Notification: at the 
earliest appropriate 
time the subject of 
surveillance should 
be notified of the 
occurrence to provide 
opportunity for legal 





publicise number of 
requests, grounds, 
and authorisations 
to enable public 
accountability of 





should be established 
to ensure transparency 
and accountability of 
surveillance practices
to a legitimate aim 
and a high probability 
that surveillance will 
produce evidence that 
removes the threat
Necessary: judge 
must test whether 
surveillance is 
necessary to secure 
the evidence and that 
no other less invasive 
method is available to 
address legitimate aim
Proportionality: judge 
must test whether 
proposed surveillance 
is limited in scope, and 
that the duration is 
in proportion to the 
Source: Authors - adapted from EFF (2014).
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The UN Draft Legal Instrument
In 2018, a group of experts from global technology companies, civil society 
organisations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and universities 
came together under the auspices of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy to produce the Draft Legal Instrument on Government-
led Surveillance and Privacy (UNHCHR 2018a). The Draft Legal Instrument 
is a comprehensive guide to legislation that enables narrowly targeted 
surveillance with safeguards for privacy rights. The Draft Legal Instrument 
provides a clear guide for drafting and assessing surveillance legislation that 
complies with international law on human rights.
The African Declaration
In 2019, many of the elements of the International Principles and the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument were incorporated into section 41 of the African 
Commission’s (2019) Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa (African Declaration), as illustrated in Box 1.1. 
The founding charter of the African Commission includes a responsibility to 
promote human rights, in part by formulating and laying down principles 
to help African states draft legislation that is consistent with international 
human rights law. Mindful of this responsibility and of the rapidly evolving 
digital landscape, the 2019 declaration sought to update the previous 2002 
declaration as major new issues had emerged, including in relation to digital 
information and mobile and internet technologies (Mute 2019).
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Box 1.1  African Commission (2019) Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa 2019.
Principle 41. Privacy and communication surveillance
1. States shall not engage in or condone acts of indiscriminate and 
untargeted collection, storage, analysis or sharing of a person’s 
communications. 
2. States shall only engage in targeted communication surveillance 
that is authorised by law, that conforms with international human 
rights law and standards, and that is premised on specific and 
reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been or is being 
carried out or for any other legitimate aim. 
3. States shall ensure that any law authorising targeted communication 
surveillance provides adequate safeguards for the right to privacy, 
including:
a. the prior authorisation of an independent and impartial  
judicial authority; 
b. due process safeguards; 
c. specific limitation on the time, manner, place and scope of the 
surveillance; 
d. notification of the decision authorising surveillance within a 
reasonable time of the conclusion of such surveillance; 
e. proactive transparency on the nature and scope of its use; and 
f. effective monitoring and regular review by an independent 
oversight mechanism.
Source: adapted from EFF (2014).
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The Principles
There is a high degree of consensus between the guidance contained 
in the International Principles, UN Draft Legal Instrument and African 
Declaration. All three documents emphasise the importance of guarding 
against indiscriminate or mass surveillance and are clear about the need 
to ensure any surveillance is narrowly targeted only on legitimate aims. The 
International Principles, UN Draft Legal Instrument and African Declaration 
all agree prior authorisation for surveillance by a judge should test that 
any authorised surveillance is legal, necessary and proportionate; and 
that subject notification, transparency and oversight mechanisms must be 
defined in legislation. This relatively settled consensus on what constitutes 
good practice in surveillance law informed the framework for this study. We 
adopted nine core elements of these three documents as the basis of our 
analytical framework. We use the shorthand term ‘the Principles’ to refer to 
them in this review. The remainder of this section defines and details nine key 
principles. They are summarised visually in Figure 1.2.
A core principle is the requirement for prior authorisation of any surveillance 
by a competent judicial authority: a judge who has responsibility for 
assessing applications to conduct surveillance against a series of legal 
tests that are defined in the legislation, and which are designed to protect 
citizens’ constitutional right to privacy. A competent judicial authority is a 
judge with specific expertise in digital technologies and human rights who 
has been provided with the appropriate level of resources necessary to 
assess the volume of applications received from investigating agencies. 
The legality of each instance of surveillance is a key concern of the Principles. 
A judge should only be able to authorise surveillance as explicitly defined 
and allowed for in legislation. Only investigating agencies specifically 
named in the legislation can be granted authority by the judge. Surveillance 
legislation should state that any other surveillance is criminal, with the 
resulting evidence being inadmissible in court, and detail the legal penalties 
for illegitimate surveillance.
Critically, legislation must define in law what qualifies as a legitimate aim 
of surveillance (e.g. prevention of terrorism). The judge will need to test each 
surveillance application to determine whether the application addresses 
a legitimate aim of surveillance as defined in legislation. The precise 
parameters of ‘terrorism’, ‘national security’ and other legitimate aims of 
surveillance must be defined in law. For privacy rights to be adequately 
protected, any state surveillance must be narrowly targeted. To achieve 
this, it is necessary for a limited number of legitimate aims of surveillance 
to be specified in the legislation (and for all other surveillance to be ruled 
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illegitimate). Examples of legitimate aims could be national security, terrorism 
or serious crime. However, it is essential that any such categories are closely 
specified in legislation in order to enable consistency of application and 
to prevent abuse of powers. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR 2018b: 10) has argued that ‘Vague and overbroad justifications, 
such as unspecific references to ‘national security’ do not qualify as 
adequately clear laws’. The definition of what constitutes national security 
should be sufficiently precise such that it would be consistently interpreted in 
the same way by any judge. 
Assessing legitimate aims is only the first of a series of tests that must be 
made by the competent judicial authority. The judge must also determine 
whether there are sufficient grounds (i.e. whether there is a high probability 
that the subject of surveillance presents an imminent threat to a legitimate 
aim and that the proposed surveillance will produce evidence adequate to 
removing the threat).
The judge must also assess whether the proposed scope and time frame 
of surveillance are necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim. The 
judge must test whether the proposed surveillance is strictly necessary 
to obtain the information needed (i.e. all other methods having been 
exhausted or that this method is the least intrusive to privacy) and that it 
is proportionate in scope and duration to the legitimate aim (UN 2016). The 
person or premises to be surveilled should be named in the application and 
the surveillance must be limited to that subject.
To ensure that due process is possible for those who are subjected to 
surveillance, notification should be provided that their privacy was violated, 
at the earliest appropriate time, to make possible legal appeal, remedy or 
redress. Annual transparency reports should be made public, documenting 
the number of surveillance requests, grounds and authorisations, to enable 
public confidence in and accountability of the judicial process and public 
officials. 
The whole process should be overseen by an independent oversight body 
that is independent of the investigating agencies, judiciary and executive, 
and whose duties and power should be defined in law. The independent 
oversight body should have access to all applications and authorisations 
and must be adequately staffed and resourced to carry out its duties.
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5. Country report summaries 
The next section of this review provides two-page summaries of each of 
the six country reports that are included in full later in this publication. The 
intention here is only to provide an accessible visual summary of the detailed 
and fully referenced reports that follow this introductory synthesis.
22Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Egypt summary
The Egyptian government 
has made extensive use 
of emergency powers that 
evade the few protections 
that do exist. The lack of a 
single surveillance law, weak 
definitions regarding the 
legitimate aims of surveillance 
and protections, and the 
absence of safeguards, 
transparency or oversight 
mechanisms leave ample 
opportunity for abuse of 
surveillance powers. 
Despite constitutional guarantees of private 
communications, the protections provided by 
Egyptian domestic law are among the weakest of 
the countries in this study. There are few safeguards 
built into Egyptian law and offences such as 
offending ‘public morality’ are nowhere defined in 
law. There is no transparency or independent 
oversight mechanism. 
The large power imbalance 
between the state and organs 
of civil society makes it difficult 
to address existing impunity for 
state violation of privacy rights. 
Surveillance law and practice 
have not been challenged in 
court. As the Egyptian government 
continues to increase its surveillance 
technology capacity, there is a need 
to strengthen legal protections 
and practical mechanisms of 
recourse and remedy. 
Recommendations
• Incorporate the International Principles into a dedicated     
surveillance law.
• Create an independent oversight body and publish           
transparency reports. 
• Raise public awareness of privacy and surveillance issues and build 
the capacity of lawyers and civil society organisations to create a 
movement for change. 
• Use parliamentary oversight powers to review privacy/surveillance 
and propose changes.
• Use Universal Periodic Review and shadow reports to build pressure 
for reform.




law does not 
require prior court 
authorisation for 
surveillance. The Anti-
Terrorism Law gives 
the power to public 
prosecutors or ‘any 
other investigation 
authority’ to conduct 
surveillance.
Legality: use of 
imprecise terms, like 
national security, 
provides investigating 
authorities with wide 
scope for surveillance 
and few safeguards.  
Legitimate aim: 
Egyptian law considers 
national security, 
national emergencies, 
prevention of terrorism 
and cybercrimes to 
be legitimate aims 
of surveillance. What 
reasonable suspicion 
prior to authorising 
surveillance.
Necessity: Egyptian 
law does not require a 
test of necessity. 
Proportionality: there 
is no clarity in Egyptian 




is no right to subject 
notification in Egypt. 
Transparency:  there 
is no public reporting 
requirement.
Independent 
oversight: there is no 
independent oversight 
body in Egypt, 
making the state the 
sole judge, jury and 
regulator. 
constitutes ‘national 
security’ is very 
broadly defined as 
‘everything related to 
the independence, 
stability, and security 
of the homeland and 
anything related 
to the affairs of the 
Presidency, the Ministry 
of Defence and 
General Intelligence, 
and the Administrative 
Oversight Authority’.
Reasonable grounds: 
the Egyptian legal 
framework does not 
require any test for 
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Kenya summary
Privacy rights that are guaranteed in 
the constitution and domestic laws 
have been violated by state surveillance 
practices. As several court cases have 
shown, surveillance powers justified with 
reference to preventing terrorism can be 
used to enable mass surveillance of other 
groups. Kenya does not have a specific 
surveillance law as is the case in South 
Africa and Nigeria. Instead, a multiplicity 
of laws regulate surveillance, and it is 
not always clear which law applies. 
Kenya’s compulsory biometric citizen 
ID system, huduma namba, alongside 
mandatory mobile phone registration,  
combined with state monitoring of 
citizen’s internet, mobile and financial 
activity, provides the most comprehensive 
state surveillance infrastructure 
of the six countries studied.  
Kenya has a strong 
civil society, and 
independent media 
and courts. Strategic 
legislation has been 
used successfully to 
raise public awareness 
about privacy violations 
and surveillance 
practices and has led 
to legal reform. 
Recommendations
• Incorporate the International Principles into a single surveillance law.
• Initiate annual transparency reports of surveillance applications and 
authorisations. 
• Create an independent oversight body with sufficient resources.
• Raise public awareness about privacy rights and surveillance 
practices to mobilise political will to improve legislation and practice.




law requires prior 
authorisation of 
surveillance from 
a judge who must 
test applications 
against criteria of 
legality, necessity and 
proportionality.
Legality: a multiplicity 
of relevant laws create 
uncertainty about 
legal surveillance 
powers and although 
case law is clarifying, a 
single surveillance law 
would be beneficial. 
Legitimate aim: 
national security is the 
only legally defined 
legitimate aim for 
surveillance in Kenya; 
however, the definition 
of national security is 
very broad.
proportionality and it 
can be unclear which 
law is being relied 
upon. The absence 
of reporting or 
oversight mechanisms 
make it impossible 
to assess whether 
proportionality is 
being tested. A single 
surveillance law with 
defined mechanisms is 
needed.
Notification: there 
is no right to subject 
notification in Kenya.
Transparency: there 
is no requirement for 
public reporting in 
Kenya.
Independent 




there is no explicit 
requirement to show 
evidence that the 
proposed surveillance 
subject has or is about 
to threaten national 
security.
Necessity: applications 
to conduct surveillance 
must show necessity, 
but how necessity 
must be tested is not 
defined.
Proportionality: 
different laws pay 
varying attention to 
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Nigeria summary
These infringements have yet 
to be challenged in court. New 
investments are now being 
made in biometric ID, CCTV and 
licence plate surveillance. Civil 
rights organisations in Nigeria are 
concerned about use of illegitimate 
surveillance and are worried that 
mass surveillance is becoming 
normalised. The 2019 Lawful 
Interception of Communications 
Regulation (LICR) is the Nigerian 
law that most directly defines the 
surveillance powers of the state, 
but other powers are also provided 
in an array of other laws. 
Nigeria spends the most on surveillance 
technologies of any country included in 
this study, with reported totals in the order 
of hundreds of millions of dollars. Digital 
surveillance tools have been procured from 
Israel, Germany, the UK, US and China. There 
are multiple examples of state surveillance that 
are neither legal, necessary nor proportionate, 
including on journalists, peaceful activists and 
opposition politicians. 
There are clear opportunities 
to improve surveillance law in 
Nigeria by tightening up legal 
definitions and introducing 
notifications, transparency 
and independent oversight. 
If impunity for illegitimate 
surveillance is to end, there 
is a need to raise awareness 
among the public, media and 
civil society to bring about 
revision of the law and practice 
until all surveillance is narrowly 
targeted, legal and necessary 
to secure a legitimate aim.
Recommendations
• Incorporate all of the African Declaration and International Principles 
into a revised LICR that takes precedence over all preceding   
Nigerian law.
• Annual transparency reports should be made public. 
• An independent oversight body should be established. 
• Civil society and media should raise awareness about privacy rights 
and mobilise the necessary political to end impunity for violations of 
constitutional privacy rights.




law requires prior 
authorisation of 
surveillance by a 
judge, although 
exceptions apply in 
emergencies.
Legality: Nigerian 
law requires that any 
restriction to the right 
of privacy be defined 
in law. The LICR 
authorises only the 
Department of State 
Security, the Nigeria 
Police Force and the 
Office of the National 
Security Adviser to 
conduct surveillance 
yet other agencies are 
procuring surveillance 
technologies. 
Legitimate aim: the 
LICR specifies five 
legitimate aims of 
surveillance; however, 
what qualifies as 
national security. is 
not defined in law, 
without warrants and 
with impunity. 
Proportionality: 
the LICR requires a 
detailed description 
of the target and 
duration of proposed 
surveillance, but a test 
of proportionality is not 
included in the law. 
Notification: there is no 
requirement in Nigerian 
law for subject 
notification. 
Transparency: annual 
reports are made to 
the attorney general 
but not to the public, 
so it is not possible for 
citizens or legislators 
to know whether the 
legislation is working 
as intended.
Independent 
oversight: there is 
no requirement in 
Nigerian law for an 
independent oversight 
mechanism. 
providing scope for 
inconsistency or abuse 
of power
Reasonable grounds: 
in order to justify 
surveillance, Nigerian 
law requires a judge to 
test that ‘facts alleged 
in the application 
are reasonable and 
persuasive enough’ to 
constitute a threat to a 
legitimate aim.
Necessity: the LICR 
requires necessity to 
authorise surveillance, 
but Nigerian police 
often detain journalists 
and surveil the 
contents of their phone 
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Senegal summary
Senegal has made the second-
highest surveillance data requests 
of any country according to the 
transparency report of mobile 
telecommunications company 
Orange. The 2016 Intelligence 
Services Law documents the 
circumstances in which the 
state gives itself the power to 
violate privacy. This aligns with 
the recommendation of the 
International Principles that 
any surveillance that violates 
privacy rights must be legal, 
necessary and proportionate. 
Senegal enjoys a stable democracy and the right 
to privacy of communications is an inviolable 
constitutional right. National security concerns 
have been used to justify expanded surveillance 
powers. The state has made mobile phone 
registration mandatory and has purchased 
FinSpy mobile phone surveillance technology. 
There are opportunities to 
improve the legal framework for 
surveillance as there are presently 
no transparency reporting, 
independent oversight or subject 
notification mechanisms. There 
has been no documented 
legal case challenging state 
surveillance processes. This may 
be due in part to the secret nature 
of surveillance and the absence 
of any transparency reporting. 
The African Declaration and 
International Principles could 
help improve privacy safeguards 
and independent oversight.
Recommendations
• Public transparency reports and independent oversight would 
increase trust in the system.
• Key terms, such as national security, should be defined in law and 
anchored in human rights.
• Restrictions on encryption should be removed to protect the right to 
anonymity.
• Further research is necessary on the surveillance taking place and 
any impact on human rights.
• Public awareness about citizens’ privacy rights and surveillance help 
guard against overreach.




authorisation of an 
investigating judge is 
required to conduct 
surveillance under 




Law stipulates that 
intelligence agents 




the law defines a 
limited number of 




the Cybercrime Law 
allows surveillance for 




authorities are able to 
conduct surveillance 
surveillance must be 
proportionate to the 
seriousness of the 
threat. This assessment 
is carried out by the 
public prosecutor.
Notification: 
there is no right to 
subject notification 
in Senegalese 
surveillance law.  
Transparency: there is 
no legal requirement 
for public reporting of 
the number and type 





oversight: there is 
no independent 
oversight body to 
provide confidence 
that the law is being 
implemented as 
legislators intended 
and is consistent with 
constitutional rights. 
if there is presumption 
of a crime, but the law 









can only be adopted if 
it is the only means to 
access the information. 
There is insufficient 
clarity in law about 




Law states that 
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South Africa summary
South Africa has the 
advantage of a dedicated 
surveillance law. Implemented 
in the wake of 9/11 to 
enable surveillance to 
prevent terrorist threats, 
in practice the majority of 
surveillance authorisations 
are for a wide range of 
other crimes. South Africa 
does not face the scale of 
terrorist threats encountered 
elsewhere yet has among 
the most advanced 
surveillance capabilities.
South Africa has a clear surveillance law 
framework and sufficient civil society capacity to 
mount strategic litigation, resulting in the most 
tractable surveillance law framework of the six 
countries studied. The South African state has 
abused its surveillance powers but has been held 
accountable by civil society and the court has 
suspended the state’s surveillance powers. 
The state has been found guilty of 
using surveillance outside of the law. 
State surveillance powers have been 
used to monitor political opposition 
and business competitors. A 
challenge in the Constitutional Court 
found the state guilty of carrying 
out unlawful mass surveillance and 
foreign signal interception. Civil 
society has raised concerns about 
the rapid expansion of surveillance 
infrastructure including biometric 
registration, mandatory SIM 
registration, and CCTV surveillance.
Recommendations
• A genuinely independent oversight body is needed that is dedicated 
to surveillance.
• Legal precision of terms such as national security is needed to ensure 
consistent implementation.
• More work is needed to raise public awareness of privacy rights and 
surveillance practices.
• An urgent legal rights assessment is needed of facial recognition 
surveillance in South Africa.
• Further research is necessary on surveillance actors, tools, incidence 
and remedies.





is required. The 
constitutional 
court ruled in the 
amaBhungane 




to adequately test 





powers to authorise 
surveillance, after 
ruling that state 
surveillance practice 
went beyond what 
was permitted in law. 
Legitimate aim: 
legitimate aims include 
serious offences, 
public health or safety, 
national security or 
compelling national 
economic interests. 
These overly broad 
categories have been 




being practised in 




was no legal right to 
subject notification in 
RICA, but in 2021 the 
Constitutional Court 
ruled that notifications 
should be made to 
allow due process. 
Transparency: 
transparency 
reporting is required 
by the RICA judge 
to a parliamentary 
committee, but 
the level of detail is 
insufficient to fully 




oversight is provided 
by the Inspector-
General of Intelligence 
and a parliamentary 
committee, there is 
no oversight body 
that is independent 
of the RICA judge and 
state agencies, as 
recommended in the 
UN Draft Instrument.
Reasonable grounds: 
proof of reasonable 
grounds is required 
to the satisfaction 
of the judge, prior 
to authorisation of 
surveillance. However, 
the ability of the judge 
to adequately assess 
proof of reasonable 
grounds is currently 
compromised due to 
under-resourcing. 
Necessity: necessity 
is required. In the 
amaBhungane case 
the court ruled that 
the bulk surveillance 
carried out by the 
state exceeded that 
necessary to secure a 
legitimate aim. . 
Proportionality: 
proportionality is 
required. The same 
court ruled that the 
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Sudan summary
This is perhaps a legacy of a long 
period under oppressive rule. Prior 
to the 2018 revolution, Sudanese 
government surveillance targeted 
activists, lawyers and journalists by 
intercepting electronic messages 
between private citizens. Omar Al 
Bashir’s regime included a special 
unit called the ‘Cyber-Jihadists’ to 
spy on government critics, human 
rights activists, journalists and 
opposition parties. Sudan is known 
to use software company Hacking 
Team’s spyware for this purpose. 
In Sudan, the right to privacy is protected by the 
constitution, through international conventions and 
in domestic law. However, the legal safeguards and 
protections in Sudan’s surveillance law framework 
are among the worst of the countries studied. 
The new government continues 
to rely on foreign software to 
spy on citizens and has used 
the Covid-19 pandemic as an 
opportunity to introduce new 
surveillance technologies and 
limit people’s digital rights. 
There are many opportunities 
for the government to 
improve legislation and 
practice in line with the 
Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam (1990) and the 
African Declaration (2019). 
Recommendations
• Define the legitimate aims of surveillance in law.
• Require prior authorisation from an independent judge for all 
surveillance.
• Require judges to test requests for reasonable grounds, legality, 
necessity and proportionality.
• Raise public awareness of privacy rights and build civil society 
capacity to challenge law.
• Use human rights law as a basis for legal review and revision of 
legislation.
• Conduct research into the experiences of other countries to guide 
Sudanese practice.





laws require prior 
judicial authorisation 
for surveillance, the 
National Security Law 
gives national security 
officers the power to 
seize any information 
or communication 
data without judicial 
authority. 
Legality: surveillance 
should only be carried 
out as authorised in 
law, but Sudanese law 
lacks legal precision, 
providing opportunity 
for abuse of power.
Legitimate aim: the 
Cybercrimes Law 
does not specify the 
legitimate aims of 
surveillance. Laws refer 
to policing ‘moral and 
Proportionality: there 
is no legal requirement 
to show that proposed 
surveillance is 
proportionate to the 
perceived threat. 
Notification: there is no 
legal right to subject 
notification in Sudan.
Transparency: there is 
no legal requirement to 
publish transparency 





oversight: there is 
no independent 
surveillance oversight 
body in Sudan to 
provide confidence 




public order’, but these 
terms are nowhere 
defined in law, creating 
scope for abuse 
and inconsistency of 
application. 
Reasonable grounds: 
there is no legal 
requirement to show 
reasonable grounds 
prior to conducting 
surveillance in Sudan.
Necessity: there is no 
legal requirement to 
show that surveillance 
is necessary prior to 
authorisation in Sudan. 
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Figure 1.3 provides a visual summary of the provisions of surveillance law in 
each country studied. This table is derived from the more comprehensive 
analysis contained in each of the full country reports included in this 
publication. Each of the full country reports contains sections addressing a 
specific area of privacy rights and that country’s surveillance law framework.
Figure 1.3 Privacy Protections Provided 
in Surveillance Legislation
* Although Egyptian law provides some partial protections the Emergency Law in 
place since 2017 removes all of these protections
** South Africa’s RICA law provides most protections but parts of the law have been 
suspended by the constitutional court to add new protections
*** Although some protections are provided in Sudanese law the current National 
Securty law enables state agencies to override the protections
Provided in legislation
Partial provision
No provision in legislation
KEY
EG* KE NG SG SA** SD***
Competent judicial authority: a judge knowledgeable in digital 
technologies and human rights to assess and authorise requests to 
conduct surveillance from investigating agencies of the state.
Legality: surveillance carried out only within parameters and by 
agencies specified in the legislation. The legislation criminalises all other 
surveillance and specifies penalties.
Legitimate aim: law closely defines the only legitimate aims of 
surveillance e.g. prevention of terrorism or serious crime with a legal 
punishment of 10 or more years in jail.
Reasonable grounds: judge must test whether there is a high degree of 
threat and a high probability that surveillance will produce evidence that 
removes the threat to a legitimate aim. 
Necessary: judge must test whether surveillance is necessary to secure 
the evidence and that no other less invasive method is available to 
address legitimate aim.
Proportionality: judge must test whether proposed surveillance is limited 
in scope, and that the duration is in proportion to the evidence needed 
to remove the threat.
Notification: at the earliest appropriate time the subject of surveillance 
should be notified of the occurrence to provide opportunity for legal 
appeal and due process.
  
Transparency: annual transparency reports should publicise number of 
requests, grounds, and authorisations to enable public accountability of 
process and public officials. 
Independent oversight: public oversight mechanisms should be 
established to ensure transparency and accountability of surveillance 
practices.
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6. Findings
This section presents our main findings regarding the existing frameworks for 
African surveillance law when reviewed against the criteria contained in the 
Principles.
A positive finding is that the right to privacy is guaranteed in each 
country in three ways: in the constitution, in international conventions 
and in domestic laws. In all six countries, the fundamental human right to 
privacy of communication and correspondence is explicitly guaranteed in 
each country’s constitution. In all six cases, the country has also adopted 
international conventions that further protect privacy rights, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966) and the Declaration of Principles 
of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa (African 
Commission 2019). And in each case these constitutional and conventional 
rights to privacy are additionally guaranteed in domestic legislation – most 
often reaffirmed in several different laws. As the Nigeria and Egypt country 
reports illustrate, it is not uncommon for a country to be party to six or seven 
international conventions or declarations securing privacy rights for its 
citizens, in addition to making privacy rights explicit in the constitution and 
national laws (Oloyede this edited collection; Farahat this edited collection). 
Although African constitutions ‘guarantee’ or make ‘inviolable’ privacy rights, 
domestic laws create exceptions where state agencies can legally carry out 
surveillance.
Governments are using new domestic laws to award themselves increasing 
surveillance powers that violate privacy rights. A wide range of justifications 
are given to the public for needing these new powers, from the threat of 
terrorist attack to economic interests and protecting public morality. In Kenya 
alone, arguments deployed by the government to expand surveillance have 
included: national security, money-laundering, monitoring state officials, 
control of hate speech, public health, fake news, and protecting intellectual 
property rights (Mutung’u this edited collection). Playing the ‘national 
security’ card is often sufficient, as it trumps protecting privacy rights by 
framing the decision as a binary choice between the interests of all good 
citizens and those of a few suspected of serious crimes. However, evidence 
in this report demonstrates that surveillance powers obtained to narrowly 
target terrorists are used to spy on peaceful activists, journalists, business 
competitors, political rivals and governments. Civil society organisations 
are concerned that governments are building their capacity for mass 
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surveillance and normalising surveillance (Mutung’u this edited collection; 
Oloyede this edited collection).
Surveillance powers intended to narrowly target the most serious crimes are 
used widely. There is ample evidence of state surveillance powers being used 
to violate the privacy rights of citizens who have no links to terrorism and who 
present no conceivable threat to legitimate aims. The South Africa report 
provides evidence of state surveillance being used illegally for business 
surveillance, targeting journalists and civil society organisations (Mutung’u 
this edited collection). The Sudan report shows that state surveillance 
has been used to target peaceful critics of the government, lawyers, and 
journalists (Farahat this edited collection). In Kenya, civil society organisations 
have criticised the government for extra-legal surveillance of human rights 
defenders, minors and people living with HIV (Mutung’u this edited collection). 
According to the transparency report of mobile telecommunications 
company Orange, Senegal made the second-highest number of surveillance 
requests of any country using their service (Oloyede this edited collection).
In all six countries studied, there is insufficient clarity about what 
surveillance is legal. Legal imprecision is a significant problem in existing 
surveillance law frameworks, including as explained in the Egypt country 
report (Farahat this edited collection). What is considered to be a matter 
of national security or national interest is insufficiently well defined in law, 
making it impossible to apply consistently, providing scope for abuse of 
power and making legal challenges practically impossible. This lack of clear 
definition may be by design or omission, but in either case greater legal 
precision is in the interests of privacy rights. In cases such as Sudan (Farahat 
this edited collection) it is the absence of clarity about what qualifies as 
the legitimate aims of surveillance that is the root of the problem. In other 
countries, such as South Africa, the absence of clear legal definitions has 
created opportunities for inconsistency of application or abuse of powers 
(Mutung’u this edited collection). In some countries, such as Kenya and 
Senegal, the lack of legal clarity is due to confusion caused by a multiplicity 
of laws prescribing surveillance powers (Mutung’u this edited collection; 
Oloyede this edited collection). There are opportunities to improve the 
definition of the legitimate aims of surveillance in all of the countries included 
in this study.
In all six countries studied, impunity exists for those carrying out illegal 
surveillance. Evidence was found of surveillance outside of that permitted 
in law; however, no evidence was found of any prosecutions or disciplinary 
action taken against investigating agencies acting illegally. Surveillance 
should only occur as prescribed in legislation. All other surveillance is by 
definition illegitimate and should incur penalties that should be detailed in 
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legislation. Legal clarity about (il)legitimate surveillance is essential to foster 
public understanding, enable consistent application and avoid abuse of 
powers. Surveillance legislation needs to be clear about which agencies 
can conduct surveillance; who can judge requests to conduct surveillance; 
what legal tests a judge must apply to requests; and what legal penalties 
apply for illegitimate surveillance. The International Principles, UN Draft Legal 
Instrument and African Declaration are useful resources for improving legal 
precision regarding surveillance.
The tests of necessity and proportionality are insufficient in all six countries. 
It is widely accepted in international law that any limitation of fundamental 
human rights must be ‘legal, necessary and proportionate’. However, all of 
the country reports draw attention to the need to either provide clearer 
definition of the terms necessity and proportionality or the mechanisms by 
which they are assessed. The legislation in Egypt and Sudan does not require 
any tests of necessity or proportionality (Farahat this edited collection). In 
Senegal and Nigeria, the tests are required but the testing mechanisms 
are insufficiently detailed (Oloyede this edited collection). In Kenya and 
South Africa, where the law is clear, evidence exists that surveillance has 
taken place in cases where it was neither necessary nor proportionate 
(Mutung’u this edited collection). The African Declaration is a useful resource 
for definitions of necessity and proportionality (African Commission 2019) 
and the International Principles and UN Draft Legal Instrument are helpful 
regarding assessment mechanisms (EFF 2014; UNHCHR 2018a). 
Additional safeguards, transparency and independent oversight are 
required in all six countries. Recommendations from the six country reports 
focus on three clear gaps in existing frameworks: judicial tests of surveillance 
applications, transparency reporting and independent oversight. The 
most important safeguarding mechanism is a judge who is technically 
competent and sufficiently well-resourced to assess all surveillance requests 
against legitimate aims, reasonable grounds, legality, necessity and 
proportionality. All governments (and mobile and internet service providers) 
should also publish annual transparency reports of surveillance requests 
and authorisations. The third measure is the establishment of a dedicated 
independent oversight body to improve public accountability and boost 
confidence that the law is being consistently applied to protect national 
interests rather than private economic or partisan political interests. . 
South Africa has the best safeguards of the countries studied, although 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the authorising judge had insufficient 
resources to adequately assess the very high volume of surveillance 
applications received. The Court also found that the level of detail contained 
in the transparency reports was insufficient to enable effective oversight. 
38Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
In all six countries studied, existing surveillance legislation and practice 
fall short of the Principles detailed in the African Declaration, UN Draft 
Legal Instrument and International Principles. There is an urgent need to 
improve privacy protections and end impunity for illegitimate surveillance. 
The Principles provide a clear actionable basis to enable narrowly targeted 
surveillance within a framework that provides appropriate protections for 
privacy rights. The use of the International Principles avoids centring practice 
from the global North and instead relies on widely supported principles that 
reflect human right conventions that already form part of African countries’ 
existing constitutional and legal frameworks.
There appears to be an advantage in having a single surveillance law. In the 
Senegal and Kenya country reports, it was noted that confusion is caused 
by a multitude of different laws that provide surveillance powers (Oloyede 
this edited collection; Mutung’u this edited collection). The result is that it 
may not always be clear from which piece of legislation an investigating 
authority derives its authority. In Nigeria, it is not yet clear whether the new 
LICR will clarify this situation (LICR 2019). Where there is a single piece of 
legislation that supersedes prior legislation and provides legal precision, the 
opportunity for inconsistency of application or abuse of powers is reduced. In 
South Africa, RICA is not perfect but having a dedicated piece of legislation 
has provided a central focus for efforts to establish the balance between 
privacy rights and legal surveillance, including an unambiguous target 
for efforts to reform and improve the law over time (Mutung’u this edited 
collection).
Existing surveillance law is failing to protect privacy in all six countries. 
Despite good privacy protection from national constitutions, international 
conventions and in national laws, in all of the countries studied surveillance 
is expanding and privacy rights are being eroded. States are rapidly 
expanding investments in surveillance technologies and enacting new laws 
that provide them with new surveillance powers. The capacity for expanding 
surveillance is being built both in countries with significant national security 
threats and in countries where there are none. South Africa does not 
have national security threats in the way that Kenya has, but it has been 
conducting bulk surveillance in ways that its courts ruled were not legal, 
necessary or proportionate (Mutung’u this edited collection). 
Strategic litigation can improve surveillance law and practice in some 
African countries. The reports from South Africa and Kenya have shown that 
legal challenges can be fruitful in raising public awareness and securing 
reforms, partly due to the strong constitutional protection of privacy rights 
in those countries (Mutung’u this edited collection). Although surveillance 
law or practice have not yet been challenged in the other countries studied, 
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the report authors note that constitutional courts have proven fruitful in 
other areas and that parliamentary committees and review processes offer 
additional options to leverage privacy guaranteed by national constitutions, 
international conventions and national law (Farahat this edited collection). 
However, legislative reform alone is insufficient to deliver privacy rights. 
The country reports provide ample evidence that governments conduct 
illegitimate surveillance outside of what is allowed for in law. This has been 
evidenced in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in Nigeria and Kenya, by the 
Snowden revelations about South Africa and most recently by investigations 
of states using NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware to spy on peaceful activists, 
journalists and political opponents (Ekdale and Tully 2020; Snowden 2015; 
Amnesty 2021). 
The evidence is that governments are circumventing the law, violating 
citizens’ rights and conducting illegitimate surveillance. The power 
imbalance between citizens and the state is a factor in citizens’ ability to 
hold governments accountable to the law. South Africa’s strong civil society, 
independent courts and media freedoms make the legal framework for 
surveillance more tractable than in the other countries studied. This is 
evidenced in the recent legal challenge that resulted in the suspension of 
surveillance powers in order to reform them (Mutung’u this edited collection). 
Improving the surveillance law framework requires mobilising the political 
will for reform. The framework for surveillance law appears to be more open 
to challenge where civil society actors have the ability to hold governments 
accountable to their commitments to protect privacy rights that are 
enshrined in constitutional, international and domestic laws. Sufficient 
guidance already exists on how to draft excellent surveillance laws (EFF 2014; 
UNHCHR 2018a; African Commission 2019). What is lacking in many countries 
is the political will for legislative reform in this direction and capacity in civil 
society to hold governments accountable to the spirit and letter of the 
law. Like the other countries in this study, South Africa’s surveillance law 
is imperfect; its government has been conducting illegal surveillance on 
citizens, and it is increasing its legal and technological capacity to further 
expand surveillance. However, South Africa, as well as Kenya, have sufficient 
capacity in civil society to identify problems and work in collaboration with 
constitutional lawyers and journalists to press successfully for reform of 
surveillance legislation and practice. 
It may be that strategic litigation to challenge the law and its application 
will prove useful in raising awareness and creating legal precision. The 
South Africa country report (Mutung’u this edited collection) provides an 
example of legal challenges being used to produce court rulings that 
raised public awareness, clarified the law and introduced new privacy 
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safeguards. The Kenya country report (Mutung’u this edited collection) 
illustrates how internet or mobile service providers can challenge in court 
government requirements to store customers’ communication records and 
make them available to security agencies. It can be argued in court that 
any bulk interception contravenes constitutional guarantees of privacy 
of communications as well as the ‘necessary and proportionate’ tests 
derived from international law. In these cases strategic litigation has gained 
substantial media coverage, raised public awareness and strengthened 
the capacity of civil society to hold governments accountable in law. The 
situation is arguably more tractable in South Africa and Kenya than other 
countries, but the country report from Egypt (Farahat this edited collection) 
argues that precedents in that country suggest this avenue may also be 
possible in other countries.
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7. Conclusion
This research provides the first comparative analysis of African legal 
surveillance frameworks. It set out to understand what legal provisions 
currently exist to protect privacy and enable targeted surveillance in six 
African countries: Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Sudan. 
The objective was to understand existing strengths, identify opportunities 
for improvement and produce actionable recommendations. We used nine 
core elements from existing international guidance on surveillance law as 
a framework for our analysis. This section draws together some conclusions 
before presenting recommendations for policy, practice and further research.
This review found that surveillance practice is eroding privacy rights due to 
six factors:
1. The introduction of new laws that expand state surveillance powers.
2. Lack of legal precision and privacy safeguards in existing surveillance 
legislation.
3. Increased supply of new surveillance technologies that enable 
illegitimate surveillance.
4. State agencies regularly conducting surveillance outside of what is 
permitted in law.
5. Impunity for those committing illegitimate acts of surveillance.
6. Insufficient capacity in civil society to hold the state fully accountable 
in law.
The report argues that citizens have good reason to value privacy. 
The right to communicate free from state surveillance is an intrinsically 
valuable freedom. It also has instrumental value for democracy. People 
who experience repression may need to communicate in private to build 
movement for change. Surveillance violates privacy rights. Its covert nature 
and the large power imbalance between states and citizens make it 
important to provide strong privacy protections in surveillance laws. These 
protections include prior authorisation by a competent judicial authority 
which should assess surveillance applications against tests for legality, 
legitimate aims, reasonable grounds, necessity and proportionality. 
Surveillance law should also require safeguards including subject notification, 
transparency reporting and independent oversight. 
Privacy rights are well established legally but increasingly violated by state 
surveillance. In all six countries the right to private communication is explicitly 
guaranteed in the national constitution, international conventions, and 
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domestic laws. However, these privacy rights are increasingly being violated 
by a rapid expansion of state surveillance practices. The country reports 
noted increased state investments in mobile spyware, artificial intelligence-
based internet surveillance, surveillance cameras, licence plate recognition 
and facial recognition; the introduction of compulsory biometric ID systems 
and mandatory mobile SIM card registration laws; and the compulsory 
retention of data by mobile, internet and banking companies for access by 
state security agencies. The country reports provide evidence that much 
of this increased surveillance is illegitimate in its aims and exceeds what 
is legal, necessary and proportionate. There is insufficient documentation 
about which companies from the global North, are providing which states 
in the global South, with which surveillance technologies, and with what 
outcomes. This report is one of the first attempts to document this expansion 
of surveillance technologies across Africa, but is modest in its scope. Further 
research is needed if efforts to mitigate and curtail illegitimate surveillance 
are to be well targeted and successful. 
States are awarding themselves ever-greater surveillance powers that 
violate privacy rights. In every country we studied, the state used threats 
to national security to justify expansion of its surveillance powers. National 
security was often a Trojan horse to establish surveillance powers which were 
then deployed for other purposes. Each of the six country reports begins 
by reflecting on the reasons given by African governments for awarding 
themselves new powers of surveillance. The reasons provided to the public 
and lawmakers were often not consistent with the application of the powers 
once attained. All governments used terrorism or the need to provide 
national security as a key motive for extending state surveillance powers. This 
was the case both in countries that had clear terrorist threats to national 
security and in countries that had none. The six country reports provide 
evidence that the application of surveillance powers once obtained was not 
confined to legitimate national security interests but in practice was used to 
further partisan political and private business interests, as well as for mass 
surveillance and general policing. These are illegitimate aims of surveillance 
and contravene the letter and spirit of human rights law.
State violation of citizens’ privacy involves both legal and illegal 
surveillance practices. States are passing new laws to award themselves 
increased surveillance powers. They argue that these new surveillance 
powers are necessary to protect citizens from terrorist threats and to secure 
national security and national interests. The absence of a legal definition 
of these legal aims of surveillance has led to the surveillance of many 
journalists, opposition politicians and peaceful activists in ways that remove 
freedoms and threaten democracy and social justice. The study shows that 
the state is expanding its surveillance capabilities both in countries such 
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as Kenya, which have a genuine terrorist threat, and South Africa, where 
there is no comparable threat. The study also shows that once surveillance 
powers exist, they are most often used on non-terrorist subjects including 
spying on political opponents and business rivals. Civil society organisations 
are worried that, rather than restricting itself to narrowly targeted legitimate 
surveillance, states are increasingly conducting mass surveillance and 
illegitimate surveillance of those who oppose their private or partisan 
interests. There is a concern that surveillance creep is taking place, that mass 
surveillance is becoming normalised and privacy rights eroded, and that 
illegitimate surveillance is being conducted with impunity. 
There are clear opportunities to improve existing surveillance law 
frameworks in all six countries. A single, dedicated surveillance law is 
preferable to multiple laws defining surveillance powers. Laws in all six 
countries can be improved by incorporating the International Principles. 
Specific attention needs to be spent closely defining legitimate aims 
and prior authorisation tests. Safeguards, transparency reporting and 
independent oversight needs strengthening in all six countries. The African 
Declaration, UN Draft Legal Instrument and International Principles are 
helpful in these regards.
Legislation alone is insufficient. States conduct illegitimate surveillance in 
both democratic and authoritarian countries. Holding states accountable 
to the law and the ability to exercise, defend and expand fundamental 
rights require open civic space and an independent civil society, media 
and judiciary. Political will must also be mobilised if legal reform and state 
accountability to the law are to be achieved. The pathways to reform will be 
very different in different countries. Where civic space exists, civil society is 
relatively strong and courts and media independent, the situation may prove 
to be more tractable for reform of laws and surveillance practices. Where 
civic space is restricted or closed, civil society relatively weak, and courts 
and media are partisan, the situation may seem intractable and alternative 
approaches will be necessary that are cognisant of safeguarding issues. 
Contextual situational analyses will be necessary to define appropriate 
action in each country. 
It is necessary to build public awareness about privacy rights and 
surveillance practices and to build civil society capacity to bring about 
change. This will require coordinated activity involving citizens, lawyers, 
journalists, activists, researchers and policymakers. Different programmes 
of action will be appropriate in different countries. The pathways to change 
are likely to be different in Egypt and Sudan when compared to Kenya and 
South Africa due to substantially different political contexts, civic space 
and levels of independence in the media, judiciary and civil society. Applied 
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research with activists, journalists and lawyers should include situational and 
stakeholder analyses to inform theories of change and action. 
Strategic litigation may be one effective way to improve legislation and 
build capacity. Challenging the legality of surveillance law in Kenya and 
South Africa in the constitutional courts has been a productive way of raising 
public awareness, expanding citizen engagement and building civil society 
capacity to mobilise movement for change. The country report author 
for Egypt and Sudan suggested this may be productive, despite the less 
tractable situation. Parliamentary committees, judicial review processes and 
other established mechanisms may also be pathways to change. 
There is a danger that in the absence of countervailing pressure from 
civil society, political, economic and technological factors will lead to 
surveillance-creep, the normalisation of mass surveillance and a descent 
into digital authoritarianism. This is not inevitable. It is possible to balance 
the need for narrowly targeted surveillance of the most serious crimes with 
the privacy rights of citizens. The UN General Assembly urges states:
while countering terrorism… to safeguard the right to privacy in accordance 
with international law, in particular international human rights law, and 
to take measures to ensure that interferences with or restrictions on that 
right are not arbitrary, are adequately regulated by law and are subject 
to effective oversight and appropriate redress, including through judicial 
review or other means. 
(UN 2017)
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Recommendations
Arising from this analysis of the surveillance law frameworks in six African 
countries, the following recommendations emerge for policy, practice and 
further research:
• Governments should draft a single, dedicated surveillance law that 
supersedes previous legislation, reasserts privacy rights and closely 
defines the legitimate aims of surveillance. 
 
• Governments should incorporate the International Principles into 
surveillance law. 
• Governments should end impunity for illegal surveillance by defining 
in law the penalties for illegitimate surveillance and enforce them 
consistently. 
• The supply of surveillance technologies to countries that violate 
privacy rights should be ended. 
• Civil society organisations should generate public awareness about 
privacy rights and surveillance practices and hold state and non-state 
actors accountable to the law.  
• Civil society organisations should create pressure to mobilise the 
political will for legal reform by forging a coalition of human rights 
activists, journalists, policymakers, technologists and researchers.  
• Further research is necessary to provide guidance on what has (not) 
worked in practice to restrict illegitimate surveillance and improve 
privacy protections.  
• Further research is necessary to map which companies are supplying 
which surveillance technologies to which states and with what effects 
in order that efforts to mitigate and curtail illegitimate surveillance are 
well targeted and successful. 
• Further research is necessary to analyse the local drivers, stakeholders 
and practices of surveillance to plot potential pathways to reform in 
each country.
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Egypt Country Report
Introduction
Surveillance affects many human rights, including the right to freedom of 
expression, right to assembly, right to information and communication, and 
right to privacy. In Egypt, surveillance practices were used before 2011 under 
the regime of Hosni Mubarak to monitor terrorist activities. Following the key 
role that social media played during the 2011 revolution and later protests, 
the regime took specific measures to control access to the internet and 
target activists with surveillance. Since 2011, different Egyptian regimes have 
used various technical means to surveil activists and online content. They 
have used legislation to ban websites, obtain personal data, abuse citizens’ 
right to privacy and criminalise the right to freedom of expression using 
accusations of fake news. 
Although Egypt is party to a number of international conventions protecting 
citizens’ right to privacy, several state agencies are exempt from legislation 
and there is evidence that the government regularly violates citizens’ right 
to privacy. According to Paradigm Initiative (2019: 15): ‘In 2019, a series of 
sophisticated cyber-attacks targeting the nation’s journalists, academics, 
lawyers, opposition politicians and human rights activists [took place]’. The 
report added that since that time ‘the surveillance activity of government 
has only deepened and not ceased. A number of the targets of surveillance 
were then arrested by Egyptian authorities’ (ibid.). These surveillance 
practices and newly adopted legislation led to the closing of civic space in 
Egypt and abuse of the right to privacy and digital rights (Farahat 2020a).
This report reviews the Egyptian legal framework regulating surveillance 
practices and examines its conformity with international standards, 
particularly the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights 
to Communications Surveillance (EFF 2014). It makes this assessment by 
answering a series of questions that reflect on surveillance practices in the 
Egyptian context. The report will first outline the content of existing national 
legislation and then measure it against relevant international comparators. 
The report pays particular attention to the parameters within which 
surveillance is permitted in law and to the legal safeguards detailed in the 
legislation, before concluding with a number of recommendations. 
Communications surveillance has been defined in various ways. In the 
International Principles, the term refers to ‘the monitoring, intercepting, 
collecting, obtaining, analysing, using, preserving, retaining, interfering with, 
accessing or similar actions taken with regard to information that includes, 
reflects, arises from or is about a person’s communications in the past, 
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present, or future’. According to article 2(1) of the United Nations (UN) Draft 
Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy (2018):1
surveillance is any monitoring, collecting, observing or listening 
by a state or on its behalf or on its orders of persons, their 
movements, their conversations or their other activities or 
communications including metadata and/or the recording 
of the monitoring, observation and listening activities. 
Both definitions refer to the broad definition of surveillance, which includes all 
practices that constitute surveillance whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, 
this section of the report will address all related legislation that enables or 
limits surveillance practices, whether directly or indirectly. 
The remainder of this report takes the form of answers to 12 questions.
1 This draft text for a Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy is the 
result of meetings and exchanges between the MAPPING project and several categories 
of stakeholders shaping the development and use of digital technologies. These include 
leading global technology companies, experts with experience of working within civil 
society, law enforcement, intelligence services, academics and other members of the multi-
stakeholder community shaping the Internet and the transition to the digital age.
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1. What reasons does the 
Egyptian government use 
to justify surveillance?
According to principle 1 of the International Principles (legality): 
Any limitation to human rights must be prescribed by law. The State must 
not adopt or implement a measure that interferes with these rights in the 
absence of an existing publicly available legislative act, which meets a 
standard of clarity and precision that is sufficient to ensure that individuals 
have advance notice of and can foresee its application.  
(EFF 2014)
Citizens’ right to privacy is protected in Egyptian law. However, state 
agencies have been given permission to violate this right in specific 
circumstances. Reasons the government argues justify breaching privacy 
and carrying out surveillance include national security, states of emergency, 
terrorism and cybercrime. These are referred to as ‘legitimate aims’ in the 
language of the International Principles.
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2. Which international 
conventions protecting privacy 
has Egypt adopted?
The 2014 Constitution of Egypt (art. 151) states that, ‘Egypt is obliged by all 
international human rights conventions that it has ratified, and they have the 
same power as the law once published’ [author’s translation]. 
International human rights conventions
In the context of privacy, Egypt is party to several international human 
rights instruments that provide the right to privacy, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 and International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966. Egypt is also a party to the African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1980 and Arab Convention of 
Anti-information Technology Crimes (Cybercrimes) 2010.
Table 1.1 Egypt’s ratification status
Instruments of the International Labour Organization Date of signature Date of ratification
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 04 August 1967 (optional 
protocol not signed)
14 January 1982
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 04 August 1967 (optional 
protocol not signed)
14 January 1982
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women
16 July 1980 18 September 1981
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 05 February 1990 06 July 1990
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 16 November 1981 20 March 1984
Arab Charter on Human Rights 2018
Arab Convention of Anti-information 
Technology Crimes (Cybercrimes) 2010
8 October 2014
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 05 August 1990
Source: Adapted from University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library2
2  http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-egypt.html
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in Egypt?
It is not only the legality principle that the state should adhere to; 
surveillance should also have a legitimate aim. According to principle 2 of the 
International Principles: 
Laws should only permit Communications Surveillance by specified 
State authorities to achieve a legitimate aim that corresponds to a 
predominantly important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic 
society. Any measure must not be applied in a manner that discriminates 
on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
(EFF 2014)
Not only do the key international conventions to which Egypt is party prohibit 
surveillance and protect the right to privacy, but the Egyptian constitution 
also emphasises the same rights and obligations. However, domestic laws 
do not align with these international and constitutional obligations, as is 
discussed later in this report.
a) 2014 Constitution of Egypt
Privacy of communication is constitutionally guaranteed for all Egyptian 
citizens. Article 57 of the constitution stipulates that: 
Telegraph, postal, and electronic correspondence, telephone calls, 
and other forms of communication are inviolable, their confidentiality is 
guaranteed, and they may only be confiscated, examined or monitored 
by causal judicial order, for a limited period, and in cases specified by the 
law; the state shall protect the rights of citizens to use all forms of public 
means of communication, which may not be arbitrarily disrupted, stopped 
or withheld from citizens, as regulated by the law. 
(Arab Republic of Egypt 2014 [author’s translation])
According to article 71 of the constitution: ‘it is prohibited to censor, 
confiscate, suspend or shut down Egyptian newspapers and media in any 
way. In exceptional circumstances, they may be subject to limited censorship 
in times of war or general mobilization’ (ibid.). Despite these constitutional 
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guarantees some Egyptian laws provide a legal basis for surveillance in 
certain circumstances. 
Egypt has domestic legislation that provides the legal basis for surveillance 
such as Emergency Law no. 162 (1958), Telecommunications Regulation Law 
no. 10 (2003), Anti-Terrorism Law no. 94 (2015), Anti-Cyber and Information 
Technology Crimes (Cybercrime Law) no. 175 (2018) and Personal Data 
Protection Law no. 151 (2020).
b) Emergency Law no. 162 (1958)
The Emergency Law is one of the legal tools that permits surveillance in the 
context of a declared emergency. This law is designed to be used only in a 
state of emergency, which by its nature is temporary, exceptional and for 
a limited time. However, in Egypt states of emergency have been used on 
a regular basis and, having been declared, are frequently extended (often 
multiple times). One is in place at the time of writing this report. Article 3(2) 
of the Emergency Law stipulates that, ‘the President has a right to order 
surveillance of all messages, whatever their type, and to monitor all means of 
expression.’ Although the constitutionality of article 3 has been challenged 
before the Constitutional Court (case no. 17/15/2013), the court ruled that 
searching physical spaces was unconstitutional but made no ruling on digital 
surveillance.
c) Telecommunications Regulation Law no. 10 (2003)
Article 64(1) of the law prohibits using devices to encrypt communication 
without permission from security agencies. Article 64(2) stipulates that service 
providers should collect accurate information and data about service users. 
Article 67 gives the competent authority power to control all communication 
services. Prevention of encrypted communication violates citizen’s right to 
privacy and to anonymity.
d) Anti-Terrorism Law no. 94 (2015)
Without clarifying the grounds that justify surveillance, article 46 of the 
law authorises public prosecutors or ‘any other investigating authority’ 
in the case of terrorist crime, upon a justifiable order to surveil, to record 
conversations and messages; and to record and photograph what happens 
in private places or via websites for a period of not more than 30 days. The 
surveillance order is renewable for another period or periods. This means that 
the surveillance order could be renewed indefinitely, particularly as the law 
does not identify safeguards for renewing the surveillance order. 
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e) Cybercrime Law no. 175 (2018)
The law enables state surveillance by requiring all phone and internet service 
providers to record and store all communications and metadata and to 
make them available to state agencies. Article 2/first/(1) of the law states 
that service providers should retain and store information system records for 
a period of 180 continuous days. The retained information should include: 
data that can identify service users; and data relating to the contents of 
the information system used. Article 2(2) adds that service providers should 
maintain the confidentiality of retained and stored data, including: users’ 
personal data; information relating to the websites and private accounts 
they navigate and log into; and persons and destinations they communicate 
with.
Article 6 gives the power to the investigating authority to issue a decision 
allowing surveillance and access to information. Although individuals have 
the right to challenge the surveillance order before a court (art. 6(2)), the 
order can be issued without obtaining prior court authorisation. This means 
investigating authorities are able to access data possessed by internet 
service providers relating to all user activities, including phone calls, text 
messages, websites navigated, and applications used on smartphones and 
computers. 
In a different context, article 25 criminalises breaches of the ‘principles and 
values of Egyptian families’, without providing a legal definition of those 
principles and values. As a result, in July 2020 several Egyptian women were 
arrested on charges related to this article, now known as the ‘TikTok girls’ 
case (Columbia University n.d.).
f) Personal Data Protection Law no. 151 (2020) 
The UN Human Rights Committee in its general comment no. 16 on article 17 
of the ICCPR states that: 
integrity and confidentiality of correspondence should be guaranteed de 
jure and de facto. Correspondence should be delivered to the addressee 
without interception and without being opened or otherwise read. 
Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, 
telegraphic and other forms of communication, wire-tapping and 
recording of conversations should be prohibited. 
(UNHRC 1988)
Article 3 of the Egyptian Personal  Data Protection Law stipulates that ‘the 
law will not apply to the personal data in the possession of national security 
bodies’. Article 1 identifies the national security bodies as: ‘The Presidency of 
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the Republic, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence 
Service and the Administrative Oversight Authority’. This means that 
national security bodies are able to possess all personal data without legal 
justification. 
Although, the legislation’s claimed purpose is to protect rights, in practice the 
Egyptian legal framework has been the strongest tool used to abuse digital 
rights during the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic (Farahat 2020b).
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4. How does Egyptian surveillance 
law compare with that 
in Africa/US/EU/UK?
The previous sections give an overview of existing national laws regulating 
surveillance practices, highlighting the key international conventions that 
Egypt is part of and has used to prohibit communications surveillance. This 
section uses the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa as a means to compare Egyptian law against 
an ideal rights-based approach to surveillance practice.
Principle 40 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa states that: 
Everyone has the right to privacy, including the confidentiality of their 
communications and the protection of their personal information and 
Everyone has the right to communicate anonymously or use pseudonyms 
on the internet and to secure the confidentiality of their communications 
and personal information from access by third parties through the aid of 
digital technologies.  
(African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2019)
The Egyptian constitution guarantees the inviolability of private 
communication and prohibits surveillance (art. 57 and art. 71). However, 
article 6 of the Cybercrime Law as well as article 3(2) of the Emergency Law 
authorise the state to breach the right to privacy and enable it to practise 
surveillance under legal cover. 
In addition, principle 4(1) of the African Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information in Africa adds that: 
States shall only engage in targeted communication surveillance that is 
authorized by law, that conforms with international human rights law and 
standards and above-mentioned declaration, and that is premised on 
specific and reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been or is being 
carried out or for any other legitimate aim.  
(ibid.) 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian legal framework does not require any test 
for reasonable suspicion prior to authorising surveillance targeting 
communications. Egyptian laws enumerate the circumstances in which 
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authorities are allowed to target communications. Moreover, article 67 of 
the Telecommunications Law gives the competent authority the right to 
control all communications services. According to a report by the Association 
for Freedom of Thought and Expression (2020): ‘[mobile telecoms operator 
Orange Egypt] said on its website that it “has the right to disclose all or some 
of the data and information of its customers if this is in implementation of 
the law or a decision issued by a competent judicial authority or any of the 
national security agencies”’. 
In the context of principle 42 of the declaration (‘Legal framework for the 
protection of personal information’), Egypt has adopted a legal framework 
for data protection. Although the law attempts to align with international 
standards, especially the European Union (EU)’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), the law contains some provisions that contradict the 
right to privacy, such as article 3, which gives security agencies the right to 
access personal information without specific restriction. Although Egypt has 
adopted legislation that is apparently in line with international standards, 
on closer inspection these pieces of legislation have many legal gaps, as 
discussed in section 9 of this report.
The International Principles are an additional point of comparison for 
Egyptian surveillance law. The International Principles were cooperatively 
drafted by more than 40 international privacy and security experts at a 
meeting in Brussels in October 2012 and officially launched at the UN Human 
Rights Council in Geneva in September 2013 (EFF 2014).
When assessing Egyptian laws against the 13 International Principles, it is 
clear that Egyptian legislation falls short in a number of regards. Gaps exist 
particularly regarding the principle of legality, which refers to the fact that 
any surveillance practices should be as prescribed in legislation. Although 
surveillance takes place according to law, ambiguous provisions and the 
exemption of some security agencies from the law’s applicability make 
surveillance practices in Egypt illegal. Moreover, Egyptian laws do not align 
with the principles of necessity and legitimate aim, which refer to the fact 
that surveillance should have to achieve a legitimate aim (such as preventing 
terrorist attacks). It is important the legislation defines clearly what are 
considered to be legitimate aims. The issue of proportionality is also central 
to the principles. This requires the authorities to weigh the benefit sought 
from surveillance against the violation of privacy rights. The Emergency 
Law exempts security agencies from the applicability of the principle of 
proportionality, and it constitutes the root of all abuses of human rights in 
Egypt according to Hassanin (2014), who argues that: ‘The emergency law 
seems to be diametrically opposed to the [International Principles]’.
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According to the authors of the International Principles (EFF 2014), ‘States 
should enact legislation criminalizing illegal Communications Surveillance by 
public or private actors. The law should provide sufficient and significant civil 
and criminal penalties’. In addition: ‘States should also enact laws providing 
that, after material obtained through Communications Surveillance has 
been used for the purpose for which information was given, the material must 
not be retained, but instead be destroyed or returned to those affected.’ 
This principle reflects that: 
the duty of governments to deter unlawful surveillance by way of criminal 
and civil sanctions reflects the requirements of international human rights 
law to protect individuals from breaches of their privacy, not only by the 
state but also by private individuals.  
(ibid.)
According to article 36 of the Personal Data Protection Law: 
the controller and possessor shall be punished with a fine of not 
less 100,000 Egyptian pounds3 and not more than 2m Egyptian 
pounds,4 [and] anyone who collects, processes, discloses, or 
circulates any personal data which is electronically processed in 
non-permissioned cases or without consent of data subject. 
According to the same article: 
the punishment will be jail for not less six months and a fine of not less 
than 200,000 Egyptian pounds5 and not more than 2m Egyptian pounds 
or one of these punishments if the purpose was not for material or moral 
benefit or for the purpose of exposing the data subject to harm and risk. 
Article 41 of the same law stipulates that the: 
processor, controller and possessor shall be punished with jail for 
no less three months and a fine of not less than 500,000 Egyptian 
pounds6 and not more than 5m Egyptian pounds7 or one of these 
punishments, for collecting, processing, disclosing, circulating, 
storing and maintaining any sensitive personal data in non-
permissioned cases or without consent of the data subject.
3  c.US$6,400.
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5. How does Egyptian surveillance 
law compare with the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument?
As addressed in previous sections, the principles of legality, legitimate 
aim, proportionality and transparency are key principles that ensure the 
elimination of unauthorised electronic surveillance. Article 4 of the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument set out, inter alia, principles that ensure that surveillance 
systems shall be authorised by law prior to use. This law identifies the 
purposes and situations where surveillance systems are to be used and 
defines the category of serious crimes and/or threats for which surveillance 
system are to be used. States should set up and promote procedures to 
ensure transparency about and accountability for government demands for 
surveillance data and non-surveillance data for surveillance purposes. 
A review of sections 3, 4 and 9 of this report illustrate that Egyptian laws 
regarding surveillance are not in line with the UN Draft Legal Instrument, 
specifically in terms of identifying the purposes and situations in which 
surveillance systems are to be used and defining the category of serious 
crimes and/or threats for which they are to be used. Moreover, the 
applicability of the Emergency Law constitutes a permanent legal challenge 
to the right to privacy and undermines any attempts to combat surveillance 
practices. Therefore, one of the indispensable recommendations of this 
report is to amend the Emergency Law to bring it in line with international 
standards.
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6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms?
According to principle 2 of the International Principles (legitimate aim): 
Laws should only permit Communications Surveillance by specified 
State authorities to achieve a legitimate aim that corresponds to a 
predominantly important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic 
society. Any measure must not be applied in a manner that discriminates 
on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
(EFF 2014)
According to principle 3 (necessity): 
Surveillance laws, regulations, activities, powers, or authorities must be 
limited to those which are strictly and demonstrably necessary to achieve 
a legitimate aim. Communications Surveillance must only be conducted 
when it is the only means of achieving a legitimate aim, or, when there are 
multiple means, it is the means least likely to infringe upon human rights. 
(ibid.)
The review of the national laws in section 3 of this report reveals that they 
do not include an adequate definition of key legal terms or use vague terms. 
For example, article 1 of the Cybercrimes Law defines national security 
as: ‘everything related to the independence, stability, and security of the 
homeland and anything related to the affairs of the Presidency, the Ministry 
of Defence and General Intelligence, and the Administrative Oversight 
Authority’. The same article and article 1 of the Personal Data Protection Law 
identifies the national security bodies as: ‘The Presidency of the Republic, the 
Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence Service and the 
Administrative Oversight Authority’. Other than these definitions, no existing 
laws address or explain the definitions of key legal terms such as reasonable 
grounds, legitimate purpose, etc.
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7.  How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?
Although the existence of the laws ensures the right to privacy and 
restricts surveillance practices, constituting a legal guarantee, it does not 
at all demonstrate the efficiency of the laws, particularly if these legal 
safeguards are not clear or if they are restricted by exceptional laws, namely 
emergency laws. Article 3 of the Personal Data Protection Law specifies 
the pre-conditions for collecting data. These include: collecting data for a 
specific purpose; declaring to the data subject that their collected data 
will be processed legitimately and explaining the relevance and purpose 
of collecting their data; and not retaining data for longer than the period 
necessary to fulfil the purpose of collecting it. 
However, article 2/first/(1) of the Cybercrime Law states that service providers 
should retain and store records of information systems for a period of 180 
continuous days. The retained information should include: data that can 
identify service users; and data relating to the contents of the information 
system used. Item 2 of the same article adds that service providers should 
maintain the confidentiality of retained and stored data, including: users’ 
personal data; information relating to the websites and private accounts 
they navigate and log into; and persons and destinations they communicate 
with it.
This reflects that legal guarantees in the Personal Data Protection Law 
directly conflict with the Cybercrime Law. 
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8. How effective are Egypt’s existing 
laws and practices in protecting 
privacy and limiting surveillance?
Principle 5 of International Principles (proportionality) states that: 
Communications surveillance should be regarded as a highly intrusive 
act that interferes with human rights threatening the foundations of a 
democratic society. Decisions about Communications Surveillance must 
consider the sensitivity of the information accessed and the severity of the 
infringement on human rights and other competing interest.  
(EFF 2014) 
As mentioned in the previous section, existing laws are not sufficient to ensure 
respect for privacy or to eliminate surveillance and they do not  consider the 
sensitivity of information and data. Although Egypt is party to the ICCPR and 
other human rights conventions that protect the right to privacy guaranteed 
in the constitution, there is no specific guarantee of privacy written into 
domestic Egyptian law. Additionally, new legislation about data protection 
only applies to electronic data and does not address physical data, which 
means that privacy is still at risk of abuse. 
On the other hand, the exception which excludes information in the 
possession of security agencies from application of the Personal Data 
Protection Law reflects that the existing laws are not efficient at protecting 
privacy or limiting surveillance. On the contrary, they allow the expansion 
of surveillance. For example, existing laws have been used to enable 
surveillance of social media platforms and to track information posted 
about Covid-19, which has led to the arrests of many people who have been 
interrogated for circulating ‘fake news’ (Farahat 2021b). In addition, the 
Emergency Law is the main factor in the breakdown of legal guarantees, in 
contravention of the International Principles (Hassanin 2014).
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in Egypt ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’?
All surveillance is a violation of the right to privacy. However, some 
surveillance is legal. Legislation can define legitimate aims of surveillance, 
such as the prevention of serious crimes. These legal boundaries refer to the 
legality of practices that constitute a restriction on human rights. They aim to 
protect human rights against arbitrary state practices (EFF 2014). 
Article 2/first/(1) of the Cybercrime Law allows personal information to be 
retained for 180 days, as discussed in sections 3 and 7 of this report. The 
article does not mention what constitutes a legal and proportionate purpose 
behind obliging service providers to retain this information for six months. 
In conclusion, although being legal, necessary and proportionate are 
mentioned in some provisions, without clear definition in law it is not possible 
to apply these tests prior to authorisation. Without transparency in the 
decision-making process, and publication of statistics on requests and 
authorisation, it is not possible to verify whether practices are aligned with 
the intent of legislators or fulfil the International Principles. Moreover, the 
investigating authority and national security bodies are the only bodies that 
have the absolute discretionary power to define, determine and assess the 
legality, necessity and proportionality of surveillance, which creates a state 
of legal uncertainty. Without independent oversight, the state is judge, jury 
and regulator.
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10. How has surveillance law 
played out in court in Egypt?
Laws do not operate and are not implemented in a vacuum. How courts 
apply and interpret the law and identify judicial trends needs to be explored, 
and this would help evaluate to what extent using litigation in surveillance 
cases could help to change and improve – in strategic ways – existing 
laws, practices and surveillance-related policies. Despite the absence of 
surveillance test cases brought before the courts, it is important to point out 
two court cases. According to a report by Amnesty International (2014): 
the Interior Ministry calls for tenders for a more sophisticated mass 
monitoring system which will scan social media networks for 26 topics 
including defamation of religion, calling for illegal demonstrations, strikes 
and sit-ins as well as terrorism and inciting violence. However, the full list 
of topics to be monitored has not been made public, leaving individuals 
unsure of whether and when their communications will be targeted. 
In case no. 63055 (28 February 2017), the plaintiff, Egyptian citizen Mustfa 
Hussien Hassan, brought a case against the Minister of Interior, asking 
the court to suspend and cancel the decision of the Minister of Interior 
to conduct a tender for a social media security risk monitoring software 
system, known as the public opinion measurement system. Although the 
administrative judiciary court dismissed the case for procedural errors, the 
court clearly stated that the contract process for this project had already 
been completed and had entered into force. What is remarkable about this 
court decision is that the Ministry of Interior did not deny using a surveillance 
system and surveillance techniques. 
In Constitutional Court case no. 17/2013 the court ruled that article 3(1) of 
the Emergency Law, which allowed authorities to search and arrest persons 
without the restriction of the criminal procedure code, to be unconstitutional. 
This is evidence that the courts could play a potentially significant role in 
challenging surveillance practices. These two cases highlight the great 
potential of using strategic litigation as a mechanism to test surveillance 
practices, which in the long term could assist in amending the laws that 
enable surveillance.
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11. What is working? What gaps are 
there in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge, and capacity?
Although personal data protection refers to ‘law designed to protect your 
personal data’ (Privacy International 2018: 9), the first article of the Personal 
Data Protection Law stipulates that data protection law only applies to data 
that is processed electronically, which means that adoption of the law does 
not really aim to protect personal data and the right to privacy (Technology 
& Law Community ‘Masaar’ 2021: 1). Publishing the executive regulation of 
law would reveal the exact aim behind adopting the new Personal Data 
Protection Law. It is doubtful this would change the perception of the law. 
Although the Egyptian Personal Data Protection Law resembles international 
standards on privacy and data protection, the law does not align with 
these international standards where it exempts security agencies from data 
protection law. Egyptian law gives security agencies the power to process 
personal data without the prior consent of the data subject. Collecting, 
accessing, and processing data do not constitute a breach of the right to 
privacy if they occur in a legitimate manner, for a legitimate purpose and 
in a lawful way. However, the existence of the national security exemption 
significantly weakens data protection and privacy (SMEX 2021). 
In the context of principle 42 of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression and Access to Information in Africa (‘Legal framework for the 
protection of personal information’), Egypt adopted the required legal 
framework on data protection in July 2020. Although the law attempts to 
align with international standards, especially GDPR, it contains provisions 
that contradict the right to privacy; for example, the third article, which gives 
security agencies the right to access personal information without specific 
restriction. This supports the conclusion that: ‘Numerous Egyptian security 
agencies are permitted to conduct electronic surveillance, frequently with 
limited court oversight’ (Marczak et al. 2015:18).
The Telecommunications Regulation Law constitutes an additional legal 
challenge, motivating and protecting illegal surveillance practices. Article 
64(1) of the law prohibits using devices to encrypt communication services 
without permission from security agencies. Moreover, article 64(2) of the same 
law states that the ‘services provider should collect accurate information 
and data about service users’ [author’s translation]. As a result, some reports 
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state that: ‘Telecommunications surveillance is facilitated under the 2003 
Telecommunications Regulation Law’ (Marczak et al. 2018: 26). 
The same report states that: 
This law compels telecommunications operators to provide technical 
capacity for the military and national security entities to ‘exercise their 
powers within the law’ as well as prohibiting the use of ‘telecommunication 
services encryption equipment’ without written authorization from entities 
including the armed forces.  
(ibid.) 
In terms of privacy and communication surveillance, article 6 of the 
Cybercrime Law authorises the investigation authority to issue a decision 
that allows surveillance and access to personal information. Although the 
article reveals that it is in line with international standards and principle 41 
of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information in Africa, in practice there have been many breaches of this 
provision, with people subjected to searches of their mobile phones without 
advance permission from the investigation authority; for example, ‘police 
stopping young persons in public places and searching their telephones for 
evidence of involvement in political activities deemed antigovernment in 
nature’ (US Embassy in Egypt 2021).
There is a clear conflict between article 3 of the Personal Data Protection 
Law and article 2/first/(1) of the Cybercrime Law, which obliges service 
providers to retain personal data and data related to online activities, 
messages and communication. As a result, activists have been interrogated 
over circulating fake news (Farahat 2021a) about Covid-19; for example, 
as detailed in State Security cases no. 535 and no. 558 of 2020, involving 
doctors, journalists, activists, citizens and researchers, which indicate that 
there was government surveillance of social media targeting users who 
circulated information about Covid-19 or criticised the performance of 
government in dealing with the crisis. 
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12. What recommendations 
arise for legislation, practice, 
or further research?
In conclusion, the existing legal framework in Egypt is not effective at 
protecting citizens’ right to privacy. Existing legislation does not sufficiently 
define what constitutes a legitimate aim or reasonable grounds for 
surveillance. It does not provide sufficient clarity about the assessment of 
whether proposed surveillance is legal, necessary or proportionate. Although 
the constitution makes citizens’ privacy inviolable, and parliament has 
adopted international conventions expanding and extending these rights, 
existing laws falls short of the International Principles and the Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa. 
Therefore, the following actions are strongly recommended.
General
• Surveillance practice should be within very narrow limits. Legality, 
necessity and proportionality of surveillance decisions and orders 
should be subjected to prior judicial review. Any exceptional authority 
for any agency should be suspended immediately. As long as 
surveillance practices affect human rights, there should be oversight 
by a competent judicial body. 
For the Egyptian parliament
• Parliament should amend or cancel article 2/first/(1) of the Cybercrime 
Law regarding retaining data for 180 days in a manner that prevents 
abuse of users’ privacy. 
• Parliament should amend the Telecommunications Regulation 
Law and ensure the legitimacy of surveillance practices. It should 
require that surveillance has an explicit legitimate aim. Courts should 
be responsible for assessing the existence of a legitimate aim for 
surveillance and issuing the surveillance order based on their own 
assessment, giving a person who will be under surveillance the right 
to challenge the first instance court decision before higher or appeal 
court. 
• Parliament should activate its parliamentary oversight tools to monitor 
abuses of the right to privacy and illegitimate surveillance practices. 
• Parliament should establish a fact-finding committee responsible for 
investigating surveillance practices and its root causes, which would 
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report its findings and make recommendations before the whole 
parliament. 
For academia and researchers 
• Court cases and decisions related to surveillance practices should 
be analysed and studied, and judicial trends in this respect should be 
identified at regional and national levels. 
• The impact and potentiality of using judicial bodies to change existing 
laws, practices and policies should be assessed. 
For NGOs
• Capacity-building is required for lawyers and NGOs on using strategic 
litigation mechanisms nationally, regionally and internationally in 
surveillance and digital rights cases.
• Public awareness on privacy rights and surveillance practices needs to 
be increased.
• Concerns should be raised about surveillance practices during 
universal periodic reviews and via shadow reports.
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Introduction
This report provides an overview of the legal basis for government 
surveillance and protections of citizen privacy in Kenyan law. The report 
summarises the most relevant pieces of legislation and compares them 
to existing law in other countries and draft legislation and principles 
provided by human rights actors. The report focuses particular attention on 
circumstances in which surveillance is legally permitted, as well as checks 
and balances detailed in legislation. The final section makes a series of 
recommendations arising from this analysis for future legislation, legal 
practice and further research.  
Kenya has had a long history of surveillance practices, inspired by the need 
for social control during the colonial and post-colonial periods, motivated 
in recent years partly by anti-terrorism, anti-money laundering and public 
health initiatives. During the colonial period, the government appropriated 
intelligence systems from various Kenyan communities as part of its 
colonial conquest. For example, elders would send people pretending to 
be mad, herders or lost strangers to check out the military strength of other 
communities or fertility of lands they were interested in (Boinett 2009: 18). 
Thereafter, the colonial government developed surveillance practices to 
monitor and counteract dissent. These included fingerprinting of Africans 
and requirements for movement passes (Breckenridge 2019). 
Apart from fingerprinting of the indigenous population, surveillance of 
persons of interest also dates back to the colonial period. The colonial 
government in Kenya had an elaborate administrative structure whose 
duties included gathering intelligence. The police force, established in 1906, 
also carried out surveillance. Following increased unrest and resistance in 
the 1920s, a criminal investigations department was established in 1926. One 
of its duties was to collate data on ‘criminals, undesirable and suspicious 
persons’. It was later mandated to carry out intelligence, and passport and 
immigration control, as well as fingerprinting. Eventually, a unit known as the 
‘special branch’ was carved out within the department for covert operations 
and intelligence gathering (Boinett 2009). 
At independence, Kenya inherited these surveillance practices. Constitutional 
changes resulted in a centralised government that maintained colonial 
administrative structures. The special branch acquired immense power 
as the intelligence outfit of the central government. It is most infamously 
remembered for monitoring dissenters in all sectors of society, extrajudicial 
killings and a disregard for human rights (ibid.: 26). The special branch was 
dismantled and a national intelligence service established under a 1998 law. 
These experiences informed provisions in the new Constitution of Kenya. 
74Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Kenya Country Report
During the constitution-making process at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, several constitutional provisions spelling out the powers and limits 
of national security organs were included. Article 239 of the Constitution 
defines national security organs as the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and National Police Service (NPS). The 
organs are supervised by the National Security Council (NCS). A provision 
on how fundamental rights and freedoms could be limited was also made 
(Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 24). 
Since 2013, Kenya has suffered several terrorist attacks by militant Islamist 
group Al-Shabaab. The attacks revived the agenda to strengthen the 
national security apparatus (Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom 2015). In 2014, 
following several terrorist attacks in northeastern Kenya, the executive 
sponsored a bill amending various security laws to give national security 
organs a legal basis for communications surveillance. The surveillance 
extends to the financial system, where financial institutions closely monitor 
and report cash flows; and security operations, where law enforcement 
bodies have wide latitude to investigate suspected crimes and undertake 
covert operations. Surveillance extends to anti-corruption initiatives; and 
there are also regulations for mandatory mobile phone SIM card registration 
and proposals to whitelist all mobile devices, including phones (Republic of 
Kenya 2015; Communications Authority 2018). 
Kenya also has massive data sets that can be used for surveillance 
purposes. For example, under the Registration of Persons Act, every person 
is required to register for an identity card on reaching the age of 18. In 2019, 
the government transformed the register under the Act to a digital identity 
system known as the National Integrated Identity Management System 
(NIIMS). Popularly known as huduma namba,1 the system collates and 
centralises all identity profiles and identity processes issued and carried 
out by government agencies. Subsidiary laws under NIIMS mandate issuing 
a unique personal identifier to each person – citizens, residents and even 
children. The number – together with biometrics such as fingerprints and 
iris, earlobe and facial photographs – is required for identification and 
authentication, prior to accessing government and private services. This 
could arguably become the most comprehensive surveillance system in 
Kenya, if the government integrates data sets from government identity 
systems under huduma namba with private data such as mobile phone 
numbers and social media. It was noted in a judgement following a 
case contesting huduma namba that the government needed to enact 
an appropriate comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure legal 
protections (eKLR, 2020b: para. 1047(III)).  
1 Swahili for ‘service number’.
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However, civil society organisations have criticised the Kenyan government 
for conducting extra-legal surveillance and intercepting communications 
(Privacy International 2017). They have also raised concern about surveillance 
of groups such as people with HIV or AIDS, human rights defenders 
and children (UPR Info 2020; eKLR 2020b: para. 791). In addition, private 
companies such as mobile network operators have been reluctant to install 
systems that would give government actors access to subscriber information 
on their networks. These include the 2012 International Telecommunication 
Union-supported Network Early Warning System (NEWS), which operators 
argued would disproportionately affect subscriber privacy, as well as 
the 2018 Device Management System (DMS), which the communications 
regulator wanted installed to weed out counterfeit devices. In the case of the 
DMS, mobile network operator Safaricom was among the parties that went 
to court to oppose the system, arguing that anti-counterfeiting goals could 
be achieved using less invasive measures (eKLR 2020a).
This report reviews the legal basis for legitimate surveillance in Kenya 
and protections provided in law for citizens’ right to privacy. It does so by 
answering a series of 12 questions about surveillance law in Kenya. 
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1. What reasons does the 
Kenya government use to 
justify surveillance?
Motivations for surveillance include prevention of terrorism and serious 
crimes, national security, anti-corruption, health emergencies and control 
of hate speech, particularly during election periods. All these are provided 
for in various laws and practices, which have been developed with local 
and external influences. For example, following a United Nations (UN) 
Security Council resolution on suppression of terrorism, Kenya introduced 
mechanisms for the surveillance of terrorism financing (Prevention of Terrorism 
(Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on 
Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations 2013). Further anti-terrorism-inspired 
laws were made in December 2014 under the Security Laws Amendment Act. 
The statute amended several security-related laws to provide for surveillance 
of persons suspected of serious crimes, as well as terrorism. Finance laws 
were also amended to strengthen know-your-customer measures, as well as 
reporting requirements for financial institutions, payment service providers 
and foreign exchange bureaus.
Under the National Intelligence Service (NIS) Act 2012, protection of national 
security is among the main reasons for intelligence surveillance. Other 
rationales for surveillance include prevention of crime and keeping of law and 
order (National Police Service (NPS) Act 2011, section 51(g)). Anti-corruption 
and prevention of economic crimes is also cited as a basis for surveillance, 
although this is not specifically provided for in the anti-corruption law. 
Another motivation for surveillance is to protect intellectual property. Private 
actors such as content owners have attempted to have internet service 
providers and mobile network operators monitor their networks for content 
that infringes on their intellectual property rights (Article 19 Eastern Africa 
2020). The Communications Authority in 2017 attempted to install a DMS that 
would connect to mobile network operators’ systems to filter out counterfeit 
devices in the country. The High Court in 2018 declared DMS unconstitutional, 
but later in 2020 the Court of Appeal allowed the DMS project to 
recommence and ordered the Communications Authority to subject the 
proposed DMS guidelines to public participation (eKLR 2020a).
Health surveillance is carried out under the Public Health Act 1986, which was 
enacted during a time when digital surveillance had not been anticipated. 
Since the emergence of Covid-19 in Kenya in 2020, the Ministry of Health, 
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with the aid of the NIS, has been undertaking health surveillance, reportedly 
through a system that helps with contact tracing (Odhiambo 2020). The 
Public Health Act does not specifically provide for contact tracing. Initially, 
the state tracked Covid-19 patients as well as people under quarantine, to 
ensure that they did not flout movement restriction rules (Olewe 2020). Along 
the way, a digital tracing app that used geolocation data to track people 
passing through the country’s airports and ports was deployed. Currently, 
Kenya is collaborating with African health authorities in sharing information 
about Covid-19 testing and vaccination certification for travellers (Amoth 
2021). The Ministry of Health also has a vaccine management system linked to 
the national identity (ID) card system. This system is among use cases for the 
national ID, which is increasingly becoming digitalised. 
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2. Which international 
conventions protecting privacy 
has Kenya adopted?
Article 2 of the Constitution of Kenya incorporates international law and 
obligations as part of domestic law. Kenya has signed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which confer on all citizens 
the right to privacy and to private correspondence and communication. 
Regionally, Kenya is also a signatory to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Although the ACHPR does not specifically provide 
for the right to privacy, it provides for dignity of individuals and groups to 
pursue their development (African Union 1981: articles 5 and 24). Along with 
other members of the East African Community (EAC), Kenya adopted the 
EAC Framework for Cyberlaws Phases I and II in 2008 and 2011 respectively 
(EAC 2008). These frameworks envisage a harmonised cyber environment, 
with each country expected to adopt laws on data protection as well as 
cybersecurity. 
Kenya has also signed and domesticated UN conventions aimed at 
addressing terrorism and terrorism financing; and established a financial 
reporting centre, as well as the Counter Financing of Terrorism Inter-
Ministerial Committee under the Prevention of Terrorism Regulations. These 
regulations create a basis for financial surveillance and reporting.
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in Kenya?
Kenya does not have a specific law regulating surveillance, but several laws 
either prohibit or regulate surveillance. At the highest level, the Constitution 
protects privacy, including informational privacy. Article 31 frames the right 
to privacy as including protection from: search and seizure of property; 
information about family or private affairs being unnecessarily required; and 
infringement of communications. In addition, article 35 guarantees citizens’ 
right to access to information. This includes information held by the state and 
others that is necessary for the enjoyment of rights or freedoms. 
Both the right to privacy and access to information are among the 
fundamental rights that can be limited through legislation. Article 24 of the 
Constitution lists the factors to be taken into account when limiting a right. 
These include the: nature of the right; purpose of the limitation; nature and 
extent of the limitation; and a balance between individual enjoyment of 
rights and the rights and fundamental freedoms of others, whether less 
restrictive measures to limit the right exist or not. In addition, the Constitution 
allows for limitation of the right to privacy, among other rights, for members 
of the Kenya Defence Forces and the NPS (Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 
24). For example, police officers’ right of access to information is limited, under 
several justifications, such as protection of classified information, national 
security, security and integrity of the police service as well as protection of 
the fundamental rights of others (NPS Act 2011, section 47(2)). 
For access to information related to surveillance, the Access to Information 
Act sets out reasonable grounds under which an access to information 
request may be denied. These range from national security interests to 
due process, protection of the privacy of others, protection of commercial 
interests, including intellectual property, and professional confidentiality 
(Access to Information Act 2016, section 6). The law further outlines what 
‘national security’ consists of, which includes covert operations, intelligence 
activities and lawful investigations. However, the law includes a public 
interest test, where a court may order disclosure of information if the public 
interest outweighs the harm to protected interests. In addition, requests 
for information relating to environmental tests override protected interests 
(Access to Information Act 2016, section 6(4)). 
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Statutes on surveillance can be broadly classified into laws that prohibit 
surveillance and those that allow it. 
a) Laws prohibiting surveillance 
The Kenya Information and Communication Act (KICA) is the primary law 
on telecommunications and broadcasting. Section 31 penalises unlawful 
interception of communication by service providers. Section 83 also creates 
the offence of accessing computer systems for purposes of interception of 
communication. Consumer protection regulations under KICA also prohibit 
licensees from monitoring communications. 
Unauthorised interception is prohibited under the Computer Misuse and 
Cybercrimes Act (CMCA) 2018, with stiff penalties of up to 20 million Kenyan 
shillings (about US$200,000) (section 17). There is also a new crime of 
interception of mobile money messages in section 31 of the CMCA. 
Kenya in 2019 enacted the Data Protection Act, which regulates lawful 
processing of personal data. The Act generally prohibits processing of 
personal data without data subjects’ consent (section 30). 
b) Laws allowing surveillance 
The laws allowing surveillance are varied, ranging from communications 
regulation to anti-money laundering, security and content regulation 
statutes. More recently, e-government services such as a national system for 
schoolchildren and a digital ID programme have created databases for easy 
surveillance.
KICA has provisions for court-mandated search and seizure where a person 
is suspected to have committed an offence (section 89). Law enforcement 
officers often rely on this provision to access information from mobile network 
operators, which are licensed under this Act (Safaricom 2019). 
The main law regulating financial surveillance is the Proceeds of Crime 
and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2009. Financial institutions are required to 
monitor patterns of cash flowing into financial reporting centres. They must 
also verify customer identities, keep records of customers, and establish 
and maintain internal reporting procedures. This has created the basis for 
electronic surveillance of financial transactions. It has also led to a push for 
digital ID, which financial institutions can use to validate their customers’ ID 
documents (Breckenridge 2019).  
The NIS Act limits the right to privacy by allowing for court-warranted 
investigations into suspected crimes. Warrants may be issued for monitoring 
of communications (section 36A). Although the provision does not specify 
the offences for which surveillance may be undertaken, provisions for court 
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warrants under the Act are linked to covert intelligence operations. The NIS 
Act broadly defines offences that may attract covert operations as any 
‘threats against national security’ (section 42). In terms of proportionality, 
the provision gives broad powers to monitor communication for purposes 
of preserving national security. Political leaders, as well as Parliament, have 
severally proposed or directed NIS to carry out intelligence operations on 
issues such as impropriety in public service, cheap imports in the agricultural 
sector and public fundraising (Ombati 2020; Otieno and Obala 2020; 
Ng’ang’a 2021). The provision on covert operations, however, requires a 
court to issue a warrant before monitoring of communications can begin. 
A court can only issue an order for surveillance for 180 days, but this can be 
extended.
Security laws that allow surveillance include the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) 2012, NPS Act, NPS Commission Act, CMCA and Mutual Legal Assistance 
Act. The PTA permits the investigation and interception of and interference 
with a person’s communications in the course of investigating, detecting or 
preventing a terrorist act (sections 35, 36 and 36A). Such interception can 
be carried out by various bodies, with varying levels of adherence to the 
principle of proportionality. When carried out by the police, there is a pre-
authorisation procedure, involving approval by the inspector general of 
police or director of public prosecutions, as well as a court warrant. 
The law also directs the court to analyse the necessity of the application 
for a warrant, especially since the application for a warrant may be carried 
out by the police without involving the subject of surveillance. The law also 
criminalises unauthorised interception by a police officer. However, in a 
separate provision, the same law authorises interception of communications 
by national security organs2 to intercept communications in ‘detecting, 
deterring and disrupting terrorism’ (section 36A). This provision does not 
further delineate how necessity and proportionality are to be achieved, 
although it empowers the cabinet secretary to make regulations to give 
effect to the provision. 
Under the NPS Act 2011 and NPS Commission Act 2011, the police can 
collect and provide intelligence on crimes and undertake investigations on 
serious crimes including cybercrime. The Act further makes provisions for the 
classification of information (NPS Act 2011, sections 24, 27, 35 and 51).
The CMCA envisages court-warranted interception of ‘content data’, 
defined as the substance of a communication, by law enforcement officers 
in the course of investigating crimes. Under section 53, officers are expected 
to procure court orders that can also extend to service providers, which 
2  Article 239 of the Constitution defines national security organs as the KDF, NIS and NPS.
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may be compelled to help with investigations. Section 52 envisages real-
time collection of electronic traffic data, where service providers can be 
compelled to permit law enforcement officers to collect data. Requests for 
real-time traffic data, as well as content data, can also be made under 
mutual legal assistance arrangements;3 these are not locally authorised by 
courts (sections 63 and 64). 
However, the Mutual Legal Assistance Act contains some necessity and 
proportionality requirements. For interception requests, the Act requires 
that the requesting state give information on: the criminal conduct under 
investigation; identification of the subject, with details for the electronic 
or telecommunication address to be monitored; desired duration of the 
interception; and the authority requesting the interception. A confirmation 
of a warrant or lawful interception order from the requesting country is also 
required. The Act does not provide any other oversight for mutual legal 
assistance requests; yet once a request is accepted, Kenya may immediately 
require immediate transmission of interceptions or recording and subsequent 
transmission of communications to the requesting state (Mutual Legal 
Assistance Act 2011, section 27). 
Content regulation statutes such as the CMCA and the National Cohesion 
and Integration Act (NCIA) 2008 establish offences that law enforcement 
bodies use as a basis for surveillance. The CMCA has established offences 
such as publication of fake news and spreading of false information, while 
the NCIA prohibits content that may incite ethnic hatred. The NCIA was 
passed following post-election violence in 2007–08 that led to the deaths of 
more than 1,200 people and displaced over 500,000. The National Cohesion 
and Integration Commission (NCIC), which is charged with implementing the 
NCIA, has invested in surveillance software to monitor election campaign 
content online (The Nation 2011). During election periods, monitoring of online 
spaces occurs to identify content that could lead to violence. In 2017, the 
Communications Authority, in collaboration with the NCIC, issued guidelines 
on election campaign content disseminated through electronic networks 
(Communications Authority and NCIC 2017). This was the basis for monitoring 
SMS text messaging services and social media for what they termed 
undesirable content. However, there is no specific law mandating digital 
surveillance for hate speech. 
3  Mutual legal assistance is a framework under which a state may request for assistance 
from another state during criminal investigations. In Kenya, such arrangements are governed 
under the Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2011, where legal assistance is available to states 
and international organisations that Kenya has signed agreements with and, in some cases, 
requesting states, even when there is no prior mutual legal assistance agreement (section 3). 
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During the Covid-19 pandemic, surveillance has been carried out under the 
Public Health Act 1986 (section 67). Examples of digital health surveillance 
include a contact tracing app that integrated public service vehicles 
(PSV). PSV operators were required to enrol their vehicles on the app using 
registration numbers and to collect identification card numbers and contact 
details from every passenger (Oketch 2021; Phillips 2021). The system was later 
dropped, but other systems (e.g. a testing and vaccine certification system) 
have been adopted. Civil society organisations have raised concerns over 
the lack of a legal framework to address the privacy of those whose data is 
collected, as well as oversight of such surveillance (article 19 2020; Article 19 
Eastern Africa, the Kenya ICT Action Network and Pollicy 2021). In the Covid-19 
pandemic, people found to be spreading information that was contrary to 
government reports on both open platforms and private messaging apps 
were charged with spreading false information under the CMCA (Article 19 
2020).
Identity data can also enable government surveillance. The Ministry of 
Education manages the National Education Management Information 
System (NEMIS), which records information on all learners in Kenya, including 
their educational activities. The system issues learners with a unique personal 
identifier, using their birth certificates and parents’ national identity card 
numbers (Ministry of Education 2017). It is not clear if the system is linked to 
any other system – for example, huduma namba – though law enforcement 
officers have warned students caught breaking the law that their details will 
be recorded (Muchunguh 2021). 
NEMIS was a precursor of NIIMS, a more comprehensive database that is 
meant to cover all citizens and residents in Kenya. NIIMS was established 
in 2019 under the Registration of Persons Act. Subsidiary legislation issued 
in 2020 makes NIIMS the primary source of identification of all Kenyan 
citizens/residents in Kenya. This means that through NIIMS, the government 
can track all the services that a person accesses, from birth to death; for 
example, mobile phone registration, land registration, health insurance, 
school enrolment, national examinations and driving records. While the Data 
Protection Act 2019 prohibits processing of data without the data subject’s 
consent, the Act also lists duties carried out by public bodies as among 
exceptions to processing without consent. Other exceptions include public 
interest and exercise of official authority.
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4. How does Kenyan surveillance 
law compare with that in other 
countries in Africa/US/EU/UK?
The provisions prohibiting surveillance in Kenya – starting from the 
constitutional provisions on privacy, access to information and limitation of 
rights – measure up to international standards such as the UDHR, ICCPR 
and ACHPR. They guarantee protection of fundamental freedoms including 
the right to privacy. Under article 24 of the 2010 Constitution, laws limiting 
fundamental rights are required to pass the three-part test of legality, 
necessity and proportionality. This test, which is elaborated under the 
Constitution, has been the subject of many lawsuits, with judges testing 
the laws against considerations such as the nature of the law, whether less 
repressive means could have been used to achieve the same ends, and 
whether the law is appropriate for a democratic society. 
There is no single law that comprehensively regulates surveillance as is the 
case in South Africa, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). 
However, from the various security legislations – for example, the NIS Act, 
NPS Act and PTA – a primary reason for surveillance is national security. This 
is similar to many African countries where intelligence gathering is carried 
out for protection of national security. Other reasons for surveillance include 
prevention and investigation of crimes, as well as preventing and countering 
terrorism. 
Without a comprehensive law, surveillance practices go on without a 
legitimate basis or any oversight. These include mandatory SIM card 
registration, hate speech monitoring and content regulation in general. This 
is similar to many other African countries where governments undertake 
surveillance without specifying a legitimate basis and without oversight 
(CIPESA 2019: 6).
Similar to the US, where the USA PATRIOT4 Act was adopted as an anti-
terrorism measure, Kenya has enacted the PTA as well as regulations on 
financial reporting as part of the war on terror. However, as has been argued 
in cases such as the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) case, anti-
terrorism efforts can easily give rise to mass surveillance as state agencies 
can use investigation of terrorism to gain access to mobile, internet and 
financial records (eKLR 2015). The case challenged a raft of amendments to 
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism.
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security laws where the state sought to enhance anti-terrorism investigation 
by detaining terrorism suspects without charging them, limiting expression 
and creating a legal basis for covert intelligence operations. 
In terms of oversight, Kenyan law has similarities with South African law 
with regard to seeking administrative and judicial approval of warrants for 
surveillance. Under the NIS Act, court warrants are required prior to covert 
operations, similar to the provisions of the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information 
Act (RICA) in South Africa. However, the reporting mechanisms differ, in that 
Kenya has no specific reporting requirements for surveillance activities to 
parliamentary committees as is the case in South Africa. 
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5. How does Kenyan surveillance 
law compare with the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument? 
The UN Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and 
Privacy recommends that states have a specific statute and oversight on 
government-led surveillance. The instrument considers surveillance as a 
limitation to privacy, requiring states to adopt necessity and proportionality 
in surveillance. Kenya partly aligns with the draft instrument with regard to 
the intelligence law, but fails in many other respects, including use of digital 
identity data for surveillance. 
Although there is no single statute regulating surveillance, Kenyan laws 
enacted immediately after the 2010 Constitution – for example, the NIS Act, 
NPS Act and PTA – acknowledge that surveillance is a limitation to rights 
such as privacy and access to information. Where a court has authorised 
surveillance, the laws require an application to the court to list the reasons 
why law enforcement officers need to infringe on people’s privacy. 
Use of digital identity data for surveillance has not been well captured in the 
laws. For example, there are mandatory SIM card registration laws, where 
the SIM card is linked to the national ID. However, national ID laws do not 
provide principles or data-sharing codes among civil registries in the country. 
Civil registries is a term introduced under huduma namba regulations. It 
refers to government agencies that issue identity documents such as birth 
certificates, passports and education certificates. Since the registries 
perform duties of a public nature that may be subject to exceptions to 
the grounds for data processing, it is important that use of their data for 
surveillance purposes be regulated. 
Kenya’s surveillance activities often take place under the veil of national 
security, an area that has traditionally been protected from public scrutiny. 
The 2010 Constitution defines national security very broadly, encompassing 
‘internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, 
and other national interests’ (Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 238(1)). 
National security is one of the bases for intelligence operations under the NIS 
Act. National security is also exempted from the Data Protection Act under 
section 51.
The NIS Act does not provide a specific oversight mechanism for surveillance, 
but it does provide three mechanisms for oversight of intelligence in general. 
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The first is a council consisting of three cabinet secretaries, the attorney 
general, director general of the intelligence service and any other person 
the president may appoint. The second is parliamentary oversight and 
the third is a complaints board. The complaints board, which is headed by 
a person who may serve as a judge, is mandated to receive complaints 
from any member of the public (NIS Act 2012, pt. VII). The UN Draft Legal 
Instrument and International Principles on the Application of Human Rights 
to Communications Surveillance call for an oversight mechanism specific to 
surveillance that is independent of government and security services; and 
which has the power to access all surveillance requests and authorisations to 
verify whether surveillance practice is ‘legal, necessary and proportionate’ as 
the Act intended. 
While the new laws provide for judicial pre-authorisation, this only occurs 
in specific cases. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) has 
a mandate to investigate complaints regarding the police. It is made up 
of a board of experts from various fields. IPOA annual reports highlight the 
nature of cases the authority has dealt with since its establishment in 2012. 
Surveillance is not among the complaints, although complaints such as 
enforced disappearance can be traced to surveillance (Privacy International 
2017). IPOA, along with other human rights institutions, could be strengthened 
through capacity building on issues of surveillance, to be able to play the role 
of independent oversight body. Also, laws do not provide for the specifics of 
surveillance, hence there are no guidelines on any of the surveillance systems 
in use. There are no recorded human rights impact assessments, even for 
non-surveillance data such as digital ID. 
The right to notification that you have been subject to surveillance – 
recommended in the UN Draft Legal Instrument and the International 
Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance – is not provided for in Kenyan surveillance law. While notification 
is provided for under data protection laws, surveillance may fall under 
exceptions to the Act as it is undertaken as a public duty (Data Protection 
Act 2019, section 51(2)(b)). In addition, the law came into force in 2019 and 
is in the early stages of implementation. Data subjects have not been 
provided with mechanisms for asserting their data rights. The right to human 
assessment in automated decision-making processes is also provided for 
under the data protection law. However, the public is not aware of decisions 
which are made by automated means or their right to have such decisions 
subjected to human assessment. Matters of cross-border data transfer are 
also provided for under the Data Protection Act.
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6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms?
The NIS Act defines national security with reference to the constitutional 
definition. This definition also applies to all other laws on surveillance. The 
law specifies privacy rights that are limited and outlines ‘purposes for the 
limitations’ in part IV. These include: national security; protection of classified 
information; discipline and security of intelligence officers; and protection of 
fundamental freedoms of a person which does not prejudice the rights and 
freedoms of others (section 32). 
Section 48 of the NPS Act provides for limitations of the right to access to 
information, for similar purposes as described under the NIS Act. 
Other key legal terms such as reasonable grounds and legitimate purpose 
are not defined in law but have been considered by courts. For example, 
Kenya’s experiences with terrorism in the country have created the basis for 
considering the prevention of terrorism to be a legitimate aim of conducting 
surveillance. In the wake of terrorist attacks, the 2014 Security Laws 
Amendment Act was enacted. In a case contesting increased risk to privacy 
under the NIS Act, the court found anti-terrorism intelligence to be rationally 
connected to the purpose of ‘detection, disruption and prevention of 
terrorism’ (eKLR 2015: para. 308). In this particular case, the High Court found 
that the provisions for internal pre-authorisation as well as requirements 
for judicial warrants would provide adequate opportunity for the judicial 
officer to ensure that there were legitimate aims and reasonable grounds for 
surveillance.
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7. How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?
Existing safeguards such as constitutional and legal provisions have been 
removed from public scrutiny since there is no mechanism for independent 
oversight and public reports. This lack of transparency prevents the public 
from understanding the full extent of surveillance in the country. Reports 
indicate that Kenya undertakes surveillance, although it is not possible to 
know the extent to which the law, or international standards such as the 
UN Draft Legal Instrument, or necessary and proportionate principles are 
adhered to. Since 2012, the Communications Authority has attempted to 
install two systems, NEWS and the National Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), 
on internet service providers’ servers. As reported by Privacy International 
(2017), the surveillance potential of the systems is not proportionate to the 
stated benefit, which is to monitor cyber threats. 
Another example of a system installed without a proper legal framework is 
the street-level closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance system in the 
capital Nairobi and in Mombasa. The system was installed by mobile network 
operator Safaricom in collaboration with Chinese telecoms technology 
manufacturer Huawei. It includes facial recognition technology as well 
as licence plate readers (Kapiyo and Githaiga 2014; Burt 2018). Despite 
protests from civil society organisations, there has been no transparency 
on use of the system and reports indicate that it is running (Mutai 2020). The 
system was enhanced by integrating all national security communications 
systems (The Presidency 2020). Regulations on CCTV use were also put out 
for public consultation but have yet to be gazetted (Ministry of Interior and 
Coordination of National Government 2019).  
Reports on data use for political campaigning during the 2017 elections 
indicate that political parties obtained data from public and private 
databases for targeted advertising (Mutung’u 2018). Use of corporate 
surveillance for political gain undermines democracy, particularly where the 
incumbent administration also has political control (Nyabola 2020).
National security has often been used as a reason for not openly discussing 
surveillance practices. For example, in the 2020 statutory annual report 
on the state of security, the government reported that it had increased 
surveillance of online spaces to combat threats such as ethnic hatred, 
student unrest and counterfeit goods. However, further information – such 
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as on the systems used, action taken against persons of interest, and 
safeguards – was not provided (Kenyatta 2020: ix, 13, 17). 
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8. How effective are existing laws 
and practices in protecting privacy 
and limiting surveillance?
Although Kenya has constitutional provisions on the right to privacy and 
access to information, as well as laws on surveillance, these frameworks 
have not been sufficient to protect the public from unwarranted surveillance. 
According to a report by Privacy International (2017), law enforcement officers 
gained access to mobile network operators’ data to carry out surveillance 
on persons of interest. The report tied this surveillance to extrajudicial killings, 
which led to calls for privacy laws. 
However, the Data Protection Act 2019 exempts national security functions 
from its application. This leaves gaps in areas such as public and private 
CCTV cameras, which law enforcement agencies can gain access to in the 
course of their duties, without proper oversight.  
The Data Protection Commissioner developed guidelines on data-sharing 
by private and public entities during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, it 
is not clear if the guidelines are in operation and there are no records on 
data-sharing agreements during the pandemic period. This points to the 
need for the kind of annual public transparency reports recommended 
by the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance, so that citizens and parliamentarians can 
have confidence that surveillance is being applied in accordance with the 
law. 
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in Kenya ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’?
The Constitution defines national security as ‘the protection against internal 
and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, 
their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other 
national interests’ (Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 238). This provision was 
included during the making of the 2010 Constitution to safeguard against 
the practice of government overreach affecting human rights on grounds of 
national security. 
Laws made pursuant to national security interests have been the subject 
of constitutional interpretation, with courts generally supporting national 
security-related activities unless they violate citizen’s rights. For example, 
following a spate of terrorist attacks in the country from 2013, the government 
amended several security laws with the aim of specially investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism cases. In a case instituted by the Coalition for Reform 
and Democracy (CORD) political party and others, the petitioners argued 
that the amendments severely affected fundamental rights and freedoms 
such as privacy, access to information and the right to a fair trial. The court 
found the sections related to access to justice – such as issues of bail, 
the right to remain silent and access to evidence to be used against the 
accused – to be unconstitutional. However, limitations on privacy were found 
to be justifiable in the fight against terrorism (eKLR 2015). 
Lack of transparency or reporting mechanisms make it difficult to analyse 
how judges have considered surveillance applications from law enforcement. 
Data from private internet service providers on government requests 
for access to personal data would also be useful in analysing whether 
surveillance requests are based on law and whether they are necessary and 
proportionate. 
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10. How has surveillance law 
played out in court in Kenya?
Besides the CORD case, other landmark cases include one challenging 
the collection of data on HIV-positive people, the petition against the 
DMS and the huduma namba digital identity (NIIMS) case. In the first two 
instances, the courts ruled in favour of the petitioners, upholding the right to 
privacy. These two cases were instituted following plans by public agencies 
to create systems for surveillance. In the third case, which concerned a 
digital ID system, the court seemed to resign itself to the fact that the 
country must digitalise. It allowed the system, but ordered that a sufficient 
and comprehensive framework on issues such as protection of privacy be 
enacted first. 
In 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta directed national government 
administrators to collect data on HIV-positive people in their jurisdictions, 
including children attending school, to streamline the supply of HIV 
medication. The Kenya Legal & Ethical Issues Network on HIV and AIDS 
(KELIN), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), challenged the directive 
on grounds of its proportionality, among other reasons. The organisation 
argued that collection of biometric data was a violation of privacy that 
could consequently lead to criminalisation and stigmatisation of already 
vulnerable people. The court found that, although the government had 
a legitimate interest, the means of collecting data infringed on people’s 
privacy. Therefore, the directive was declared unconstitutional and the 
government was ordered to code data that had already been collected 
(eKLR 2016).
In the DMS cases, mobile network operators and civil society activists 
protested against the DMS that would have been installed on mobile 
network operators’ systems, to check the authenticity of mobile devices to 
rid the country of counterfeit devices (Communications Authority 2016). They 
argued that the system was disproportionate to the mischief the government 
wanted to cure. The High Court also found that the measures were not 
necessary because less invasive measures were available that achieved the 
same ends without violating mobile subscribers’ privacy. This decision was, 
however, subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal, which ordered 
the Communications Authority to engage in consultations and also develop 
guidelines for the project (eKLR 2020a). 
Kenya Country Report
94Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Issues of surveillance were part of the CORD case. Petitioners argued that 
introducing a new provision allowing the NIS to carry out covert operations 
and interception of communications by national security organs legitimised 
mass surveillance (eKLR 2015: para. 282). The court, however, took judicial 
notice of the terrorist attacks that had taken place in the country and 
found that there was a genuine national security interest – a ‘legitimate 
aim’ in the language of the international principles – in monitoring 
communications to prevent further attacks. With regard to intelligence, 
it found that the pre-authorisation by a judge, time-limited warrants 
and criminalisation of unlawful surveillance were sufficient safeguards to 
privacy. The court emphasised that, given the nature of terrorism, it was 
justifiable for the government to carry out surveillance, after obtaining court 
orders. In addition, the court found that the parties had not demonstrated 
less restrictive ways of achieving the national security purposes of the 
surveillance law (ibid.: para. 308). Notably, petitioners in the CORD case did 
not canvass issues of oversight and accountability of surveillance. As was 
the case in the South African case AmaBhungane Centre for Investigative 
Journalism v. Minister of Justice and Minister of Police, the court decried the 
opaque nature of surveillance orders (Constitutional Court of South Africa 
2021). 
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11. What is working? What gaps are 
there in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge and capacity?
The right to privacy under Kenya’s Constitution is well provided for. It includes 
privacy of information as well as communications. Further, the Constitution 
has domesticated the legitimacy, necessity and proportionality principles 
under international law by providing guidelines on how rights such as privacy 
may be limited. However, the laws under which surveillance is undertaken do 
not always provide a legitimate basis for surveillance. 
Issues of surveillance have been the subject of litigation and courts have 
upheld the right to privacy in some cases. However, litigation cannot be 
a sustainable means of protecting the rights of people, with increasing 
government-led surveillance. A comprehensive law is therefore needed to 
narrowly define legitimate grounds for surveillance. 
Where the private sector is involved, transparency reports by technology 
companies such as Google are important in bringing to the fore issues of 
surveillance. People would otherwise not be aware that law enforcement 
officers surveil their private communications or have any means of appeal or 
redress. However, not all companies provide reports and, even in the case of 
Google, not all requests for information are published (Google 2021).
National human rights institutions such as the Kenya National Commission 
on Human Rights (KNCHR) have not been pursuing digital rights. For example, 
annual and general reports of such institutions in the past few years have 
not highlighted the impact of electronic surveillance on fundamental rights. 
While a 2021 submission to the UN Human Rights Committee raised concerns 
about the implementation of the PTA being used to shrink civic space, it 
does not sufficiently link this to digital surveillance. Linkage of surveillance to 
fundamental rights would be a positive step in making surveillance actors 
more accountable, since the KNCHR has a general oversight mandate for all 
state organs. 
Issues of surveillance should receive more attention in Parliament. 
Parliamentary committees on security should provide reports on emerging 
issues including procurement of surveillance systems. For such oversight to 
be meaningful, parliamentarians’ capacity on issues of surveillance should 
be built. Researchers and civil society organisations working on surveillance 
and human rights should therefore disseminate their research findings 
to parliamentarians, who could serve as a useful mechanism for seeking 
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information on surveillance programmes. Parliament could also contribute to 
transparency, and provide oversight and accountability.
Lack of transparency is a problem. Mandatory SIM card registration, for 
example, has been faulted by several civil society organisations. During 
Kenya’s 2019 universal periodic review by UN mechanisms, mandatory SIM 
registrations were linked with surveillance of human rights defenders (UPR Info 
2020). Whereas national security is used as a reason for requiring registration 
of the SIM cards, registration has been cited as providing law enforcement 
officers direct access to telecommunications networks. Networks do not 
publish information on government requests for such access (ibid.). 
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12. What recommendations arise 
for future legislation, practice, 
or further research?
• Surveillance systems such as hate speech monitoring and anti-
corruption are implemented in a legal vacuum, contrary to the 
guidance of the UN Draft Legal Instrument. Kenya should enact 
a specific surveillance law prior to purchasing or developing 
surveillance systems. The law should cover both surveillance 
systems and use of non-surveillance systems such as digital ID 
for surveillance purposes. As surveillance is a limitation on human 
rights, the surveillance law should adhere to the constitutional 
requirement for legality, necessity and proportionality. 
• While Kenya currently has a system for judicial authorisation for 
some types of surveillance, the system is still lacking in that there is 
no independent oversight body to supervise surveillance practice. 
Mechanisms for public accountability, such as transparency reports, 
are also lacking. 
• Existing – and future – surveillance systems should undergo human 
rights impact analysis. All surveillance actors should develop mitigation 
measures for the people whose rights surveillance systems affect. 
Measures could include notification of surveillance subjects, removal 
from surveillance and independent review of surveillance activities. 
• The law should adopt surveillance principles in the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument, especially on transparency of surveillance and 
accountability of surveillance actors. Issues requiring transparency 
include notification of surveillance subjects as well as publication 
of surveillance reports. Issues of accountability include retirement of 
surveillance data, so that surveillance subjects are not perpetually in 
government files. Similarly, health surveillance data collected during 
the Covid-19 pandemic should be retired once the pandemic is over. 
• There should be greater protection of special interest groups such 
as children and people with HIV or AIDS. Mass surveillance of such 
groups should be specifically outlawed; and where surveillance is 
applied for, the requesting authority should be required to indicate 
to the judge whether the subject is from a protected category.  
• The National Security Council should provide information on the 
nature of surveillance in Kenya, actors, statistics on surveillance 
activities and their value. In tandem, private companies involved in 
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surveillance such as telecommunications network operators should 
publish periodic reports on government surveillance requests. 
• Information on health surveillance during the Covid-19 
pandemic should be published. People who accessed the 
information as part of the pandemic response – for example, 
app developers – should also be required to retire that data or 
at least de-identify it to protect the privacy of the public. 
• The NPS Act should have narrower provisions on surveillance to 
meet the legitimate aims and reasonable grounds recommended 
by international law. These should include the basis for surveillance, 
types of crimes that attract surveillance as well as internal and 
independent external oversight on surveillance activities. 
• Surveillance carried out under other laws such as the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, Kenya Revenue Authority 
Act, and National Cohesion and Integration Act should be 
contested for their lack of legitimate aims and accountability. 
• All surveillance laws should have a reporting mechanism whereby 
Parliament and the public are made aware of the statistics, nature 
and value of surveillance in a given period. Subjects of surveillance 
should also be notified of surveillance even if this is after the fact. 
Who needs more capacity to do what? Journalists, academics, researchers
• The KNCHR should extend its monitoring to surveillance activities of the 
various government and private bodies. 
• Security researchers should be sensitised on human rights aspects of 
surveillance for groups such as children and people with HIV or AIDS.
• More awareness should be created about the impact of digital 
surveillance among the public, in general, and groups such 
as human rights defenders and journalists, in particular. 
What additional research is needed into which areas? 
• More research is needed on the impact of surveillance on groups. How 
can group rights impact assessments be done? How can mechanisms 
such as the UN Draft Legal Instrument incorporate group rights 
and, where groups’ rights are affected, impose higher sanctions? 
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Nigeria Country Report
This report explores the surveillance landscape in Nigeria. It provides a 
concise review of the existing domestic laws, practices and jurisprudence 
relating to surveillance and privacy, while outlining the safeguards, checks 
and balances available and how they operate in practice. Surveillance 
is defined here as the ‘monitoring, interception, collection, analysis, use, 
preservation and retention of, interference with, or access to information that 
includes, reflects, arises from or is about a person’s communications in the 
past, present or future’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 2014). 
The report also examines surveillance cases that have played out in Nigerian 
courts and decides whether the existing surveillance practices are legal, 
necessary and proportionate. In addition, the report considers the efficacy 
of existing laws to protect privacy and limit surveillance. Nigerian surveillance 
law is then compared against international law, specifically against the 
UN Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy 
and the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance (EFF 2014). Recommendations are then made 
based on the analysis of legislation, gaps in existing policies and practices, 
and the need to protect Nigerians’ privacy rights adequately. Finally, the 
report closes with recommendations to different stakeholders on improving 
the quality of legislation, understanding prevalent practices and responsibly 
implementing the law.
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Introduction
State surveillance on its own is ‘not inherently unlawful, especially when 
governments have legitimate reasons to undertake surveillance that is 
not rooted in a desire to enforce political repression and limit individual 
‘freedoms’ (Feldstein 2019: 11). However, governments must ensure that while 
protecting national security they take care to avoid infringing on the human 
rights of their people (Privacy International 2014). Historically, Nigeria has had 
a repressive colonial and military past that encouraged state surveillance. 
Unfortunately, it has continued to fester even during the democratic 
dispensation. As a result, information capture to monitor Nigerian citizens’ 
activities has proliferated in recent years, despite the legal right to privacy.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a population of over 180 
million people. In the past decade, the country has witnessed an increase 
in violent incidents that are threatening national cohesion,1 which the 
government has cited as the justification for surveillance. The government 
was reported in April 2013 to have procured surveillance technology from Elbit 
Systems Limited in Israel (Johnson 2013; Ogala 2013) to ‘advance the internet 
and computer-based gathering of Nigerian citizens’ personal data’ (Advox 
2013). The government ignored protests by concerned civil organisations and 
citizens, and the lack of enabling legislation for such procurement, and went 
ahead regardless. More research (Marquis-Boire et al. 2013) conducted in the 
same year also revealed the government’s involvement with global spyware 
giant FinFisher (ibid.: 104). A report titled ‘Running in Circles: Uncovering 
the Clients of Cyber-espionage Firm Circles’ also revealed that ‘a telecom 
surveillance company by the name of Firm Circles [had] been helping state 
security apparatuses across 25 countries, including Nigeria, to spy on the 
communications of opposition figures, journalists, and protesters’ (Al Jazeera 
2020). The Nigerian government spent close to 46 billion naira (US$127.6 
million) in 2017 (Budget Office of the Federation 2021) and budgeted almost 9 
billion naira (US$22.8 million) in 2020 (Adegoke 2021) for surveillance-related 
activities or equipment.
Multiple state agencies now require fingerprint, facial capturing or other 
biometric2 data for identification. No less than six government agencies 
maintain different biometric data points on citizens and residents at federal 
1  There is the notorious threat posed by militant Islamist group Boko Haram, which has been 
reported to be the cause of more than 300,000 deaths, with more than 2 million people displaced in 
the north-eastern part of the country since 2002 when the group started its operations. In the north-
west, communities have witnessed killings and kidnappings by armed groups. There have also been 
military actions in the south and the south-east.
2  Biometrics is the measurement and statistical analysis of people's unique physical and 
behavioural characteristics.
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level,3 while some state governments have also adopted resident registration 
programmes (Ajayi 2021). Some states have adopted closed circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras in public for surveillance and security (TVC News 2020). The 
live feeds from the cameras are observed from a command centre, ensuring 
real-time updates to law enforcement agencies. The Lagos State Vehicle 
Inspection Service uses licence plate recognition of CCTV images to monitor 
traffic offenders and impose sanctions on erring vehicle owners (QED 2018). 
The fine ticket is sent to the address of the owner of the offending vehicle. 
Some law enforcement agents in Lagos state reportedly now wear body 
cameras (Guardian 2021).
The Nigerian Senate in July 2021 approved 4.8 billion naira (US$11 million) to 
the Nigerian Intelligence Agency for the purchase of WhatsApp Intercept 
Solution and Thuraya Interception Solution, ‘a communications system used 
for monitoring voice calls, call-related information, short message service 
(SMS) and data traffic, among others’. The deployment of these tools will 
impact end-to-end encryption for ‘communication’ (Iroanusi 2021). In the 
past year, Nigerians have used virtual private networks (VPNs) to beat the 
‘government’s blocking of access to micro-blogging site Twitter (Arise News 
2021). In June 2021, the government suspended the operation of Twitter in 
Nigeria. Nigerians have also relied on the use of other privacy-preserving 
communication tools such as Signal and Telegram (The New York Times 2021). 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, it ‘found at least two 
companies that produce digital forensics tools – Israel-based Cellebrite and 
U.S.-based AccessData – operating in Nigeria’ (Rozen 2019). The tools are 
capable of extracting information from phones and computers.
One might argue that the government needs targeted surveillance, primarily 
because of the sad realities of the state of insecurity in the country. However, 
civil society organisations and citizens generally are concerned that 
surveillance could be normalised and abused by authorities, especially in 
the absence of adequate legal protection. This concern has been confirmed 
repeatedly by the incidence of surveillance abuse by governments the 
world over. For example, in the case of Nigeria, research has shown that the 
procurement of surveillance equipment by the government was simply for 
‘political reasons, especially by the then authorities in power to monitor their 
adversaries and political opponents’ (Ekott 2013). At the same time, others 
consider the Nigerian government to have the capability to ‘intercept all 
internet activity and to invade users’ privacy at will’ (Dada and Tafida 2014).
3  Independent National Electoral Commission (voter card); Central Bank of Nigeria (bank verification 
number); Nigeria Police Force (tint permit, which allows drivers to wear tinted glasses); Federal Road 
Safety Commission (driver’s licence); Nigeria Immigration Commission (international passport and 
residential permit); and National Identity Management Commission.
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Against this background, this report provides a country assessment of the 
Nigerian government’s use of state surveillance on citizens. In addressing the 
research questions, this report will provide a concise review under several 
subheadings. 
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1. What reasons does the 
Nigerian government use 
to justify surveillance?
Due to its lengthy colonial and military history, surveillance of citizens, 
dissents and opposition has been a recurrent theme. Article 7(3) of the Lawful 
Interception of Communication Regulations (LICR) specifies as legitimate 
aims for surveillance in Nigeria: national security; preventing or investigating 
crime; protecting and safeguarding the economic wellbeing of Nigeria; 
public emergency or safety interests; and giving effect to any international 
agreement Nigeria is a party to. The rise in domestic terrorism has also 
fuelled the case for surveillance, leading to increased spending in this area. 
In addition, the outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014 and the coronavirus 
(Covid-19) pandemic in 2020 provided public health and emergency 
as a premise for health surveillance. Visitors’ personal information was 
documented for testing and tracing. The motive is evident in the enactment 
of the Covid-19 Regulations 2020, under the Quarantine Act (Cap Q2 LFN 
2004). 
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2. Which international 
conventions protecting privacy 
has Nigeria adopted?
Nigeria has ratified or adopted into domestic law a range of international 
conventions that guarantee its citizens’ right to privacy and freedom from 
unwarranted surveillance, including those listed below.
a. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
Article 10 of the charter guarantees African ‘children’s right to privacy. 
Accordingly, children enjoy protection of the law in relation to their 
communications and correspondence, which cannot be unduly interfered 
with. Nigeria ratified the charter in 2001.
b. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 12 provides that no one should be subjected to arbitrary 
interference in relation to their privacy and correspondence. Thus, 
all Nigerians should enjoy legal protection against such arbitrary 
interference.
c. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 17 of the covenant provides that individuals should enjoy protection 
from arbitrary and unlawful interference in their communications and 
correspondence.
d. Economic Community of West African States Supplementary Act on 
Personal Data Protection 
The act creates a legal framework for the protection of personal data 
in the West Africa sub-region. Nigeria is a signatory to the act.These 
international instruments have emerged as international human rights 
norms Nigeria is committed to uphold in relation to protection of privacy. 
According to section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution, these instruments 
take effect and have the force of law in Nigeria when enacted into law by 
the legislature.
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in Nigeria?
The most significant laws and draft bills enabling surveillance include those 
listed below.
a. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
Section 37 of the constitution guarantees the ‘privacy of citizens, their 
homes, correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic 
communications’. However, section 45 restricts the application of rights ‘in 
the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health’. Nonetheless, such derogation must be ‘reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society’.
b. Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015
Section 45(2) (e) and (f) permit law enforcement officers to apply to 
a judge ex parte4 for a warrant to ‘search any data contained in or 
available to any computer system or computer network’ and to ‘use 
any technology to decode or decrypt any coded or encrypted data 
contained in a computer into readable text or comprehensible format’. 
These provisions provide one of the bases for the decryption of encrypted 
communication in Nigeria. 
Similarly, section 38(1) of the act mandates service providers to retain 
traffic and content data for two years. Further, section 38(2) of the act 
allows law enforcement agents to request data from service providers, 
and they are mandated to comply. Section 38(4) prescribes that data 
obtained under the provision can only be used for a legitimate purpose. 
However, the act fails to define what constitutes a legitimate purpose. 
Section 45 of the act enables a law enforcement officer to apply to a 
judge to obtain electronic evidence in the investigation of crime without 
notifying the individual subject to the investigation. There is no publicly 
available repository or report to the legislature documenting such 
requests and approvals. Section 12 criminalises unlawful interception of 
communication with an imprisonment term of up to two years, a fine of 5 
million naira (US$13,888) or both, which is consistent with the international 
principle on safeguards against illegitimate access. Finally, section 38(5) 
4  Ex parte means a legal proceeding brought by one party in the absence of and without 
representation of or notification to another party.
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prescribes that the exercise of the power must uphold the right to privacy 
guaranteed under the constitution.
c. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2019
Part V of the act provides for interception of telecommunications and 
postal items and surveillance, including covert electronic surveillance. 
Among other things, it allows for the exchange with other countries 
of: surveillance information relating to the identification and location 
of criminal offenders; obtaining evidence; securing the production of 
official or judicial records; interception of postal orders; interception 
of telecommunications; and conversion of electronic surveillance. An 
interception under the act is limited to criminal matters of a serious 
nature. In this regard, the government can be involved in the surveillance 
of citizens once it pursues a criminal investigation. The act further 
encourages transparency through the requirement that government 
requests for citizens’ data should be published: such a request can only 
be made based on reasonable suspicion, and it must specify the purpose, 
the type of communication to be intercepted, the details of the recipient 
of the data and details of the authority concerned. The attorney general 
of Nigeria is designated as the central authority responsible for handling 
requests for mutual assistance between the countries. 
d. Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013
The act amends the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 (TPA). It gives the 
relevant law enforcement agency power to intercept communications to 
prevent terrorist acts and detect offences related to them. However, this is 
subject to getting the approval of the attorney general, inspector general 
of police and coordinator of national security. Section 29 of the act 
empowers the relevant law enforcement agency to conduct intelligence 
gathering ‘for the prevention of terrorist acts or to enhance the detection 
of offences related to the preparation of a terrorist act or the prosecution 
of offenders under this Act.’ The judge’s order can permit the installation 
of a device to intercept communication. However, the order must specify 
the duration for the service provider to retain the communication data. 
Section 24 permits terrorism investigation with a judge’s approval; the 
warrant request must specify the purpose and material relevance to 
the investigation. In contrast, section 25 allows an investigation without 
a warrant when there is a verifiable urgency, where life is threatened 
and when seeking the judge’s approval would delay or be prejudicial to 
public safety. Such an officer cannot be less than the rank of the chief 
superintendent of police. 
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e. Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019
The National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) 
published the regulation in 2019. It creates a set of obligations for both 
public and private entities. The regulation provides for data protection 
rights, principles and lawful bases for processing personal data. 
Prominently, public interest exercised by public authority and lawful 
obligation is part of the lawful bases recognised under the regulation. 
The Data Protection Implementation Framework, which is an addendum 
to the regulation, includes processing carried out by public agencies to 
investigate crime, national interest and public safety as exceptions to 
the application of the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation (NDPR). Finally, 
individuals have the right to approach the court to seek redress for 
violation of their rights.   
f. Nigerian Communications Commission Act 2003
The Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) regulates internet service 
providers and mobile phone companies. The Nigerian Communications 
Act provides a ‘regulatory framework for the Nigerian telecommunications 
industry’. Section 147 gives the NCC the power to determine that a 
licensee or class of licensee has ‘the capability to allow authorised 
interception of communications’. Section 148 gives the NCC the power 
on the occurrence of ‘a public emergency or in the interest of public 
safety’ to: suspend operation licenses; take temporary control of services 
or network facilities; order the disclosure, interception or prevention of 
specified communications; withdraw services or network facilities; or 
order the possession of ‘network facilities, service, or customer equipment’ 
(section 148(1a–d)). 
It is disturbing that the act refers to the preservation of ‘national security’ 
and dedicates sections 146–149 to ‘national interest matters’ but fails 
to provide a working definition of the terms. Section 157, which is the 
interpretation section, also categorically fails to spell out what qualifies as 
a public emergency and to define what constitutes public safety. All these 
provide gaps that could occasionally be abused by a future government, 
which could use this imprecision to curtail citizens’ rights.
Outside the principal act, the NCC is empowered to issue secondary 
legislation to regulate the telecommunications sector. The NCC has 
exercised this power by issuing regulations, guidelines and a code of 
practice that impose an obligation on service providers to intercept 
communications, decrypt encrypted communication, disclose 
communications data to law enforcement agencies and potentially 
violate the right to privacy. Concerning surveillance, some of the related 
regulations issued by the NCC are listed below.
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g. Nigerian Communications Commission (Registration of Service 
Telephone Subscribers) Regulations 2011 
Part 2 of the regulation establishes the obligation to maintain a central 
database domiciled within the NCC for the central processing and 
storage of subscribers’ information. Article 8 of the regulation provides 
for access to subscriber information on the central database by security 
agencies. However, it requires that a prior written request specifying the 
purpose of the request should be made to the NCC from ‘an official of 
the requesting security agency who is not below the rank of an Assistant 
Commissioner of Police or a coordinate rank in any other security agency’. 
h. Nigerian Communications (Enforcement Process, etc.) Regulations 2019 
The regulation gives the NCC monitoring and enforcement powers. 
Regulation 8(1) prescribes that ‘every licensee shall keep records of call 
data under the Cybercrimes Act and the consumer code of practice 
regulations’. It also requires every licensee to make available ‘basic’ and 
‘non-basic’ information that may be required by law enforcement agency 
under section 146 of the Nigerian Communications Act (Regulation 8(2)
(a, b)). It states that, concerning basic information, ‘a written request from 
the relevant authority, duly signed by a police officer not below the rank 
of assistant commissioner of police or its equivalent’ would suffice without 
any further assurance; while for non-basic information, a court order is 
necessary. 
i. Guideline for the Provision of Internet Service 2013
The guidelines apply to all internet service providers (ISPs) in Nigeria. 
Paragraph 6 of the guidelines mandate ISPs to cooperate with ‘all law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies investigating cybercrime or other 
illegal activity’. In addition, ISPs must provide investigating authorities with 
service-related information, information about users, and the content 
of their communication. Paragraph 8 of the guidelines mandates ISPs to 
retain user identification, content of user message and traffic data for 
twelve months. The power to intercept communication data is not subject 
to an independent oversight.
j. Registration of Telephone Subscribers Regulation 2011
The regulation makes it mandatory to for subscribers to register SIM cards 
with their biometric data and also establishes a central database of all 
registered subscribers in the country. The provision legitimises mandatory 
SIM registration in the country, which erodes anonymity. Article 9 of the 
regulation guarantees the privacy and confidentiality of subscriber 
information. However, the data can be accessed by security agencies 
if a request is made to the NCC by an officer not below the cadre of an 
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Assistant Commissioner of Police (art. 8). The request must specify the 
reason the information is required. In what appears to be a safeguard, 
article 10 of the regulation specifies that the release of subscribers’ 
personal information to security agents must comply with existing law, 
and such a request can be refused if it constitutes a breach of the 
constitutional provision or any other law or is a threat to national security.
k. Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations 2019
The scope of the regulation includes the provision of a ‘legal and 
regulatory framework for lawful interception of communications, 
collection and disclosure of intercepted communications in Nigeria’. It 
stipulates that only an authorised agency may affect the interception 
of communications. It gives these powers only to the Department of 
State Security, the Nigeria Police Force and the Office of the National 
Security Advisor, subject to obtaining a court warrant. The warrant to 
intercept can be granted when interception is the only way to access 
the communication data and if the ‘facts alleged in the application are 
reasonable and persuasive enough’ to provide sufficient evidence that 
the surveillance subject has or is about to threaten a legitimate aim (LICR 
art. 13(3)).
Article 9 gives the authorised agency the power to request protected 
or encrypted communications disclosure. Security officers have been 
enabled to intercept phone calls, text messages, chat messages or 
emails on this premise (Collins 2013). However, the authorised agency 
must submit an annual report of all concluded interception cases to the 
attorney general. The report is not made publicly available. It allows the 
authorised agency the liberty to store intercepted communications for 
the duration of its investigation. Article 10 mandates service providers to 
install interception capabilities that permit interception. Similarly, article 
11 prohibits network providers from providing services that cannot be 
intercepted and monitored. An application for a warrant should include 
the duration, the grounds for the application, the identity of the subject 
of interception, and the investigating authority’s identity. Article 5 makes it 
an offence to unlawfully intercept communication, which is consistent with 
the international principle of imposing safeguards against illegitimate 
access.
Article 7 provides for an interception with a warrant, while article 8 allows 
interception without a warrant. When interception is carried out without a 
warrant, the investigating authority must apply for a warrant to a judge of 
the Federal High Court within 48 hours after the interception has occurred. 
Where the application is not made, the interception shall terminate and 
be treated as unlawful. Similarly, article 13(2)(d) of the LICR provides that 
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where the judge rejects an application for the interception that has taken 
place, any information obtained before the refusal is invalid and not 
admissible for criminal persecution of the individual affected by it. The 
information extracted is valid for the investigation period and destroyed 
after the conclusion of the investigation. In addition, the information is 
confidential and can only be used for investigation and prosecution in a 
criminal proceeding. An interception order granted by a judge is valid for 
three months or a lesser period specified by the judge, after which the 
record can be archived for three years and destroyed afterwards.
Interestingly, article 20(1) of the LICR allows a network provider or any 
individual aggrieved about any interception activity to notify the NCC or 
make a formal application to the Federal High Court for judicial review. 
Unfortunately, it may be difficult for individuals to know they have been 
targeted for surveillance if they are not notified about it. Specifically, 
article 13(4) of the LICR provides that an application for a warrant shall be 
heard without placing the individual affected under notice.
Other laws and proposed bills
The National Security Agencies Act is another critical piece of legislation, 
which established the State Security Service, Defence Intelligence Agency 
and National Intelligence Agency, the government agencies responsible 
for intelligence gathering in different capacities in the country. There have 
also been legislative proposals to legitimise surveillance by the legislature. 
The Telecommunications Facilities (Lawful Interception of Information) Bill 
2019 seeks to compel telecommunications service providers to enable law 
enforcement agents to intercept communications for national security 
purposes. Section 3 of the bill requires service providers to hand over 
intercepted communications to law enforcement agents. The provision also 
allows the decryption of communications. Section 13 mandates network 
providers to hand over subscribers’ personal information to law enforcement 
agents. Any appeal over violation of the law goes to the minister of justice. 
The bill is currently at its first reading in the House of Representatives (lower 
federal legislature).
The Digital Rights and Freedom Bill 2019 provides for online privacy rights 
and defines the legal framework regarding surveillance. The bill outlines 
the provisions of lawful and authorised interception of communication 
within the digital environment. It grants the court more powers to perform 
oversight functions. Under the bill, surveillance is made subject to necessity 
and furtherance of a legitimate aim. In stemming the asymmetrical 
power dynamics between law enforcement and private citizens, the bill 
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proposes that private organisations make public the details of government 
requests for private citizens’ data. The bill is currently awaiting the House of 
Representative committee report. 
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4. How does Nigerian surveillance 
law compare with that in other 
countries in Africa/US/EU/UK?
Some African countries have been reported to engage in arbitrary mass 
surveillance (Citizen Lab 2020). In addition, there are fears that several 
governments are procuring surveillance tools to monitor dissidents, political 
opponents, human rights defenders and journalists. Algeria, Botswana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were recently reported to have procured 
and deployed surveillance tools (Jili 2020). In July 2021, after a forensic 
investigation, the Guardian and other media outlets reported the use 
by some African countries such as Rwanda, Togo, and Morocco of Israeli 
company NSO Group’s malware, Pegasus, which allows security agencies 
to listen to phone calls, intercept messages, and also to track individuals 
(Damien 2021). The malware has been reportedly used to spy on dissidents, 
opposition, journalists, and foreign leaders (Lynsey 2021).  Although Rwandan 
and Moroccan governments have denied the claim (Kirchgaessner 2021, 
Shaquile 2021), in 2019, dissident and human rights activists from Rwanda and 
Morocco were privately warned by communication giant WhatsApp that 
they were victims of cyber-attacks designed to infiltrate their phones by an 
NSO Group malware (Kirchgaessner et al. 2019). 
The pervasive practice appears to go unchallenged due to vague laws 
that are subject to abuse, codification of state power to conduct mass 
monitoring, the absence of independent oversight bodies, and weak legal 
frameworks and institutions. For example, in Uganda, facial recognition has 
been deployed to monitor protesters (Quartz Africa 2020b).
Nonetheless, there are examples of progressive practices on the continent. In 
South Africa, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communications Related Information Act (RICA) is the primary law on 
surveillance. The RICA creates an oversight body and puts in place several 
safeguards contained under the International Principles. However, the 
law also omits some safeguards. The legal frameworks in South Africa and 
Nigeria lack safeguards on transparency. There is no statutory requirement 
to publish a public annual report, although in Nigeria a report is meant to 
be submitted to the attorney general. Both countries omit the obligation 
to notify individuals either before they are surveilled or at the conclusion of 
surveillance. Under Nigeria’s Cybercrimes Act, investigating authorities can 
apply to the court to conduct surveillance without notifying the individual 
117Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
being surveilled and there is no avenue to challenge the surveillance 
measure or appeal the decision. Both the RICA and LICR mandate the 
communication service provider to ensure their communication tools are 
capable of being intercepted, which is contrary to the international principle 
of integrity of communications and systems and could also open a floodgate 
for unregulated surveillance. 
Both countries have a requirement to specify the category of offence before 
requesting a judicial directive. The TPA requires specifying the subject of 
surveillance in the application to the judge. There also appears to be a 
normative condition to establish a legitimate aim before surveillance. The 
South African law also has the benefit of being tested before the court. For 
example, in 2021 South Africa’s Constitutional Court delivered a landmark 
judgment outlawing mass surveillance in the country. In Amabhungane 
Centre for Investigative Journalism v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services (CCT 278/19) the court held that the government should no longer 
conduct mass surveillance of citizens. The court also declared certain parts 
of the RICA unconstitutional (BusinessTech 2021). Notably, the court stated 
that the RICA fails to provide sufficient safeguards to preserve the right to 
privacy, the law did not provide adequate protection or relief for persons 
subjected to surveillance, and the law did not make provision for individuals 
subjected to surveillance to be notified after the fact, among other issues. 
Nevertheless, South Africa has a specific surveillance law, as recommended 
by the UN Draft Instrument, while in Nigeria legal surveillance provisions 
are located in different laws. This could be considered preferable to having 
contradictory legitimate aims and safeguards specified in different pieces 
of legislation, as in Nigeria. South Africa has a more explicit definition of tests 
for a judge to assess before issuing authorisation, which is not evident in all 
cases in the Nigerian framework. South Africa has an ‘independent oversight 
board’ as conceptualised under the International Principles. The law in South 
Africa also has the advantage of being challenged and tested in court 
by civil society in ways that have identified flaws, clarified provisions and 
provided enhanced privacy protections. 
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5. How does Nigerian surveillance 
law compare with the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument?
The UN Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy 
sets out principles and safeguards on the minimum requirements to conduct 
surveillance. Article 4 of the UN Draft Legal Instrument sets out the principles. 
A quick review of the Nigerian legal framework – including the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Act and the TPA – suggest appreciable adherence to the 
requirement for a legitimate aim, such as the interception for serious crimes. 
In addition, the Nigerian framework requires specifying the details to be 
intercepted in the application for warrant and only intercepting when there 
is a reasonable suspicion and interception is the only way to access the 
communication data, which suggests necessity. There are other additional 
safeguards. For example, under the LICR, the failure to obtain a warrant 
where it is required renders the evidence unlawful and unacceptable before 
the court.
An appraisal of existing Nigerian laws against other principles shows a 
contrasting picture for some parts. Nigeria’s laws are noticeably lacking 
in sufficient procedural safeguards and an independent oversight 
mechanism of the activities of investigating authorities. The UN Draft Legal 
Instrument recommends that government or police officials should seek 
prior authorisation for surveillance from a court and that an oversight body 
independent of both the court and government or police be given the power 
to access all requests and authorisations to ensure that robust checks for the 
legality, necessity and proportionality of surveillance are implemented, and 
that notification is provided to the individuals under surveillance. Specifically, 
the LICR makes it mandatory not to notify the subjects of surveillance when 
the investigating authority is applying to the court for a warrant to intercept 
communication, which deprives the individuals concerned of the right to 
an effective remedy. Notification is essential to fight surveillance overreach. 
Although the LICR allows individuals who are subject to surveillance to 
approach the NCC or Federal High Court for judicial review if dissatisfied 
(LICR, art. 20), the mandatory requirement not to notify them robs them of 
the chance to be aware of the interception before or after the fact (LICR, art. 
13(4)). 
Both the TPA and LICR mandate network service providers to install tools 
that can enable interception capability, which is contrary to the principle of 
integrity of communications under the UN Draft Legal Instrument. The failure 
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to install the tool is punishable with a fine or withdrawal of operation license. 
Also, the LICR permits interception for ‘investigation of crime’ and fails to 
make a distinction or allow interception for the most severe crimes, which 
could allow the abuse of investigative powers. The Nigerian law also includes 
the notification to the regulator and the data subjects when there is a data 
breach.
Another principle of the UN Draft Legal Instrument is the requirement to 
ensure safeguards by law enforcement agencies. For example, the LICR 
and the Cybercrimes Act suggest that the application for a warrant 
should specify the subject of the interception and the grounds on which 
the application is being made, which is consistent with the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion. Under the LICR, the obligation to ensure the security of 
the transmission of data is placed on the network provider. The intercepting 
agency must ensure data are stored confidentially, which is consistent with 
the principle of ensuring confidentiality and integrity of communications 
data under the UN Draft Legal Instrument. Similarly, other laws, such as the 
NDPR, impose security obligations on public agencies. 
Another requirement addresses intelligence sharing with other countries. 
The UN Draft Legal Instrument favours a regime where independent and 
cross-border data transfer rules are adequate. However, under the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Act, the attorney general, a political appointee of the 
government, is responsible for exercising this power in Nigeria. In addition, the 
LICR mandatory requirement for installation of surveillance capability and 
decryption of encrypted communication could pave the way for unregulated 
bulk data collection, contrary to one of the principles in the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument. Also, there are instances of the government deploying 
surveillance tools, as highlighted in the introduction of this report, but 
there is no record or evidence of a human rights impact assessment being 
conducted. None of the laws on surveillance in Nigeria makes it mandatory 
to conduct a human rights impact assessment. Finally, transparency about 
requests and authorisations through the publication of an annual report 
is only visible under the LICR. The report is meant to be submitted to the 
attorney general and it is not made public. 
120Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms?
Generally, not all laws define these phrases. The TPA sets out prevention of 
terrorism as its legitimate aim. Under some laws, such as the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Act and the TPA, it is a requirement to specify the purpose 
of interception. Similarly, these laws require that the application for an 
interception should include the scope and scale of communication data 
required. The provisions appear to prohibit mass surveillance. Also, section 
45(3) of the Cybercrimes Act specifies that a warrant to decrypt data will 
only be issued where there is suspicion that the person named in the warrant 
is about to commit a crime. The exercise of the power is not reserved for 
the most severe crimes. The legitimate aim under the TPA is prevention of 
terrorism; whereas the Mutual Legal Assistance Act applies to the most 
severe crimes. The TPA allows intelligence gathering without a warrant 
where there is an emergency. However, it fails to define what constitutes an 
emergency and that imprecision could be abused. 
Under the Implementation Framework to the NDPR, and the Nigerian 
constitution, the rights guaranteed can only be derogated in limited 
circumstances prescribed by law. The Supreme Court in the case of Military 
Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (2001) FWLR (Part 50) 1779, held that: 
the Nigerian Constitution is founded on the rule of law, the primary 
meaning of which must be done according to the law. It also means 
that government should be conducted within the framework of 
recognised rules and principles which restricts discretionary powers. 
The derogation to the right to privacy under section 45(1)(a) of the 
constitution specifies that it has to be ‘reasonably justified in a democratic 
society’. Consequently, surveillance is not expected to be used arbitrarily.
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7. How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?
Section 45 of the Cybercrimes Act and article 17 of the LICR require an 
interception application be made to a judge. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest if there is recourse to a court, considering that it is done without 
notifying the individual subject of surveillance. In many cases, the individual 
is only aware of surveillance if there is an arrest based on a request for 
communication data from a network provider or in a criminal prosecution if 
it becomes part of the evidence. In 2018, a journalist, Samuel Ogundipe, was 
arrested by the police using communication data obtained from a network 
service provider. Samuel’s arrest is not an isolated case; the Committee to 
Protect Journalists profiled other cases where journalists were arrested by the 
police using records from their network provider (Jonathan 2020). There are 
also reported instances of journalists’ phones, computers and other devices 
being seized by authorities to conduct forensic searches to establish their 
sources of information (Jonathan 2019). In another instance, a Twitter user 
that created a parody account in the name of former president Goodluck 
Jonathan was arrested by the police and detained for 54 days by obtaining 
call records from a network service provider (Sahara Reporters 2020). The 
pattern suggests surveillance is being used arbitrarily for just any crime at the 
behest of security agents, and there is a disregard for rule of law and legal 
safeguards. 
The LICR and the Mutual Legal Assistance Act designate the attorney 
general as the central authority concerning international mutual assistance. 
The LICR specifies that surveillance data collected should not be kept longer 
than necessary and should be destroyed afterwards. The same regulation 
stipulates a limit of three years for the retention of data. Similarly, the 
Cybercrimes Act prescribes two years as the limit to retain traffic data, while 
the Guidelines for the Provision of Internet Service prescribes a limit of twelve 
months Arbitrary retention of data deprives people of anonymity. According 
to EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2021):
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Government mandated data retention impacts millions of ordinary users 
compromising online anonymity which is crucial for whistle-blowers, 
investigators, journalists, and those engaging in political speech. 
National data retention laws are invasive, costly, and damage the right 
to privacy and free expression. They compel ISPs and telcos to create 
large databases of information about who communicates with whom via 
Internet or phone, the duration of the exchange, and the users’ location. 
The institutional mechanism to ensure checks and balances is almost non-
existent. There is no independent oversight body to monitor activities of 
investigating authorities. The role of the Federal High Court is limited to 
surveillance requests brought to its attention. There is no similar provision 
to request an audit or to publicly publish a transparency report of 
authorisations and interception requests. Although the LICR makes it a 
requirement for law enforcement agencies to submit a report to the attorney 
general, there is no way to verify if this is observed in practice. The provision 
that seems to have paved the way for accountability, the transparency 
report, is meant to be presented to the attorney general, a political 
appointee, who is not an independent authority. It is instructive to say that 
Nigeria has an access to information law, the Freedom of Information Act.
There is also no obligation for organisations to publish a transparency 
report on the number and types of requests they get from the government. 
The Digital Rights and Freedom Bill makes it a requirement to publish a 
transparency report stating the types of request made by the government. 
To get an idea of the extent and types of requests made by the Nigerian 
government, one may look at the transparency report published by big 
technology companies. It is hard to independently verify the practical 
application of and adherence to these principles because surveillance is 
shrouded in secrecy (Dada and Tafida 2014). Also, the role of research and 
disclosures by entities selling surveillance tools has provided insights into the 
government’s capability (Citizen Lab 2020). Finally, none of the laws makes 
it a requirement to conduct a human rights impact assessment before 
deployment of surveillance tools by the government. 
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8. How effective are existing laws 
and practices in protecting privacy 
and limiting surveillance?
The Nigerian court has recognised the right to privacy and data protection. 
Data protection rights available to individuals are contained under the 
NDPR. However, public authorities could use derogations in areas such 
as public interest, national security and investigation of crime to limit the 
exercise of those rights. The constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy 
is also limited in similar circumstances and when it would affect the rights of 
another individual. This is a common scenario with many regulations: they 
broadly provide for a right, then list wide-ranging exceptions that derogate 
from the right that seeks to be protected. The efficacy of existing privacy 
laws is affected by the inadequate regulatory framework surrounding privacy 
protection in Nigeria. Nigeria lacks a comprehensive data protection law and 
an independent data protection authority to enforce the law. The gaps in 
laws and practices have been consistently exploited by authorities to violate 
the privacy rights of Nigerian citizens, civil society and the media (Adegoke 
2021). 
The laws enabling surveillance impose obligations to preserve the right 
to privacy guaranteed under the constitution, but government agencies 
are known for violating this right. For example, the NITDA issued a notice 
of enforcement on the Nigeria Immigration Service for violating a citizen’s 
privacy by publishing their biodata on social media platform Twitter, but 
they failed to issue a sanction or disclose the outcome of the investigation 
(Umoren 2019). Measures adopted by the government cast doubt on 
the intention to preserve privacy. The enactment of a law allowing the 
decryption of encrypted communication, the requirement on network 
providers to install interception capability, the requirement for mandatory 
registration of SIM cards for mobile devices, the forced integration of SIM 
registration with the national biometric identity number, and evidence of 
procurement of surveillance tools do not suggest the intention to preserve 
privacy. Surveillance is shrouded in secrecy and it is often hard to know which 
law is being relied upon.
However, section 26(3) of the National Identity Management Commission 
(NIMC) Act 2007 allows the information of an individual to be given without 
the individual’s consent if it is ‘in the interest of national security; necessary 
for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of crime; or for any 
other purpose as may be specified by the Commission in a regulation.’ The 
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problem with this provision is that the terminologies are not defined; and 
simply throwing around the defence of national security or public interest 
without a qualified, legitimate purpose would only occasion arbitrary 
restriction of citizens’ rights. States must instead ‘demonstrate the risk that 
a specific expression poses to a defined national security or public order 
interest’ (United Nations General Assembly 2014) and show that it is in the 
interest of the whole nation, and not just ‘the sole interest of a Government, 
regime or power group’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2019).
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in Nigeria ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’?
The constitutional guarantee of the right to privacy can only be derogated in 
limited circumstances. Safeguards should ensure that any such interceptions 
are legal, necessary and proportionate. The comparative assessment in this 
report suggests that existing surveillance law and practices in Nigeria do 
not entirely meet the legal threshold. Although surveillance is founded in law, 
it is hard to know which laws enforcement agencies rely upon in practice. A 
case in hand is the procurement of surveillance tools by some governors in 
the south of the country. The tools were acquired mainly to spy on political 
opponents (Ogala 2016). Presumably, all of this happened outside of the law 
and without the authorisation of the court.
Article 13(3)(b) of the LICR specifies that a judge should only grant a warrant 
where ‘interception of such communication is the only means of obtaining 
the information required’ and if the ‘facts alleged in the application are 
reasonable and persuasive enough’ to provide sufficient evidence that 
the surveillance subject has or is about to threaten a legitimate aim. 
The provisions suggest the requirement of necessity. Section 39 of the 
Cybercrimes Act requires that interception can only be done where there 
is reasonable suspicion of a crime. However, tracking journalists’ phones 
and their subsequent arrests or conducting forensic investigations on 
their computers does not appear to be necessary (CPJ 2019). Similarly, the 
retention period of data for up to two and three years under the Cybercrimes 
Act and the LICR, respectively, is excessive. Consequently, these extreme 
measures cannot be considered proportionate, but rather a violation of 
fundamental rights. In Nigeria, then, multiple examples of surveillance are 
neither legal, necessary nor proportionate. However, these failings have yet 
to be challenged in court. 
The LICR also imposes a limit on the duration of surveillance, which should be 
restricted to the period of the investigation and the record should be deleted 
upon completion of investigation. Intercepted communication can only 
be used for investigation and criminal prosecution. The judge may grant a 
warrant for three months or for a lesser period. 
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10. How has surveillance law played 
out in court in Nigeria?
Due to the secrecy around state-sanctioned surveillance in the country, the 
absence of transparency about interceptions and notification of individuals 
under surveillance, there were no records of court decisions specifically 
challenging surveillance at the time of writing. However, there are number of 
cases that slightly impact surveillance. The Court of Appeal has recognised 
the right to privacy in the case of Emerging Markets Telecommunication 
Services Ltd v. Godfrey Eneye (2018) LPELR-46193(CA). In 2013, Pan-African 
digital rights organisation, Paradigm Initiative, filed a freedom of information 
request before the Nigerian government to provide additional details about 
its contract with Elbit Systems to purchase surveillance tools, which was not 
responded to (Irene 2013). Earlier, it become public that the government 
awarded a US$40 million to Elbit Systems to purchase surveillance tools 
(Ogala 2013). Subsequently, the organisation instituted a case before the 
Federal High Court to mandate the government to provide more information 
about the contract. The court did not grant the request (Premium Times 
2013).
In 2017, Paradigm Initiative filed a freedom of information request before the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, requesting information about the details 
of the proposed launch of two satellites by the National Space Development 
and Research Agency (NASDA) (Okunola 2017). The ministry refused to 
respond to the request. Consequently, the group approached the Federal 
High Court to direct the ministry to provide information about the satellite 
launch. The court granted the request of the organisation and directed the 
ministry to provide the information requested.5 
In another case, Paradigm Initiative challenged the provision of section 
38 of the Cybercrimes on mandatory data retention for violating the right 
to privacy under the constitution and other international human rights 
instruments Nigeria is committed to. Both the Federal High Court and the 
Court of Appeal ruled against the organisation. The Court of Appeal decided 
that the provision on data retention is necessary to assist in the detection 
and investigation of crime for the public good.6 The organisation appealed 
the decision, and the case is currently pending at the Supreme Court at the 
time of writing (Paradigm Initiative 2018). Similarly, in 2019, the organisation 
5  Incorporated Trustee of Paradigm Initiative for Information Technology Development v. Ministry of 
Science and Technology. FHC/CS/481/2017 
6  Incorporated Trustee of Paradigm Initiative for Information Technology Development and others v. 
Attorney General of the Federation. CA/L/556/2017 
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sent a Freedom of Information Request to the NCC asking for information 
about the legal safeguards in the surveillance practices of the government 
after enacting the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (Paradigm 
Initiative 2019). The act permitted the interception and sharing of intelligence 
with other countries. Also, there is an increasing number of cases going 
before the court founded on the violation of the right to privacy and data 
protection.
Regardless, there is a significant role for strategic litigation to challenge 
existing legal provisions that violate fundamental human rights enshrined 
in the constitution and international human rights norms to which Nigeria 
has committed. The media have a huge role in drawing attention to these 
laws and holding intelligence services to account. The use of the freedom 
of information law to test accountability and transparency could prove 
significant in understanding law enforcement agents’ activities. 
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11. What is working? What gaps are 
there in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge, and capacity?
Some of the laws have provisions that comply with UN principles, which is 
commendable. However, the challenge has been the government’s non-
adherence to provisions of the law and the arbitrary use of state power. A 
noticeable gap in existing policies is the lack of a comprehensive framework 
that regulates the country’s data protection and privacy space and the 
absence of an independent data protection authority. How then does a 
country without an exhaustive legal framework for data protection intend to 
monitor communications or guarantee a remedy for violations of the data 
protection right within the ambit of the law?
The country also lacks the needed political will to drive such exhaustive 
policies. For instance, the country’s draft data protection bill was presented 
before the 6th National Assembly (2011–2015) without success. The 7th 
National Assembly passed the data protection bill in 2019, which President 
Muhammadu Buhari rejected. No reason was adduced publicly for the bill’s 
rejection (Oloyede 2021). Rather than drive policies, budgetary spending 
on surveillance has increased in the past decade (Adegoke 2021). The 
enactment of a law allowing the decryption of encrypted communication, 
the requirement for mandatory registration of SIM cards and forced 
integration with a national biometric identity, and evidence of procurement 
of surveillance tools do not suggest the intention to preserve privacy. Also, 
the requirement on network providers to install interception capability is 
contrary to the principle of integrity of communications.
The increased introduction of surveillance technologies in the country 
without independent institutional oversight and a mandatory requirement 
to conduct a human rights impact assessment before using them makes it 
easy to subject citizens to unnecessary and disproportionate surveillance. 
In addition, safeguards such as the right to notification, right to effective 
remedy, an independent oversight regime for intelligence sharing and review 
and the right to appeal an assessment contained in international human 
rights instruments are also missing. Lastly, transparency about requests and 
authorisation is shrouded in secrecy. 
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12. What recommendations arise 
from this analysis for legislation, 
practice or further research?
For policymakers and legislators
• Existing laws should be reviewed to incorporate the principles 
espoused in the UN Draft Legal Instrument. The amendment should 
consider the following: 
 ▫ Mandatory notification of individuals to enable them to 
contest surveillance;
 ▫ Institutionalising an independent oversight body to review 
decisions and intelligence sharing with third countries;
 ▫ A mandatory requirement to conduct human rights and data 
protection impact assessments before deploying surveillance 
tools;
 ▫ The right to appeal assessment; and
 ▫ An obligation to notify the data protection authority when 
there is a data breach.
• Nigeria should enact a comprehensive data protection law.
• The Digital Rights and Freedom Bill should be passed and enacted into 
law.
• NCC regulations should be reviewed to enforce judicial oversight 
and to accommodate a mandatory publicly accessible annual 
report. Only a judge should determine legitimate purposes.
• Members of the legislature should pass a resolution demanding 
greater transparency about the activities of law enforcement 
agencies concerning requests for communications data. They 
should also exercise their supervisory powers guaranteed under 
the constitution to audit the affairs of law enforcement agencies. 
For civil society organisations and activists 
• There is a need for mode data-driven research to show the extent of 
the government’s surveillance capability.
• There should be an increase in the use of freedom of information 
requests to demand accountability and transparency from public 
authorities on procurement and use of surveillance tools.
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• There is a need to demand greater accountability and transparency 
from the government through constant engagement, using freedom 
of information law and exploring strategic litigation to clarify the law, 
narrow surveillance targets, and protect and safeguard citizens’ rights.
• Civil society organisations should challenge intelligence services over 
violations of the laws or existing human rights instruments that Nigeria 
is a party to. 
• Civil society organisations should raise public awareness concerning 
privacy and data protection rights. This would promote citizens’ 
self-awareness concerning protection of their digital rights.
• There is an urgent need for strategic litigation to demand 
accountability and question the disregard for the provisions 
of existing laws. Also, vague words that could lead to abuse 
of power should be challenged before the courts.
For government
• The government should be transparent about its procurement of 
surveillance tools.
• Publication of details of interception requests made should be publicly 
available to promote transparency and accountability.
• The attorney general’s office should serve the interests of the people 
instead of seeking to preserve the government that appointed it.
• Institutions should be adequately funded to carry out their statutory 
duties.
For researchers and academia
• It is recommended that a regulatory impact assessment should be 
conducted to highlight failures, gaps and what is currently working in 
the existing legal framework.
• There is a need to build additional capacity within Nigerian legal, 
civil society and academic research communities to more effectively 
monitor, map and analyse the existing characteristics of surveillance 
law and practice in Nigeria, which is a necessary precondition for 
defining effective legal and policy measures to improve the current 
situation. 
• It is recommended that more research should be carried out to reveal 
new evidence on the tools, scale, methods and tactics the government 
uses to conduct surveillance.
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For journalists 
• Journalists should raise public awareness about the government’s 
surveillance practices and their effects to build political pressure for 
changes in law and practice. 
• There is a need to invest in capacity building of journalists to 
understand the implications of surveillance and its different 
manifestations to present the public with an informed perspective.
• More research needs to be done to understand the categories and 
volume of cases in which surveillance data are used as evidence.
Nigeria Country Report
132Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
References
Adegoke, A. (2020) ‘Digital Rights and Privacy in Nigeria’ Paradigm Initiative (accessed 26 May 2021)
Adegoke, B.  (2021) ‘COVID-19, digital rights and Nigeria’s emerging surveillance state’ Global Voices 
(accessed 26 May 2021)
Advox (2013) ‘Nigerian Government to Ramp up Internet Surveillance?’ Global Voices (accessed 29 
July 2021)
Ajayi, A. (2021) ‘Insecurity: Oyo to Register Residents’, Peoples Gazette, (accessed 18 September 2021)
Al Jazeera (2020) ‘Nigerian Intelligence Bought Tool to Spy on Citizens: Report’, (accessed 12 May 
2021)
Arise News (2021) ‘Nigerians Opt for VPNs Following Twitter Ban’ (accessed 15 July 2021)
Billstrack (2016) ‘Digital Rights and Freedom Bill’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
BusinessTech (2021)  ‘South Africa’s RICA Law Is Unconstitutional: Court Ruling’ (accessed 31 July 2021)
Budget Office of the Federation (2021) ‘Budget Document’ (accessed 12 May 2021)
Citizen Lab (2020) ‘Running in Circles: Uncovering the Clients of Cyberespionage Firm Circles’ 
(accessed 1 July 2021)
Collins, K. (2013) ‘Nigeria embarks on a mobile phone surveillance project’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2018) ‘Nigerian Journalist Jailed for Refusing to Reveal 
Source’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Dada, J. and Tafida, T. (2014) ‘Communications surveillance in a digital age’ (accessed 11 May 2021)
Dada, J and Tafida, T. (2014) ‘Online surveillance: Public concerns ignored in Nigeria’ Global 
Information Society Watch (accessed 1 July 2021)
Damien G. (2021) ‘Morocco, Rwanda, Togo…How Involved Is Africa in ‘Pegasus Gate’?’, The Africa 
Report (accessed 28 July 2021)
Egbunike, N. and Burbidge, D. (2013) Nigerian Government to Ramp Up Internet Surveillance? 
(accessed 26 May 2021)
Ehiagwina, F. (2015) ‘Managing Insecurity with Biometric Engineering: An Overview of the Nigerian 
Experience’, paper presented at the International Academic Conference on Globalization and 
Contemporary Issues: Opportunities for Sub-Sahara African Transformation & Development (accessed 
4 August 2021)
Ekott, I. (2013) ‘ACN Urges Nigerians to Resist Jonathan’s ‘Evil’ $40million Internet Spy Contract’, 
Premium Times, 29 April (accessed 11 May 2021)
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (2021) ‘Mandatory Data Retention’ (accessed 28 July 2021)
133Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (2014) ‘International Principles on the Application of Human 
Rights to Communications Surveillance’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Federation of American Scientists (2021) ‘State Security Service (SSS) – Nigeria Intelligence Agencies’ 
(accessed 1 July 2021)
Feldstein, S. (2019) ‘The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance’ Carnegie (accessed 26 May 2021)
Guardian (2021) ‘Response from NSO and Governments’ (accessed 28 July 2021)
Irene P. (2013) ‘Paradigm Initiative Nigeria Seeks Information on Surveillance Systems in Nigeria’ The 
Citizen Lab (accessed 28 July 2021)
Iroanusi, Q. (2021) ‘Nigerian Govt Moves to Control Media, Allocates N4.8bn to Monitor WhatsApp, 
Phone Calls’, Premium Times (accessed 15 July 2021)
Jili, B.  (2020) ‘Surveillance Tech in Africa Stirs Security Concerns’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies 
(accessed 1 July 2021)
Johnson, J. (2013) ‘Scandal in Nigeria over Israeli arms firm’s Internet spying contract’, The Electronic 
Intifada (26 May 2021)
Jonathan R (2020) ‘How Nigeria’s police used telecom surveillance to lure and arrest journalists’, 
Committee to Protect Journalists (accessed 28 July 2021)
Jonathan R. (2019) ‘Nigerian Military Targeted Journalists’ Phones, Computers with ‘Forensic Search’ 
for Sources’ Committee to Protect Journalists (accessed 28 July 2021)
Kirchgaessner, S. (2021) ‘Hotel Rwanda Activist’s Daughter Placed under Pegasus Surveillance’, The 
Guardian, (accessed 29 July 2021)
Kirchgaessner, S.; Hopkins, N. and Holmes, O. (2019) ‘WhatsApp ‘Hack’ Is Serious Rights Violation, Say 
Alleged Victims’, The Guardian, (accessed 29 July  2021)
Lagos State Resident Registration Agency (2020) ‘Welcome!’ (accessed 28 May 2021)
LawNigeria (2018) ‘Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (With Amendments)’ 
(accessed 26 May 2021)
LawNigeria (1999) ‘Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Lynsey C. (2021) ‘Pegasus Lands in Africa’, Foreign Policy (accessed 28 July 2021)
Marquis-Boire, M. (2013) ‘For Their Eyes Only: The Commercialisation of Digital Spying’ The Citizen Lab 
(accessed 26 May 2021)
Munis, V.O. (2014) ‘CBN Introduces Bank Verification Numbers’ International Law Office (accessed 26 
May 2021)
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2019) ‘Surveillance and human rights – Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
134Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
Ogala E. (2016) ‘Investigation: How Governors Dickson, Okowa Spend Billions on High Tech Spying on 
Opponents, Others’, Premium Times, (accessed 28 July 2021)
Ogala, E. (2013) ‘Jonathan awards a $40million contract to an Israeli company to monitor computer, 
Internet communication by Nigerians’, Premium Times, (accessed 26 May 2021)
Okunola, F. (2017) ‘Digital Rights Organization Gets Boost in Suit against the Science & Tech Ministry’ 
Pulse (accessed 28 July 2021)
Oloyede R. (2021) ‘Legislative prediction for privacy and data protection in Nigeria’ (accessed 15 July 
2021)
Oloyede, R. (2020) ‘A comparative analysis between the Digital Rights and Freedom Bill and other 
legislation in Nigeria’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Paradigm Initiative (2019) ‘Paradigm Initiative sends FoI Request to NCC on Nigeria’s New Surveillance 
Provisions’ (accessed 28 July 2021)
Paradigm Initiative (2018) Legal Battle Over Cybercrimes Act Moves to the Supreme Court (accessed 
28 July 2021)
Paradigm Initiative and Privacy International (2018) ‘Stakeholder Report Universal Periodic Review 31st 
Session’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Premium Times (2013) ‘Judge Asks National Assembly to Restrict Application of FOI Act’ (accessed 28 
July 2021)
Privacy International (2014) ‘Nigerian Government under Fire for Expansion of Surveillance Programs’ 
(accessed 3 June 2021)
Quartz Africa (2020a) Nigeria, Kenya Use Israeli Surveillance Tool to Listen to Calls (accessed 1 July 
2021)
QED (2018) ‘We Now Use Cameras to Track Vehicles in Lagos’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Quartz Africa (2020b) ‘Uganda Uses China’s Huawei Facial Recognition to Snare Protesters’ 
(accessed 1 July 2021)
RightDocs (2017) ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
Rozen, J. (2019) ‘Nigerian Military Targeted Journalists’ Phones, Computers with ‘Forensic Search’ for 
Sources, Committee to Protect Journalists (accessed 20 May 2021)
 
Sahara Reporters (2020) ‘How Ex-Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, Got University Student 
Who Created Parody Twitter Account in His Name Detained for 54 Days’ (accessed 28 July 2021)
Salau, G. and Akomolafe, J. (2021) ‘Lagos Kits LASTMA, VIO, Others with Body Cameras to Check 
Abuse, Crime’, The Guardian (accessed 28 May 2021)
Sesan, G.; Soremi, B. and Oluwafemi, B. (2013) ‘Economic Cost of Cybercrime in Nigeria’ (accessed 26 
May 2021)
135Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Nigeria Country Report
Shaquile G. (2021) ‘Pegasus Project: Morocco’s Public Prosecutor Orders Probe into ‘False 
Allegations’’, Morocco World News, (accessed 29 July 2021)
The New York Times (2021) ‘Millions Flock to Telegram and Signal as Fears Grow over Big Tech’ 
(accessed 15 July 2021)
Tukur, S. (2017) ‘Shocking Revelation: 100,000 Killed, Two Million Displaced by Boko Haram Insurgency, 
Borno Governor Says’, Premium Times (accessed 11 May 2021)
 
TVC News (2020) ‘Kano Installs 24/7 CCTV Surveillance Cameras to Curb Crime’, (accessed June 30)
Umoren, B. (2019) ‘NITDA commences investigation on alleged breach of NDPR’, Today.ng (accessed 
26 May 2021)
United Nations General Assembly (2014) ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ (accessed 26 May 
2021)
United Nations General Assembly (2016) ‘Oral Revisions of June 30’ (accessed 26 May 2021)
136Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Surveillance Law 
in Africa: 




137Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
Senegal Country Report
Introduction
Different countries deploy surveillance and interception of communications 
to combat crimes and ensure national or economic security (Chris 2005). The 
emergence of serious crimes such as terrorism has increased governments’ 
appetite to conduct communications surveillance. The United Nations 
(UN) Human Rights Council defines communications surveillance as, ‘the 
monitoring, interception, collection, preservation and retention of information 
that has been communicated, relayed or generated over communications 
networks’ (UNHRC 2013). Nonetheless, government surveillance must meet the 
minimum human rights standards and individuals must be protected against 
arbitrary interference with their right to privacy (Privacy International 2018a). 
Unfortunately, failure to adhere to these human rights norms and principles 
could erode the rights to privacy, expression and assembly (Media and 
Democracy 2016).  
Senegal, a former French colony, has enjoyed an uninterrupted constitutional 
democracy since independence in 1960, compared to neighbouring 
countries (Freedom House 2021). The Constitution of Senegal guarantees 
the right to privacy of communication and prohibits surveillance. However, 
violations of these rights by the government have been reported (Amnesty 
International 2020). Senegal has adopted a series of international human 
rights instruments that reinforce these guarantees (Claiming Human Rights 
2011). According to the explanatory statement of Intelligence Services Law, 
‘intelligence must play a vanguard role in the national security system’. 
Nonetheless, there have been documented instances of state use of 
surveillance capability.  
A report by non-profit association OSIRIS cited instances of citizens’ 
conversations on telephone lines being monitored (Osiris 2021). In 2010, 
the United Sates (US) Department of State reported that illegal telephone 
monitoring by security services was common practice in Senegal. However, 
the threat of terrorism and availability of digital technologies has provided 
new impetus to monitor communications (US Department of State 2011). 
The Government of Senegal has used insecurity around the Sahel region 
as a reason to introduce internal security legislation (Counter Extremism 
Project 2020). In addition, a military expedition against the separatist 
movement in the country’s Casamance region has added to the mix 
of violence confronting the country (Africanews 2021). These perceived 
threats led the government to amend the Penal Code and Code of 
Criminal Procedure, creating new terrorism-related offences, increasing 
the powers of investigating authorities (Amnesty International 2016), 
legitimising interception of communications and imposing stiffer penalties 
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for terror-related activities and unlawful interception (Lequotidien – Journal 
d’information Générale 2017). There are plans to amend both laws further to 
address terrorism (BBC News Afrique 2021). 
In 2016, Senegalese authorities arrested 11 people linked to Nigerian-based 
terror group Boko Haram, including one individual, Momodou Ndiaye, who 
was reported to have been tracked through his activities on Facebook 
(Reuters 2017). ‘In 2016, Senegalese authorities also arrested Moustapha 
Diatta, who ran a Facebook page called ‘Proselytise Senegal’. Diatta 
reportedly helped Senegalese individuals – including three of his children – 
travel to Libya to fight for ISIS’1  (Institute for Global Change 2017).  
Beyond security threats, other factors are driving wider adoption of 
surveillance in Senegal. The European Union (EU) is funding a national 
biometric identity programme worth €28 million to control immigration 
(Privacy International 2018b). The grant is part of the EU’s Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa, which was launched in 2015 to stop ‘irregular’ migration, 
‘enforcing the rule of law through capacity building supporting security 
and development and law enforcement, including border management 
migration-related aspects’ (Privacy International 2020). According to 
telecommunications company Orange’s Transparency Report on Freedom of 
Expression and Privacy Protection in 2016, the Senegalese government made 
the second-highest number of customer data interception surveillance 
requests in Africa (Orange 2017). 
Senegal has mandatory requirements to register mobile device SIM cards 
(Privacy International 2019a). The mandatory requirement to register SIM 
cards erodes anonymity and negatively impacts the right to privacy 
of communications. Senegal has also been accused of purchasing 
FinFisher surveillance malware capable of monitoring communications 
(Privacy International 2015). Some laws allow the government to carry out 
surveillance, enable monitoring capability and increase investigatory powers. 
This report looks at these laws and evaluates them against the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument (2018) on state surveillance, which allows targeted 
surveillance. The report sets out how the laws apply in practice and 
concludes with specific recommendations for different stakeholders. The 
remainder of this report is organised as answers to 12 questions about 
surveillance law in Senegal. 
1  Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham – a global terrorist group responsible for attacks in many parts 
of the world.
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1. What reasons does the 
Senegalese government use 
to justify surveillance? 
Like many other countries, the Senegalese government’s primary driver for 
surveillance is national security, according to the explanatory statement 
of the Law on Intelligence Services. Increasing terrorism activities in 
neighbouring countries and the Sahel region, and insurrection in the country’s 
Casamance region, have also been drivers. As a result, the government 
enacted an anti-terror law that empowers law enforcement agencies 
to intercept communications. However, the state has reportedly used 
surveillance outside the legitimate purpose advanced by the government. 
For example, the government has reported purchasing surveillance tools 
to monitor citizens (The Africa Report 2020). Similarly, EU funding to control 
immigration has given the government a more comprehensive capability to 
monitor people (Privacy International 2019c). Health and disease surveillance 
was also deployed to combat the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic when 
the government declared a state of emergency and conducted contact 
tracing (DHIS 2 2021).  
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2. Which international 
conventions protecting privacy 
has Senegal adopted? 
The country has ratified or signed several international instruments, some of 
which are listed below. 
a. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1999) 
Article 10 of the charter guarantees African children’s right to privacy. 
Accordingly, a Senegalese child enjoys the protection of the law over their 
communications and correspondence, which cannot be unduly interfered 
with. 
b. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
Article 12 provides that no one should be subjected to arbitrary 
interference in their privacy and correspondence. Thus, all Senegalese 
enjoy legal protection against such arbitrary interference. 
c. African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Protection of Personal 
Data (Malabo Convention) (2014)
The convention establishes a baseline for legislation to protect personal 
data in Africa. Senegal is a signatory and although it is one of the African 
countries that ratified the Malabo Convention early, the convention has 
yet to take effect because it requires ratification by 15 countries; it has only 
been ratified by ten (African Union 2021).
d. Economic Community of West African States Supplementary Act on 
Personal Data Protection (2010)
The act creates a legal framework for the protection of personal data in 
the subregion. Senegal is a signatory to the act. 
e. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
Article 17 of the covenant protects Senegalese citizens from arbitrary and 
unlawful interference with their communications and correspondence.  
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f. Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Modernised 
Convention no. 108) (1981) 
The convention provides a framework for the protection of personal data. 
It is the only binding data protection instrument globally and Senegal has 
acceded to the instrument. 
g. Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest 
Convention) (2001) 
The convention is the only binding international instrument on cybercrime. 
It prescribed the framework for countries to legislate on cybercrime. 
Article 21 of the convention provides for the interception of content data. 
Therefore, countries should adopt the legislation necessary for severe 
offences to empower their competent authorities to intercept content 
data. The power to intercept is subject to article 15 of the convention, 
which prescribes that countries should adopt safeguards. 
Other international commitments 
Senegal is also committed to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, which established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR), a quasi-judicial body responsible for the protection and 
promotion of human and peoples’ rights. The ACHPR reviews the state’s 
reports concerning its human rights situation and decides on complaints of 
alleged violations. Additionally, Senegal has accepted the jurisdiction of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to hear complaints presented 
by the commission (International Justice Resource Center 2017). 
These international commitments set out established principles that guide 
the Senegalese government. Article 79 of the Constitution of Senegal 
stipulates that international law takes precedence over domestic law. 
Consequently, international human rights instruments are part of the 
domestic law of Senegal and take precedence over any discriminatory 
state law (Privacy International 2013). Consequently, there is a solid 
legal framework that protects the privacy of communications and 
correspondence from arbitrary and unlawful interference by the government 
or any other entity. 
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in Senegal? 
a. Constitution of Senegal 2001 
Article 13 of the Constitution of Senegal establishes the right of citizens 
to privacy, stating that ‘the secrecy of correspondence and electronic 
communications is inviolable. A restriction on this inviolability can only 
be ordered following the law.’ This is in accord with the recommendation 
of the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance that any surveillance that interferes with the 
right to privacy must be expressly allowed and defined in law (EFF 2014). 
b. Intelligence Services Law 2016  
Article 10 defines a limited number of ‘legitimate aims’ for surveillance, 
such as the threat of terrorist attack. The law makes it possible for 
Senegal’s special intelligence services to conduct surveillance if there 
are no other ways to address the threat. In such cases, Article 10 makes it 
legal to resort to technical, intrusive surveillance or location procedures to 
gather valuable information to neutralise the perceived threat. Similarly, 
Article 8 provides that investigating entities may, with authorisation 
from and under the control of a competent public prosecutor, resort to 
the means of investigation under Article 10. The evidence duly collected 
by these means is admissible in court and is left to the discretion of the 
competent criminal court. Article 9 stipulates that in executing their 
mission, intelligence services must have recourse to the legality of the 
means employed and proportionality to the seriousness of the threat. This 
is consistent with the international principle of proportionality. Article 14 
provides that an administrative body will be responsible for controlling the 
activities of the intelligence services. The public prosecutor is designated 
as the administrative oversight authority; there is no judicial intervention 
or oversight as prescribed under the International Principles.  
c. Protection of Personal Data Law 2008, and Decree Concerning Law 
Enforcement 2008  
Article 1 sets out the objective of the law, which is to protect the right 
to privacy. Article 35 prohibits the misuse of personal data. The law 
also creates specific obligations on public and private authorities to 
implement data protection principles. Significantly, data-processing 
activity must be lawful. The law established the Data Protection 
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Commission (CDP), which acts as the data protection authority 
responsible for enforcing the law. The law puts in place safeguards to 
preserve data protection rights, but allows derogations in cases of public 
interest, national security or investigation of crime, as contained in Article 
40 of the Decree.  
d. Code of Criminal Procedure Law 2016 
Combatting terrorism was set out as the legitimate aim of the legislation. 
Article 90-2 empowers the investigating authority to search computer 
systems if it is essential for investigating a crime. However, the search is 
subject to international commitments in force in Senegal. Articles 90-4 
and 90-17 empower the investigating authority to decrypt encrypted 
data for investigation. According to Amnesty International, 
these articles are loosely worded and appear to extend the investigative 
judge’s powers of investigation beyond specific data concerning a 
targeted individual allegedly linked to the criminal activity in question. 
These powers seem to extend to the very functioning of the computer 
system, which compromises all the data relating to it.  
(Amnesty International 2016) 
Article 90-16 empowers the investigating authority to conduct 
interception of communications under a judicial authorisation. The 
order must specify the communications to be intercepted, the offence 
motivating the interception and the duration of the interception The 
planned investigative measures must be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offence. However, the exercise of this power is not subject to judicial 
appeal. 
Article 90-11 provides that if the necessities of the search for evidence so 
require, the investigating authority in the execution of a judicial directive 
may use appropriate technical means to collect or record in real time 
data relating to the content of specific communications transmitted using 
a computer system or oblige a service provider, within the framework of 
its technical capabilities, to collect or record computer data, or assist 
the competent authorities in collecting or recording the data. Article 
90-10 permits the investigating judge for the purpose of investigation to 
direct the installation of software to intercept, which is contrary to the 
international principle of integrity of communications system.  
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e. Code of Electronic Communications 2018 
Article 27 allows the government to oversee traffic management, 
surveillance and potential blocking of services. The code also expanded 
government oversight on intermediaries, which could lead to monitoring 
and violation of privacy rights. Article 36 of the code imposes the 
obligation on service providers to guarantee the privacy and data 
protection of users. 
f. Law on Cryptography 2008 
Article 12 provides that private individuals have the right to use 
encryption. However, its use is subject to the standard set by the National 
Cryptology Commission (NCC) (article 16). In such an instance, encryption 
is only permitted if the encryption key length is less than or equal to 128 
bits. The NCC is responsible for setting the maximum length of encryption 
keys. The use of encryption with a longer key requires authorisation from 
the NCC (Global Partners Digital 2018). The purpose of encryption is to 
ensure the confidentiality of communications, which is guaranteed under 
the constitution. Individuals have an inviolable right to the privacy of their 
communications and private correspondence. However, this law appears 
to curtail the exercise of this law by imposing a limitation on the quality 
of encryption that individuals can use. In addition, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure empowers the investigative judge to decrypt encryption. Thus, 
while on the one hand, it appears to uphold the international principle of 
security of communications, it also creates a loophole to violate that right. 
g. Telecommunications Code 2011  
Article 7 mandates service providers to protect consumers’ privacy and 
personal data, and it can only be waived by a provision of a law. Article 12 
provides that,  
[a] judge or judicial police officer, for the needs of the prosecution 
or an investigation, or the enforcement of a judicial ruling, may 
require that telecommunications operators and service providers or 
telecommunications networks make available helpful information 
stored in the computer systems they administer. Telecommunications 
operators and service providers of telecommunications networks 
are required to submit the required information to the authorities. 
The provision empowers the investigating authority to request that 
telecommunications companies make information on computer systems 
available to the investigating authority to investigate crime. In addition, 
the provision allows the authority to request the companies to grant 
access to communications. Nonetheless, the provision does not provide 
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other safeguards, such as notifying individuals that they are under 
surveillance, or clarify whether the powers apply to minor crimes or only 
the most severe crimes. 
h. Cybercrime Law 2008 
Article 667-38 empowers the investigating authority to use appropriate 
technical means to record content data or specific communications 
in real time. Service providers are obliged to support investigating 
authorities in intercepting communications data. Article 677-36 allows 
the investigating authority to intercept communications data stored in 
Senegal that are important to an investigation. Disclosure under the law 
is subject to secrecy. The exercise of investigative power under these 
provisions is subject to the judicial supervision of an investigating judge. 
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4. How does Senegalese surveillance 
law compare with that in other 
countries in Africa/US/EU/UK?  
Some African countries have been reported to engage in arbitrary mass 
surveillance (CitizenLab 2020). In addition, there are fears that several 
governments are procuring surveillance tools to monitor dissidents, political 
opponents, human rights defenders and journalists. Algeria, Botswana, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were reported to have procured 
and deployed surveillance tools (Jili 2020). In July 2021, after a forensic 
investigation, the Guardian and other media outlets reported the use 
by some African countries such as Rwanda, Togo, and Morocco of Israeli 
company NSO Group’s malware, Pegasus, which allows security agencies 
to listen to phone calls, intercept messages, and also to track individuals 
(Damien 2021). The malware has been reportedly used to spy on dissidents, 
opposition, journalists, and foreign leaders (Lynsey 2021). Although Rwandan 
and Moroccan governments have denied the claim (Kirchgaessner 2021, 
Shaquile 2021), in 2019, dissident and human rights activists from Rwanda and 
Morocco were privately warned by communication giant WhatsApp that 
they were victims of cyber-attacks designed to infiltrate their phones by an 
NSO Group malware (Kirchgaessner et al. 2019).
The pervasive practices appear to go unchallenged due to vague laws 
that are subject to abuse, codification of state power to conduct mass 
monitoring, the absence of independent oversight bodies, and weak legal 
frameworks and institutions. For example, in Uganda facial recognition has 
been deployed to monitor protesters (Quartz Africa 2020).  
Nonetheless, there are examples of progressive practices on the continent. 
In South Africa, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communications Related Information Act (RICA) is the primary 
law on surveillance. The RICA creates an oversight body and puts in place 
several safeguards contained under the International Principles. However, 
the law also omits some safeguards. The laws in Senegal and South 
Africa are silent on the role of transparency from investigating authorities 
(Privacy International 2019b). In addition, the RICA prohibits the disclosure 
of demands for communications data under the law, further hampering 
transparency. Furthermore, there is no statutory requirement to publish a 
public annual report. Finally, the laws in both countries omit the obligation 
to notify individuals that they are or have been under surveillance, denying 
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the targeted individuals the opportunity to challenge an interception or seek 
redress. 
The laws in Senegal and South Africa have the requirement to specify the 
category of offence before requesting a judicial authorisation. There also 
appears to be a normative condition to establish a legitimate aim before 
conducting surveillance. However, some existing practice falls short of the 
requirement under the International Principles. For example, in 2021 South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court delivered a landmark judgment outlawing 
mass surveillance in the country. In Amabhungane Centre for Investigative 
Journalism v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (CCT 278/19), the 
court held that the government should no longer conduct mass surveillance 
of citizens. The court also declared certain parts of the RICA unconstitutional 
(BusinessTech 2021). Notably, the court stated that the RICA fails to provide 
sufficient safeguards to preserve the right to privacy, the law did not provide 
adequate protection or relief for persons subjected to surveillance, and the 
law did not make provision for individuals subjected to surveillance to be 
notified after the fact, among other issues. 
Nonetheless, South Africa has a specific surveillance law as suggested 
by the UN Draft Legal Instrument. This could be considered preferable to 
having contradictory legitimate aims and safeguards specified in different 
pieces of legislation. South Africa has a more explicit definition of tests for 
a judge to assess before issuing authorisation, which is not evident in the 
Senegalese framework. South Africa has an ‘independent oversight board’ 
as conceptualised under the International Principles. The law in South Africa 
also has the advantage of being challenged and tested in court by civil 
society in ways that have identified flaws, clarified provisions and provided 
enhanced privacy protections.
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5. How does Senegalese 
surveillance law compare with 
the UN Draft Legal Instrument 
and international Principles
The existing legal framework in Senegal contains some of the elements 
suggested in the UN Draft Legal Instrument and the International Principles. 
For example, the Penal Code Law provides a safeguard against illegitimate 
access or interception by private entities: article 431-12 of the law carries a 
prison term of 1–5 years for unlawful interception of communications, which is 
consistent with the international principle of safeguards against illegitimate 
access. However, many elements are absent. These omissions relate mainly 
to the lack of safeguards and imprecise definitions, leaving the law open to 
abuse in the hands of a repressive government or officials.
Conversely, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigative measures 
must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and are 
subject to the necessity of investigation under the judicial supervision 
of an investigating judge. However, the exercise of power to intercept 
communications under article 90-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is 
not subject to appeal, which violates one of the principles of the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument: that, as soon as is practical, the subject of surveillance 
should be notified that they have been under surveillance and have the legal 
right to information and ability to appeal. The UN Draft Legal Instrument 
prescribes that the individual should be informed ahead of the surveillance 
activity to be able to contest it (except in specified urgent circumstances). 
The investigating authority is also expected to notify the CDP when there 
has been a data breach. Unfortunately, the Protection of Personal Data Law 
does not include the obligation to notify the CDP when there has been a 
data breach. 
Requirements such as conducting a human rights impact assessment before 
deploying surveillance tools are not contained in any legislation. The law also 
enables the weakening of encryption and the cryptography law prescribes 
the standard of encryption. Furthermore, encryption is tied to freedom of 
expression and privacy; restricting the standard of encryption restricts these 
rights. According to the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), ‘strong encryption is needed to protect privacy 
and freedom of expression in the digital age’ (UNESCO 2016). Lastly, there 
is no requirement for transparency. For example, investigating authorities 
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are not required to publish a public annual report. As a result, much of the 
surveillance capability of the state is shrouded in secrecy. 
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6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms?  
Phrases like ‘national security,’ ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘interception’ are 
hardly defined or centred on respect for human rights. The Penal Code sets 
out prevention of terrorism as its legitimate aim. The failure to define these 
words leaves room for potentially arbitrary abuse. However, a semblance of 
how the terms should work is found in some laws. For example, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure sets out prevention of terrorism as a legitimate aim and 
provides context for what can be considered a severe crime under Article 
90-16. The provision allows interception by investigating authorities:
in felony matters, for a renewable period of four months; in 
misdemeanor matters when the minimum penalty is greater than 
or equal to five years’ imprisonment, for a renewable period of 
four months; in a bid to investigate into the cause of death or 
disappearance, for a renewable period of two months; in the 
context of the search for a fugitive, for a period of two months. 
Similarly, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the interception decision 
must specify the offence, which has to be proportionate to the threat, and 
the duration of surveillance must be indicated.  
The data protection law and the constitution impose the obligation to 
ensure the preservation of individuals’ privacy and cannot be violated 
without a lawful basis. The constitutional guarantee is inviolable and 
serves as the basis to protect individuals against unwarranted surveillance. 
However, the constitutional provision is subject to derogations prescribed 
under a law. The Law on Intelligence Services allows for intrusive surveillance 
to neutralise a threat if it is the only means. Similarly, the Cybercrime Law 
allows surveillance for investigation of crimes. These legitimate surveillance 
aims are insufficiently defined. A constitutional provision cannot be 
considered inviolable if an official can waive it in the case of a petty crime or 
be justified concerning subjective issues of morality that are not defined in 
law.  
Investigating authorities have an essential role in surveillance; they act 
based on judicial directives and supervision. However, under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, decisions on interception are not subject to an appellate 
process. Therefore, notification of individuals ahead of surveillance is an 
effective tool to combat overreach but it is not required under any of the laws 
examined. 
Senegal Country Report
151Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
7. How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?  
Under the International Principles, there are legal safeguards such as 
competent judicial authority, public oversight, transparency, and protection 
against illegitimate access. The role of independent oversight body is 
absent. There is no obligation or central oversight body concerning public 
disclosures of statistics on requests for and collection of communication 
data. Under the Law on Intelligence Services, the investigating authority 
determines what is proportionate to a threat and the decision is not 
subjected to a judicial decision-making process. Similarly, investigating 
authorities are not mandated to make public the details of legal requests or 
interceptions made. Safeguards such as conducting human rights impact 
assessments before deploying surveillance tools are not conducted. As 
a result, it is hard to know which law the government relies on to conduct 
surveillance. According to a report by the Association for Communications 
Progress (APC), ‘the Government of Senegal never informs the population 
about how it concretely uses this legal framework of surveillance, a total 
opacity is maintained’ (APC 2016).
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8. How effective are existing laws 
and practices in protecting privacy 
and limiting surveillance? 
The constitution and the law on the protection of personal data seek to 
protect individuals’ privacy. Similarly, other laws reiterate the preservation 
of the right to privacy. The data protection law, for example, imposes many 
obligations on public and private authorities. This comprehensive data 
protection law covers the collection, processing, transmission, storage 
and use of personal data by legal entities under public or private law. In 
addition, Article 35 prohibits the misuse of data; and article 34 proscribes the 
collection of personal data without the knowledge of the data subject. The 
law also creates the obligation for public authorities to ensure data security, 
consistent with the international principle of the integrity of communications 
and systems.  
Protection of Personal Data Law and the Decree Concerning Law 
Enforcement create derogations to the application of data protection 
law. Article 73 of the decree empowers a court to order necessary security 
measures in a period of emergency. Similarly, article 40 of the decree 
provides that the law will not apply to ‘public security, defence, investigation 
and prosecution of criminal offences or the security of the State.’ Similarly, the 
Protection of Personal Data Law empowers the CDP to impose administrative 
and penal sanctions for violation of the law. The Law on Cybercrimes 
provides a safeguard against illegitimate access or interception by private 
entities. Article 431-12 of the law carries a prison term of 1–5 years for unlawful 
interception of communications. 
The state may carry out surveillance for legitimate aims such as preventing 
terrorism and other serious crimes (defined by the law). However, mass 
surveillance and monitoring of communications in violation of existing 
legal mechanisms and international human rights norms are considered 
intrusive, violating privacy and protection of personal data. Nevertheless, the 
Senegalese government is not transparent as it never informs the public how 
it uses the existing legal framework of surveillance in practice (GIS Watch 
2014). This opacity is further reinforced by the lack of an obligation to publish 
public transparency reports on legal requests.  
Despite a lack of resources, the CDP has been relatively efficient and 
transparent about its activities. It publishes a quarterly report highlighting 
its activities, which includes the number of public complaints on violation of 
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data protection rights received and resolved. However, the law was enacted 
in 2008 and has yet to be amended. It does not entirely address emerging 
modern concerns such as the requirement to conduct a data protection 
impact assessment, appointment of a data protection officer and data 
protection by design (Robertson 2020). Aside from these concerns, there are 
not sufficient safeguards around surveillance and the abuse and violations 
of rights that could accompany it. For example, the mandatory requirement 
to register SIM cards is not accompanied by sufficient data protection 
measures. According to a report by Privacy International, a non-profit 
watchdog (2019a):  
Mandatory SIM card registration laws require that people provide 
personal information, including a valid ID or even their biometrics 
before they can purchase or activate a prepaid SIM card for their 
mobile device. Such laws can allow the State to identify the owner 
of a SIM card and infer who is likely to be making a call, sending 
a message, in a particular location at any particular time.  
There is no reference to users’ right to access their data or to rectify errors 
in their data. Operators are not obliged to inform users of how their data 
are used or how they are processed. No information is given to users on 
the procedures for deleting their data when they change operators. The 
lack of sufficient safeguards could enable the government to monitor 
communications arbitrarily under the guise of maintaining security.  
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in Senegal ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’? 
Senegal’s biggest domestic threat is the security situation in the Sahel 
region, which has required it to strengthen counterterrorism measures. 
Similarly, the country is confronting an insurgency in the Cassmance region 
(Freedom House 2021). The legitimate aim advanced under the Penal Code 
and Intelligence Law is prevention of terrorism. The capacity to conduct 
surveillance is found under different laws, but it is not easy to ascertain 
which law is being relied upon. The Code of Criminal Procedure makes 
it a requirement to specify the purpose of interception and it must be 
proportionate to the threat. 
In appraising necessity, the UN Draft Legal Instrument has established that 
surveillance measures being deployed must be necessary and they can only 
be carried out when there are no other, less intrusive measures that could 
secure the same legitimate aim (such as foiling a terrorist attack). Article 10 
of the Law on Intelligent Services provides that intrusive surveillance can only 
be conducted if there is no less intrusive way to carry out the investigation. 
The weakening of encryption infringes on freedom of expression and the right 
to privacy.  
Surveillance under the Code of Criminal Procedure requires prior judicial 
authorisation, and measures adopted must be proportionate to the 
severity of the crime, which is consistent with the international principle of 
proportionality. 
The EU-funded digital identity programme has raised many privacy 
concerns. Biometric information is a unique identifier; when it is combined 
with other data such as financial transactions, mobile location, or facial 
and vehicle recognition technologies, the government has the opportunity 
to build an extensive surveillance capability. A repressive government 
could abuse the capability to weaken encryption to conduct surveillance 
on activists and political opponents. Crackdowns on the opposition have 
increased in Senegal in the past few years and formed part of the most 
recent election cycle in 2019 (Amnesty International 2021).  
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10. How has surveillance law played 
out in court in Senegal? 
Unlike other African countries, Senegal has enjoyed a democratic transition 
without military interference. The courts have been mainly independent and 
adequately run. However, there has been no documented case challenging 
the state over conducting surveillance. This may partly be the result of the 
secrecy over government surveillance, which is reinforced by the absence 
of the requirement to publish a transparency report. According to a report, 
Senegalese authority used intelligence to monitor the movement and phone 
conversations of Muktar Diokhane, a Senegalese linked to Boko Haram. 
The report also stated that Senegal tracks open-source information and 
social media, and collaborates with ‘French and Nigerien authorities on 
tracking and monitoring the phone calls of suspects’ (Zenn 2018). Diokhane 
was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. The evidence presented 
before the court was gathered through intelligence. Although surveillance of 
Diokhane was not directly challenged, the case demonstrated an instance 
where evidence gathered through surveillance was used for prevention of 
crime. 
The Law on Protection of Personal Data empowers the CDP to impose 
administrative and financial sanctions for violating the law. The Penal Code 
creates several offences for abuse and misuse of personal data. The code 
imposes varying prison terms and financial sanctions. Individuals who 
perceive their rights have been abused can approach the court for relief. 
A report by non-profit association OSIRIS cited instances of citizens’ 
telephone conversations being monitored (Osiris 2021). Similarly, a 
telecommunications company was also found to be monitoring employees’ 
communications (EnQuete+ 2019). However, the provisions of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure make it impossible to appeal against the decision 
to intercept communications, which could encourage the invasion of 
Senegalese citizens’ privacy (Cio Mag 2019).  
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11. What is working? What gaps 
exist in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge and capacity?  
Senegal has a long-running history of uninterrupted constitutional 
democracy. Many provisions of laws enabling surveillance are consistent 
with the UN Draft Legal Instrument. For example, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure has as its defined legitimate aim the prevention of terrorism. It 
adds other safeguards such as establishing the severity of the crime, the 
duration of surveillance and proportionality of the seriousness of the threat 
before carrying out surveillance, consistent with the international principles 
of legitimate aim, proportionality and reasonable grounds. It also safeguards 
against unlawful interception by penalising unlawful interception with 
imprisonment term, which is consistent with the international principle of 
safeguards against illegitimate access. 
Another key point is the existence of the data protection law and 
establishment of the CDP. In addition, though, there are plans to amend 
the data protection law. The role of judicial supervision in the process also 
represents a trust-building process. 
Some of the gaps the report identified are the absence of transparency, 
with the absence of a requirement to publish a report on legal requests 
and lawful interception. The failure to designate an independent agency to 
hold law enforcement agencies to account under the Intelligence Services 
Law is another gap. In addition, the legal framework for surveillance is not 
clear on the requirement to notify individuals they are or have been under 
surveillance. Finally, additional safeguards, such as conducting a human 
rights impact assessment before deploying surveillance tools, are not 
contained in any law. 
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12. What recommendations arise from 
this analysis for legislation, policy, 
practice or further research?
For the government 
• The government should promote citizens’ trust by being open 
and transparent and ensuring that surveillance measures are 
proportionate and within the ambit of the law. The government should 
publish an annual transparency report on the volume of requests 
and authorisations and instances of surveillance should be available 
publicly or accessible to the members of the public. 
• The government should conduct a human rights impact assessment 
before deploying surveillance tools. 
For policymakers and legislators 
• The laws on surveillance should be enacted into a single law as 
recommended in the UN Draft Legal Instrument. 
• The law should mandate the investigating authorities to notify 
individuals who are subject or have been subjected to surveillance of 
such a decision and give them chance to contest it or appeal against 
it.  Finally, investigating authorities should be mandated to publish the 
details of interception requests.  
• There should be strict rules concerning the purchase and deployment 
of invasive surveillance technologies. A human rights impact 
assessment should be made a mandatory requirement before 
deploying surveillance tools. 
• Service providers should be mandated to publish a transparency 
report periodically.  
• The law on personal data should be amended to address the 
requirement to conduct a data protection impact assessment before 
deploying surveillance tools for surveillance. 
• The budget of the CDP should be increased and it should be more 
autonomous from government institutions. 
• Terms such as ‘national security’ and ‘interception’ should be defined 
to be anchored in respect and protection of human rights.  
• The Code of Criminal Procedure should be amended to ensure respect 
for the rights to privacy and freedom of opinion and expression. 
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The amendment should require the lifting of encryption only for the 
investigation of the most severe crimes.  
• The restriction on using encryption software should be removed. The 
use of encryption technology should be accessible to all individuals.  
For civil society and activists  
• Activists and civil society organisations should actively campaign 
for amendments to the law through engaging with policymakers.  
• Strategic litigation should be used to clarify the law, narrow down 
targets of surveillance, and protect and safeguard citizens’ rights. Also, 
civil society organisations should challenge intelligence services over 
violations of the law or existing human rights instruments that Senegal 
is party to.   
• Activists and civil society organisations should work to raise public 
awareness about privacy rights, surveillance and available protections. 
For researchers  
• It is recommended that more research is carried out to reveal 
new evidence relating to the various tools, methods and tactics 
employed by the government to conduct surveillance. 
For journalists  
• Journalists and other media personnel should do a lot more to raise 
public awareness through reporting on surveillance practices and their 
effects. More research needs to be done to understand the categories 
and volume of cases in which surveillance data are used as evidence. 
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Introduction
This report explores South Africa’s existing surveillance law in comparison 
to the United Nations (UN) Draft Legal Instrument on Government-led 
Surveillance and Privacy (UN 2018). The Draft Instrument calls for narrowing 
of the reasons for surveillance and requires that surveillance be undertaken 
with judicial oversight and other checks and balances. This report finds that 
South Africa’s law aligns with certain aspects of the Draft Instrument – for 
example, the existence of a surveillance law that requires pre-authorisation 
from a judge. However, the report identifies breaches in practice and gaps 
in the legislation and resourcing, making recommendations on the need for 
additional protections, increased capacity and improved safeguards. It also 
recommends strengthening of the law to make it human rights-centred and 
to increase transparency and accountability.
South Africa is one of the few African countries that has a law dedicated to 
governing surveillance as recommended by the UN Draft Legal Instrument 
(UN 2018). Recent history points to four eras of surveillance in South Africa 
(Africa 2009). The first two are the colonial and apartheid eras, followed 
by post-apartheid and the current post-9/11 era. During the colonial and 
apartheid periods, law enforcement employed various surveillance methods 
to control movement, and the political and economic activities of black 
people and their allies (Breckenridge 2014). These included requirements for 
black people to have movement passes, and intelligence-gathering through 
police and special forces (Africa 2009). In tandem, black political parties 
such as the African National Congress (ANC) had their own intelligence units 
(Duncan 2018). Following the transition to democracy in the 1990s, there were 
negotiations that led to an amalgamation of security services, including 
intelligence (Africa 2009). The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 
(IMPA) of 1992 was also enacted to regulate surveillance activities. The 
subsequent 1996 Constitution provided a strong Bill of Rights as well as the 
creation of post-apartheid intelligence institutions. The South African Bill 
of Rights includes guarantees of the right to privacy of correspondence, 
communication and data (Republic of South Africa (RSA) 1996). 
A year after the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US) in 2001, the IMPA 
was replaced with the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA 2002). At the 
same time, the country increasingly invested in mass surveillance systems 
varying from signal intelligence to biometric identity technologies (Duncan 
2018; Allen and van Zyl 2020). While the existence of a law regulating 
surveillance prevents arbitrary interception of communication, studies show 
that the institutions and processes created under RICA do not uphold the 
right to privacy (Kwet 2017; Duncan 2018; Allen and van Zyl 2020). A 2021 
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constitutional court judgement faults RICA for unlawful bulk surveillance and 
foreign signal interception (amaBhungane Centre 2021). The judgement calls 
for creation of post-surveillance notification and the independence of the 
judges authorising surveillance warrants. 
Like other African countries, South Africa is also adopting biometric 
technologies in identification of persons and access to government services. 
Biometric technologies have been applied in social welfare grants while 
learners in schools are registered using unique personal identifier numbers. 
There is also wide use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) by city governments 
as well as private persons. These new technologies create new capabilities 
that could be used for government surveillance (Black Sash 2019; Kwet 2017; 
Allen and van Zyl 2020).
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1. What reasons does the South 
African government use 
to justify surveillance? 
During the colonial and apartheid eras, surveillance was undertaken for 
political and social control. Surveillance studies caution that although 
colonialism and apartheid were abolished, many of the colonial institutions 
and practices were carried over into the post-apartheid era. For example, 
surveillance of journalists and protest movements is common, even though 
the constitution guarantees the rights of journalists as well as the right to 
protest (Duncan 2018). There have also been national scandals involving 
surveillance of political leaders despite the constitutional and legal 
guarantees for political neutrality and lack of partisanship in government 
surveillance (Swart 2015). 
During the transition to democracy, South Africa developed a policy on 
intelligence based on holistic and human security. The White Paper on 
Intelligence (1994) advanced the idea that many of the threats to South 
Africa’s stability would be internal, hence a need to not only solve crime 
but prevent it (Nathan 2009). This has resulted in intelligence-led policing 
where police not only enforce the law but are also concerned with risk 
management. It has also created a basis for broadening surveillance for 
reasons such as food and security (Farrell 2019).
In addition to national security, protecting ‘national interests’ is another 
motivation for surveillance. Duncan (2018) argues that this rationale has been 
applied in economic surveillance of business leaders in private interests such 
as oil and minerals. Foreign communications surveillance has been carried 
out by the National Communications Centre (NCC) of the country’s civilian 
intelligence agency, the State Security Agency (SSA). It was temporarily 
halted by the country’s apex court after the court found that there was 
no specific legal authority for the NCC to carry out foreign surveillance 
(amaBhungane Centre 2021). 
Surveillance is also practised as part of anti-terrorism measures since the 
9/11 attacks in the US. The Snowden revelations in 2013 reignited interest in 
surveillance by civil society and academia. South Africa’s three terms as 
a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council also influenced the 
country’s adoption of surveillance laws and practices (Kwet 2020). This is 
particularly so in areas of anti-terrorism and financial surveillance. Financial 
South Africa Country Report
166Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
surveillance is undertaken by the Financial Intelligence Centre created under 
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) of 2001. 
At an ideological level, South Africa’s surveillance is also driven by its 
relations with pro-surveillance development partners (Feldstein 2019). 
For example, it has intelligence research and training facilities not only 
for training of officers, but which also serve as grounds for permeation 
of intelligence doctrines (Marais 2021). Collaboration with countries such 
as China and Russia in intelligence research and training have served 
to advance domestic intelligence through various means such as social 
media surveillance and building of smart cities with surveillance capabilities 
(Bosch and Roberts 2021). Related to this is that South Africa is a surveillance 
technology producer, and the birthplace of the surveillance technology 
company VASTech. The company, which was initially funded by the South 
African government, was implicated in supplying surveillance technology 
to the Libyan government in 2011 (Privacy International 2014; McLaughlin 
2016). This may therefore contribute to South Africa acquiring vendor-
driven surveillance technology, even when the country does not face major 
terrorism threats (Duncan 2018). 
In 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic struck, South Africa turned to 
geolocation data for contact tracing (Gillwald et al. 2020). Following 
pressure from activists, contact tracing regulations were developed (Bosch 
and Roberts 2021). They require the Department of Health to protect the 
privacy of persons whose information is in the contact tracing database. A 
judge, referred to as the Covid-19 designated judge, was also appointed to 
oversee aspects of the contact tracing database such as receiving reports 
on activities undertaken during contact tracing and on the lapse of the 
pandemic period (RSA 2020). Notably, regulation 11(b) restricts use of the 
data in the contact tracing database to contact tracing and not movement 
restriction. 
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2. Which international conventions 
protecting privacy has 
South Africa adopted?
Although a founding member of the UN, South Africa did not sign the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 as the government 
then upheld the apartheid doctrine whereby a person’s rights and 
entitlements were dependent on the colour of their skin. In 1974, South Africa 
was suspended from the UN as part of the anti-apartheid struggle and only 
re-admitted in 1994 when apartheid ended. In 1996, South Africa adopted a 
new constitution that domesticates international human rights law, including 
the right to privacy through its Bill of Rights. Among the international treaties 
the country has ratified are the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which obligates the country to protect and promote various 
rights including privacy. The country is also a member of the African Union 
(AU) but has not signed the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and 
Personal Data Protection. South Africa is also active in the regional bloc, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC has been pursuing 
a harmonised information and communications technology (ICT) regulatory 
environment, including developing model laws on cybersecurity. The model 
laws approach information as an asset and criminalise unauthorised 
interception (Tembo 2013). South Africa has taken leadership by enacting a 
data privacy law in 2013, although its implementation was phased (Calandro 
and Berglund 2019). A dedicated cybercrimes law was also enacted in 2021.
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in South Africa?
Article 14 of the Constitution protects privacy, including the right to not 
have one’s communications infringed. Article 36 further stipulates that rights 
may only be limited in accordance with international principles of legality, 
necessity and proportionality. The right to privacy is further elaborated by 
the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI), which fully came into force 
in 2020. The Act has national security exemptions for processing of personal 
data. Section 6 sets out some exclusions, such as national security activities, 
anti-terrorism, public defence, public safety, prevention of money laundering, 
and investigation and prosecution of offences. The Constitution also 
guarantees the right of access to information, giving people an entitlement 
to request information related to surveillance. 
The Constitution outlines principles for national security that include: equality 
of all people and pursuit of a better life; peace and security; rule of law, 
including international law; and subjugation of national security to checks 
and balances by Parliament and the executive. 
There are therefore several laws on security, information and privacy. 
Intelligence is governed by the Intelligence Services Act, National Strategic 
Intelligence Act and the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, all dated 1994. 
These laws create operational and oversight mechanisms for domestic 
and foreign surveillance. More recent security laws that establish a basis 
for surveillance include the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2003 and FICA of 2001. 
National security-related information laws include the Protection of State 
Information Bill – a draft law on the classification and protection of state 
information. It is intended to replace the Protection of Information Act 84 
of 1982. The Cybercrimes Act was recently enacted. It creates offences of 
unlawful interception of data, messages, computers and networks involving 
hacking, ransomware attacks and cyber extortion. The Act also grants law 
enforcement agencies extensive powers to investigate, search, access and 
seize various articles, such as computers, databases or networks. The Act 
further imposes a duty to report certain offences on the part of electronic 
communications service providers and financial institutions within 72 hours. 
Failure to make the required report could lead to a fine of up to 50,000 rands 
(ZAR) on conviction.
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South Africa has had a dedicated surveillance law since the early 1990s. 
The current law, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 (RICA), prescribes 
the limited ‘legitimate aims’ of interception of citizen communications (RSA 
2002). These are listed in section 16 as serious offence, public health or safety, 
national security, or compelling national economic interests. RICA creates a 
judicially supervised mechanism for lawful interception of communications. 
Where there is no consent of one of the parties to the surveillance, then law 
enforcement officers are required to apply for an interception warrant from 
a designated judge (section 16). A RICA judge can also issue a real-time 
communication-related warrant (section 17) and any magistrate can issue 
an order for archived communication (section 19). In addition to these RICA 
provisions, law enforcement officers have a separate route for obtaining 
metadata under section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1977).
RICA also stipulates mandatory SIM card registration. The Act requires 
communications service providers to retain communications-related 
information (metadata) for between three and five years. RICA-related 
interceptions are undertaken by the Office for Interception Centres (OIC) on 
behalf of applicants. 
Other laws forming the basis of surveillance include FICA (2001). FICA was 
enacted to identify proceeds of unlawful activities as well as to combat 
money-laundering activities. It establishes a financial reporting centre to 
collect data that may be useful in achieving its goals. Financial institutions 
are therefore required to collect and keep records of their clients and 
transactions, and to report suspicious transactions as well as transactions 
above certain limits (FICA 2001, sects. 28 and 29). The financial reporting 
centre and law enforcement officers can access the records of a financial 
institution, after obtaining a court warrant. As per section 26 of the Act, 
grounds for issuance of such a warrant include identifying proceeds of 
unlawful activities and combating money-laundering activities. In addition, 
section 35 of FICA links FICA to RICA by empowering the RICA judge to 
consider applications for monitoring a person suspected of handling the 
proceeds of crime or money-laundering. Such an application and order is 
made without notice to the person suspected of these crimes. 
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4. How does South African 
surveillance law compare 
with that in other countries 
in Africa/US/EU/UK?
South Africa has a dedicated surveillance framework, including specific 
legislation as well as oversight mechanisms such as a parliamentary 
committee on intelligence. The law is similar to the Investigatory Powers 
Act (IPA) in the United Kingdom (UK) as well as the USA PATRIOT Act.1 South 
Africa’s law was enacted in 2020, the year after the 9/11 attacks in the US, 
and it shares an anti-terrorism rationale. 
The Snowden leaks in 2013 exposed some of the surveillance activities 
undertaken by the US, the UK and other governments as being outside what 
is provided for under the law. Documents filed in a case challenging mass 
surveillance also revealed extra-legal surveillance in South Africa (Mohapi 
2019). Duncan (2018) has argued that the reason for state surveillance is not 
primarily anti-terrorism but domestic politics, since South Africa does not 
face the same threats as Eastern African countries. A 2008 Commission of 
Inquiry report noted that intelligence agencies were embroiled in partisan 
intelligence-gathering and recommended reforms to laws and services. 
Recent scandals involving unauthorised surveillance on politicians and 
businesspersons show that the gap in oversight of surveillance operations 
still exists (Nathan 2017). 
Despite South Africa having a specific law on surveillance, RICA has 
some shortcomings compared to similar frameworks in other countries. 
For example, RICA does not protect the rights of people who are under 
surveillance. This is in contrast to the US procedure for interception of wire, 
oral or electronic communications where people under surveillance in 
criminal matters must be notified within 90 days of the lapse of a court order. 
This lack of a post-notification procedure was among the issues criticised in 
the RICA judgement in the amaBhungane case, described further in section 
7. 
Similar to the issues in the amaBhungane case, a 2020 judgement on the 
German foreign intelligence service (BND Act) considered the issue of foreign 
signal interception. In both cases courts found that foreign communication 
surveillance was legally subject to the same standards as domestic 
1  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism
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surveillance. While the German law was revised in 2021, there is a probability 
that a new law for foreign intelligence will be enacted in South Africa. 
Another shortcoming of RICA is its weak reporting mechanisms. While 
countries such as the UK, US and Germany have independent reporting 
mechanisms, in South Africa, parliamentary reports are written by the RICA 
judge – the same judge who hears applications for surveillance warrants. 
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5. How does South African 
surveillance law compare with 
the UN Draft Legal Instrument?
South Africa’s legal framework for surveillance meets the ‘legality’ 
requirement of the International Principles on the Application of Human 
Rights to Communications Surveillance (Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
2013) as all surveillance needs to be prescribed in legislation and authorised 
by the court. However, reports indicate that surveillance, particularly mass 
surveillance and foreign signal interception, is carried out outside of the law 
(Duncan 2018). For example, there is no clear legal basis for mass surveillance, 
yet the government admits to tapping communications in undersea cables 
(Mohapi 2019). RICA and other existing legislation is insufficiently clear 
regarding use of novel surveillance technologies such as CCTV, biometric 
identities and artificial intelligence for surveillance, leaving them to broad 
use which may not be necessary and proportionate (Allen and van Zyl 
2020). For example, government agencies such as the South African Social 
Security Agency (SASSA), which use biometrics such as fingerprints and face 
photographs in identification of social welfare beneficiaries, outsourced 
welfare distribution to third party companies, without sufficient oversight 
of how beneficiaries’ personal data would be used (Black Sash 2019). In 
addition, the country is adopting biometric technologies, including facial 
verification for national identity as well as social protection programmes 
(Allen and van Zyl 2020). CCTV is widely deployed by local governments in 
large cities to deter crime. While aspects of such surveillance (for example, 
privately owned CCTV) are covered under the data privacy law, the POPI Act, 
public surveillance may be exempt from the Act. This is despite the fact that 
some cities are adopting facial verification and facial recognition technology 
(Allen and van Zyl 2020). This calls for a review of the law to limit the use of 
biometric identity data in surveillance. 
RICA also defines legitimate aims of surveillance as recommended in the 
UN Draft Legal Instrument. Legitimate aims of surveillance under the law 
include actual and potential threats to national security, as well as public 
health. However, these categories are quite broad, and they have been 
used to target investigative journalism as well as legitimate work of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and protest movements (Duncan 2018). 
The amaBhungane case also demonstrated that mass surveillance and 
bulk signal interception occurs outside the law, a clear violation of the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument, which calls for surveillance to be based on law. There 
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is also research indicating that law enforcement officers sometimes obtain 
metadata without a warrant (Swart 2015). 
Targeted surveillance in South Africa requires pre-authorisation by a judge 
appointed specifically to consider applications under the RICA Act. This 
fulfils the requirement under the UN Draft Legal Instrument for a ‘competent 
judicial authority’ to assess surveillance requests. The judicial process 
is carried out in secret, even the application for archived information. 
Section 42(3) of RICA prohibits disclosure that a direction has been issued 
under this Act, that a communication is being or has been or will probably 
be intercepted, or that real-time or archived communication-related 
information is being or has been or will probably be provided. There are 
therefore no legal means for a subject of surveillance to know that they were 
under surveillance and for what reason, and thereby to appeal, correct or 
seek remedy. 
The judge periodically reports to a committee of Parliament that specifically 
deals with intelligence issues – the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence 
(JSCI). Reports by the judge featured in Duncan (2018) demonstrate the 
challenges of oversight of surveillance requests. These include the high 
number of requests to be considered by one judge, lack of sufficient 
information in the applications as well as over-reliance on the grounds of 
threat to national security for legitimate situations such as communications 
between journalists or protest organisers. 
While RICA provides oversight mechanisms, it fails in transparency. 
Operational oversight is achieved through institutional arrangements. 
Various law enforcement officers can apply for interception warrants through 
the Office for Interception Centres (OIC). The OIC makes quarterly reports on 
its activities to the State Security Agency (SSA). However, surveillance reports 
are also not published for public scrutiny. 
There are mechanisms for public complaints – for example, under the 
Intelligence Services Oversight Act. A Committee of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) on Intelligence as well as the Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence have wide powers such as review of intelligence and counter-
intelligence activities of any law enforcement service as well as review 
and investigation of public complaints. However, the lack of notification 
to surveillance subjects makes it difficult for the public to make use of 
these avenues, as surveillance subjects may not be aware that their 
communications are being intercepted. 
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6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms? 
RICA lists some of the legitimate aims of surveillance in section 16(5). 
Reasonable threats are broadened under section 16(5)(a)(iii), which allows 
intelligence-gathering for potential threats on public health and safety as 
well as national security. However, these terms are not closely defined in the 
legislation and in practice the majority of RICA-related warrants are issued 
for investigations involving ‘drug-dealing and drug-trafficking, vehicle theft 
and car hijacks, armed robberies, corruption and fraud, assassinations, 
murder and terrorism’ (Duncan 2018: 101). Legislation originally motivated by 
terrorism is now routinely being used to police crimes, including auto-theft. 
Clear definition of legitimate aims and judicial oversight is necessary to 
confine privacy violation to narrowly targeted surveillance of the most serious 
crimes. 
South Africa has a broad definition of national security. Article 198 of the 
Constitution outlines national security principles that encompass human 
security as well as prevention of armed conflict within the country’s borders 
(RSA 1996). Consequently, security and intelligence policies take a broad view 
on security that includes national security concerns such as terrorism and 
organised crime as well as human security issues such as food and water 
security and illicit financial flows. Nathan (2009) argues that a progressive 
interpretation of human security should include taking into consideration the 
work of other stakeholders such as NGOs and academics as opposed to 
increasing the mandate of intelligence bodies. 
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7. How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?
The existence of a surveillance law in South Africa aims to protect people 
from arbitrary surveillance since law enforcement officers are required to 
get pre-authorisation from a judge. Reporting requirements also open the 
subject of surveillance to scrutiny by Parliament, and this creates a window 
for oversight. 
However, as noted from the amaBhungane case, the checks and balances 
under RICA are not sufficient. In that case, Stephen (Sam) Sole, an 
investigative journalist and executive director of a non-profit news outfit 
(the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism), discovered that 
he had been a subject of government surveillance under RICA. He had 
previously had concerns that he was under surveillance and attempted to 
get information on whether he was being surveilled through an information 
request to the Inspector-General of Intelligence, an office that is charged 
with oversight of intelligence services. His information request was declined, 
with the Inspector-General replying that he had found no evidence of 
wrongdoing on the matter, as everything was done within the regulatory 
framework. Seven years later, transcripts of Sam Sole’s conversations with 
a senior prosecutor were annexed to an affidavit in a case involving South 
Africa’s former president, Jacob Zuma. This raised questions such as under 
what reasonable grounds an interception order had been issued against a 
journalist, as well as when and how long the intercepts had been kept. Sam 
Sole sought another information request from the SSA, and learnt that a 
judge had issued an interception warrant in 2007 and renewed it in 2008. He 
therefore instituted a case challenging several aspects of RICA, including: 
lack of notification of people under surveillance; lack of clarity under RICA 
on how interceptions are stored and processed; mandatory data retention 
under RICA; lack of procedural justice in the appointment of the RICA judge, 
their lack of tenure and lack of open justice in RICA interception applications; 
and inadequate protection for journalists and their sources (amaBhungane 
Centre 2021). 
The case demonstrated deficiencies in safeguards, oversight and checks. 
For example, the court heard that the authorisation for surveillance solely 
depends on the designated RICA judge, who is often overwhelmed by 
applications. The judge also only hears one side, making the process biased 
towards law enforcement and therefore not independent. This is worsened 
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by the lack of user notification, which means that people under surveillance 
cannot appeal wrongful surveillance. This breaches due process and 
diminishes the right to privacy. 
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8. How effective are existing laws 
and practices in protecting privacy 
and limiting surveillance?
Analysis of the number of interception orders granted shows that they have 
increased over the years. Between 2008 and 2015, there were at least 315 
interception applications each year, with the highest number being 752 in 
2015. The addition of the financial reporting centre to the RICA framework 
in 2014 contributed to a rise in interception applications (Duncan 2018). 
The number of orders issued by judges versus interceptions reported by 
the OIC also suggests that the scope of the orders was broad, defeating 
the proportionality principle (ibid.). This could also be attributed to the 
administrative over-breadth of the OIC, which results in use of the framework 
for interception orders for ordinary crimes (Klaaren 2015). 
Very few applications for targeted surveillance were denied. Nevertheless, 
there are examples of orders being given for surveillance where the facts 
were contested. In the amaBhungane case, a journalist’s communications 
were ‘lawfully’ monitored on the grounds of suspicion of trading in guns, 
yet he was following a corruption investigation. Had the journalist been 
informed of the surveillance, he might have had the opportunity to contest 
it. In another case, an order for surveillance of a lawyer was extended to his 
family and clients, even though they were not of interest to the case. This 
infringed the confidentiality of the lawyer’s clients. In these cases, there were 
interception directions that had been confirmed by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence as lawful.
Duncan (2018) also raises issue with reports to Parliament being written by the 
judge who issued the orders, arguing that the reports could be partial and 
also statistical as opposed to analytic. For example, the judge reported on 
the number of applications for interception directions, the state agency that 
made the applications, and the number that were granted or refused, with 
very general comments on trends in applications. 
The requirement for communications service providers to keep metadata, 
or information about communications, is another source of concern, as 
metadata can give granular insights into a person’s behaviour. Coupled with 
the fact that the OIC houses the fibre optic cables from the communications 
service providers, this makes it possible for the OIC to carry out surveillance 
without authorisation, or to extend authorisation to further surveillance. 
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Despite RICA requirements, South African law enforcement can and 
sometimes does use section 205 of the Criminal Procedures Act to obtain 
metadata. This provision allows officers to request a court to order 
production of metadata for investigations without the service provider 
having to appear in court. The request does not have to be before the RICA 
judge, making it possible for law enforcement to obtain orders from the other 
available courts (Swart 2017). This creates another, less stringent avenue for 
communication surveillance that goes unreported and sits outside of judicial 
safeguards and parliamentary oversight. 
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in South Africa ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’?
Although most of the targeted surveillance in South Africa is carried out 
under RICA, it is plausible that some of the surveillance takes place without 
going through the authorisation process outlined under RICA. In addition, 
as noted above, law enforcement officers can also get metadata using a 
different procedure under the Criminal Procedure Act (Duncan 2018; Swart 
2017).
Duncan (2018) and Swart (2017) are among researchers who have faulted 
practices under RICA. For example, statistics on the number of orders under 
RICA versus the number of interceptions lead them to conclude that law 
enforcement agencies often use one RICA warrant to carry out several 
interceptions. This is partly due to the under-resourcing of the competent 
judicial authority – a sole judge has to hear all RICA applications. A review 
of the RICA judge’s report under the Act also indicates that the increase 
in number of surveillance requests to the OIC (the office that makes 
applications on behalf of law enforcement agencies) increased the risk 
of making mistakes in RICA applications. This means that RICA does not 
have sufficient mechanisms to guarantee necessity and proportionality of 
targeted surveillance. 
As was the finding in the amaBhungane case, foreign signal interception as 
well as bulk surveillance are carried out without a legal basis. RICA therefore 
violates the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to 
Communications Surveillance (EFF 2013). 
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10. How has surveillance law played 
out in court in South Africa?
The apartheid era case of Mistry v. Interim National Medical and Dental 
Council of South Africa (1998) is often used not just in South Africa but other 
African countries to argue the link between privacy as part of dignity that is 
protection from surveillance. The more recent case, amaBhungane (2021), will 
also now form part of jurisprudence. It examined the limitations of privacy, 
noting that states can use prevention of crimes as a ground for limiting 
privacy in a law. However, the court pointed out that such interceptions must 
also be limited; they cannot be indiscriminate, hence the finding that bulk 
interception was unlawful. 
The amaBhungane case is also important for its discussion on checks and 
balances. While agreeing that it may not be practical to notify people prior 
to targeted surveillance, the court found that post-notification was an 
important check that could partly address the impunity of law enforcement 
officials who carry out wrongful surveillance. 
Information gathered under RICA is admissible as evidence in court. There 
are examples of prosecutions where information on crimes such as murder 
is obtained from interception of mobile phones. Mobile phone data has 
also been used to track associates of criminals. However, mobile phone 
data evidence has also been contested in other cases. In a 2009 case, 
evidence from cellphone records obtained during the investigation was 
found inadmissible, after it was noted that the orders were extended to the 
accused person’s advocate, their private investigator and their family (State 
vs. Agliotti 2010). 
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11. What is working? What gaps are 
there in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge and capacity?
RICA is useful as it outlaws arbitrary surveillance. However, the law is 
not sufficient to protect privacy in the digital age, given its ambiguity in 
metadata collection. The judicial authorisation process is also cloaked in 
secrecy, denying protection of the rights of surveillance subjects. 
The amaBhungane judgement highlights the weaknesses in South 
Africa’s surveillance law. It shows that bulk surveillance and foreign signal 
interception go against the necessity principle and can therefore not be a 
lawful limitation of the right to privacy. It also calls for transparency through 
post-surveillance notification and for the independence of the judge 
responsible. 
The judgement does not, however, annul the law in its entirety, as it is 
cognisant of the importance of a legal framework for government-led 
surveillance. The UN Draft Legal Instrument and the International Principles 
provide some pointers for areas where the law could be strengthened. These 
include: transparency through notification of surveillance subjects as well as 
better reporting to both the public and Parliament; creation of mechanisms 
for appeal against wrongful surveillance; carrying out a human rights 
assessment of the Act, to remove provisions and tools that defeat the right 
to privacy (for example, metadata retentions); and involvement of a range of 
stakeholders such as academics, lawyers and journalists in oversight of the 
law. 
On surveillance oversight, reports by the JSCI have not sufficiently addressed 
technology-based surveillance. The Committee therefore needs to increase 
its focus on emerging surveillance through artificial intelligence so as to 
provide the required checks and balances. 
There also appears to be a gap in public awareness on the problem of mass 
surveillance in South Africa. By expanding the critical mass of people who are 
aware of mass surveillance, the public and social movements would be more 
informed to demand greater transparency of surveillance. 
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12. What recommendations arise 
for future legislation, practice, 
or further research?
• As South Africa goes through the process of reforming its surveillance 
law to align with the amaBhungane judgement, the UN Draft 
Legal Instrument can provide some guidelines on the law. Some 
recommendations for the Instrument include the following. 
 ▫ The surveillance law should redefine the basis of surveillance 
to clearly and more narrowly delineate reasons for 
surveillance such as financial monitoring and terrorism. The 
law should also incorporate regulation of mass surveillance. 
 ▫ There should be a subject-notification requirement in 
RICA to enable people under surveillance to be aware 
of the fact and of the nature of that surveillance. 
 ▫ The judicial pre-authorisation regime could be reformed by 
having independent judges who are well resourced to handle 
the large number of applications for targeted surveillance. 
In addition, the law should incorporate a public advocate 
in RICA warrant applications. Such a person or organisation 
would provide alternative insights to the RICA judge and 
increase the accountability in the application process. 
 ▫ The grounds for surveillance, especially on crime, should be 
revised to be more succinct. Standards such as probable 
cause should be incorporated to strengthen rights protection 
for the current regime where interception warrants can be 
issued for threats to national security, public health and 
safety. 
 ▫ RICA provides for law enforcement to acquire metadata, 
but without protections on metadata retention. In light of 
the increasing use of data for surveillance, data protection 
principles such as data minimisation, retention, transparency, 
lawfulness and fairness should be applied to metadata 
interception. 
 ▫ Other areas that could be strengthened under RICA include 
the governance and oversight mechanisms. Opportunities for 
civilian oversight of the regime, where experts in surveillance 
matters could also advise on the RICA reports, should be 
South Africa Country Report
183Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
opened up. There is need for independent oversight with 
access to all data in order to verify whether the legislature’s 
intentions are reflected in practice and to provide public 
confidence.    
 ▫ The law should protect public interest professionals such as 
journalists and lawyers from breaking their professional codes 
or duty of care owed to their clients and sources. 
• Further recommendations on legal reform include the following. 
 ▫ Exceptions under the POPI Act should be reviewed to ensure 
that government offices are not entirely exempted from the 
privacy law but from some of its provisions (for example, 
seeking consent). This would bring an added oversight to 
surveillance activities from the Office of the Information 
Regulator.
 ▫ Other important areas of South African law that require 
urgent intervention in relation to surveillance include 
the regulation of CCTV. In addition, there is a need for 
governance of algorithms used for surveillance-related 
purposes such as facial recognition.
• Besides laws, there is a need for greater awareness of surveillance 
practices among the public. This will increase the critical mass of 
people who keep the state accountable for surveillance, especially 
with new data-intensive programmes such as digital ID and smart 
cities. 
• RICA has not been subjected to a human rights impact assessment. 
Since its implementation has been suspended for a year to allow for 
rectification of the issues identified in the amaBhungane judgement, 
this provides an opportunity for multi-stakeholder engagement in 
reform of the law as well as the surveillance environment to make it 
more rights-centric. 
• Areas of further research include: 
 ▫ Studies on South Africa as a surveillance producer and 
exporter – the actors, hidden actors and impacts of the 
industry. 
 ▫ The impact of artificial intelligence and surveillance in African 
countries, with South Africa as a case study. 
 ▫ A study on how the Mistry case (see Section 10, page 14) has 
been used in other African countries to argue for the link 
between privacy and surveillance.
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Introduction 
Many human rights can be affected by surveillance, including the right to 
freedom of expression, the right to assembly, the right to information and 
communication, and the right to privacy.   
According to one definition, ‘“Communications surveillance” in the modern 
environment encompasses the monitoring, intercepting, collecting, obtaining, 
analysing, using, preserving, retaining, interfering with, accessing or similar 
actions taken with regard to information that includes, reflects, arises from or 
is about a person’s communications in the past, present, or future’ (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) 2013). According to the United Nations (UN) Draft 
Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy (UN 2018),1 
surveillance is defined as ‘any monitoring, collecting, observing or listening 
by a state or on its behalf or at its order to persons, their movements, their 
conversations or their other activities or communications including metadata 
and/or the recording of the monitoring, observation and listening activities’. 
Both sources refer to a broad definition of surveillance that includes all 
practices that constitute surveillance, whether direct or indirect. This report 
will therefore address all related legislation that enables or limits surveillance 
practices, either directly or indirectly.  
The right to privacy in Sudan is protected in three ways: by the 2019 
Sudanese Constitution; through international conventions that Sudan is a 
party to; and in Sudanese laws. But Sudanese laws also enable surveillance. 
While surveillance always violates the right to privacy, it is argued that 
narrowly targeted surveillance in strictly limited cases is legitimate to prevent 
greater violations such as terrorist attacks. Carefully crafted surveillance 
legislation and safeguards are needed to balance the tension between 
the right to privacy and the need for surveillance. This report will show that 
excessive surveillance and privacy violations occur in Sudan; it will also 
identify opportunities to improve privacy protections and the legal practice 
of narrowly targeted surveillance.
Before 2011, Sudan witnessed offline and online surveillance practices by 
the government, which targeted activists, lawyers and journalists (Amnesty 
International 2010). According to the OpenNet Initiative (2009: 4), ‘the 
government of Sudan monitors Internet communications, and the National 
Intelligence and Security Service reads e-mail messages between private 
1 This draft text for a Legal Instrument (LI) on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy is 
the result of meetings and exchanges between the MAPPING project  and several categories 
of stakeholders shaping the development and use of digital technologies. These include 
leading global technology companies, experts with experience of working within civil 
society, law enforcement, intelligence  services, academics and other members of the multi-
stakeholder community shaping the internet and  the transition to the Digital Age.
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citizens. Media reports reveal that Sudan’s police have a special unit that 
monitors internet cafés to stop them from providing access to sexual 
content’. In 2007, the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC) ‘set 
up a special unit to censor and filter internet content before it reaches 
users inside Sudan’ (Abubkr 2014: 228). In 2011, under Al-Bashir’s regime, 
the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS) established a special 
unit called the ‘Cyber-Jihadists’ to exercise online surveillance practices, 
conduct ‘online defence operations’ and ‘act as a special internet and social 
media surveillance unit to spy on government critics, human rights activists, 
journalists and opposition parties’ (Paradigm Initiative 2019) and censor 
private accounts such as emails, Twitter and Facebook (Ali 2020). Sudan is 
one of 21 countries that has used Hacking Team’s RCS spyware (Marczak et 
al. 2014).
These state surveillance practices were present during the Sudanese 
revolution in 2018 as they have been in other North African countries. Sudan 
has used various legal tools to close civic space and control the online 
activities of those calling for change. According to the African Freedom 
of Expression Exchange (AFEX 2019: 8), ‘Online expression is susceptible to 
monitoring, removal of content and self-censorship as individuals, and 
journalists fear arrests and prosecution under the existing criminal laws 
including the Law on Combating Cybercrimes of 2018’. In common with 
other countries, Sudan has seized on the Covid-19 pandemic to increase 
surveillance practices. Ali (2020: 121) argues that ‘The government continues 
to rely on foreign software to spy on citizens and has taken the Covid-19 
pandemic as an opportunity to use technology to increase surveillance and 
limit people’s digital rights’.
This report reviews the Sudanese legal framework regulating surveillance 
practices, and examines its conformity with international standards, 
particularly the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights 
to Communications Surveillance (EFF 2013). It makes this assessment by 
answering a series of questions that reflect the surveillance practices in 
the Sudanese context. The report first outlines the contents of existing 
national legislation and then measures these against relevant international 
comparators. The report pays particular attention to the parameters within 
which surveillance is permitted in law and to the legal safeguards detailed in 
the legislation, before concluding with recommendations that aim to improve 
the legal framework and surveillance practices in Sudan. 
The remainder of this report takes the form of answering 12 questions to 
enable the reader to make direct comparisons with the other five country 
reports.
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1. What reasons does the 
Sudanese government use 
to justify surveillance? 
According to principle (1) of the International Principles on the Application 
of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (legality principle), ‘Any 
limitation to human rights must be prescribed by law. The State must not 
adopt or implement a measure that interferes with these rights in the 
absence of an existing publicly available legislative act, which meets a 
standard of clarity and precision that is sufficient to ensure that individuals 
have advance notice of and can foresee its application.’ The OpenNet 
Initiative (2004: 6) argues that ‘Countries usually justify the laws that enable 
filtering by invoking one of two broad themes: upholding “community 
standards” and ensuring “national security”’. Sudan uses both justifications. 
Reviewing Sudanese domestic legislation illustrates the use of community 
standards and of morals, national security, and indecency as justifications for 
surveillance. The details of these justifications will be elaborated in Section 3 
of this report.
The Sudanese Constitution and the Cybercrimes Law provide the legal basis 
for the right to privacy in Sudan, but other national security laws provide the 
basis for breaching this right, as we discuss in detail later in this report. 
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2. Which international 
conventions protecting privacy 
has Sudan adopted? 
Sudan is party to most of the international human rights instruments that 
provide the basis for the universal right to privacy. This includes the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. In 2013, Sudan also ratified and 
became part of the Arab Convention of Anti-Information Technology Crimes 
(cybercrimes). 
Table 1.1 International conventions signed and 
ratified by Sudan
International Conventions Signature Ratification
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 -
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights N/A 1986
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women
N/A N/A
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 24 Jul 1990 3 Aug 1990
Optional Protocol to Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography 
N/A 2004
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 3 Sep 1982 18 Feb 1986
Source: Adapted from University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library (no date) and Human Rights 
Library.  
All the international instruments detailed in Table 1.1 clearly ensure the right to 
privacy and data protection. 
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3. Which domestic laws 
enable or limit permitted 
surveillance in Sudan? 
Principle (2) of the International Principles states that ‘Laws should only permit 
Communications Surveillance by specified State authorities to achieve a 
legitimate aim that corresponds to a predominantly important legal interest 
that is necessary in a democratic society. Any measure must not be applied 
in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.’
It is not only the key international conventions that Sudan is party to 
that prohibit surveillance and protect the right to privacy, the Sudanese  
Constitution also emphasises the same rights and obligations. However, 
domestic laws are not aligned with these international and constitutional 
obligations, as we discuss subsequently. 
Sudan’s Constitution (2019)
In 2019, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) issued the Constitution 
document for the transitional period (Republic of Sudan 2019). Article 
42/2 stated that ‘all rights and freedoms, which included in human rights 
instrument that ratified by Sudan are integrated part of the document’. 
Item (2) of same article added that all rights and freedoms in this document 
will be regulated by law in a manner so as to ensure that those rights and 
freedoms are not restricted unless it is necessary as in a democratic society. 
Article 55 addresses privacy and stipulates that abuse of a person’s privacy is 
prohibited. Interference in one’s personal and family life, correspondence and 
home is not allowed except as prescribed by law.
Combat Information Technology crimes Law of 2018
Sudan’s 2007 Combat Information Technology crimes (Cybercrimes Law) 
was revised in 2018 and amended in 2020 to increase the severity of 
available punishments. According to article 5/1/A of the Cybercrimes Law 
2018 (amended 2020), the court will imprison for five years anyone who 
intentionally accesses websites that are owned by others without permission, 
which constitutes a safeguard to protect the right to privacy. It is worth 
mentioning that the punishment was previously two years (before the 2020 
amendment). Article 5/1/B adds that the court will imprison for six years 
anyone who intentionally accesses information systems owned by others, or 
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deletes, destroys, discloses, copies, uses or changes that information. (The 
punishment term was three years prior to the 2020 amendment.)   
Chapter 14 of the law, entitled Crimes Related to Moral and Public Order, 
criminalises the production, publishing, promotion, possession or storing 
of contents that breach moral and public order according to article (19). 
Moreover, article 22 criminalises using the internet to assault religions or their 
leaders. Article 20 adds prohibition of the online promotion of prostitution, 
indecent actions, and using applications to breach the moral and public 
order. Article 21 stipulates that it is considered a crime under this law to 
spread ideas, programmes, sayings or actions that breach ‘the moral and 
public order’. However, there is no legal definition of ‘moral and public order’ 
or the actions considered acceptable within those terms, which leaves the 
law open to abuse.
Article 23/1 amended by law No. 14/2020 stipulated that the state will 
punish (with up to four years in prison or a fine or both) anyone who sets up 
or uses information and communication networks or other cyber means 
or applications to abuse the privacy of any person or interfere in his or her 
personal and family life through taking and publishing photos, reading and 
publishing messages, or spreading fake news. The lack of a clear definition of 
fake news and the legal criteria that would identify fake news give ground for 
surveillance practices and undermine human freedoms, particularly freedom 
of expression and opinion.   
Article 23/2 states that the action described in 23/1 does not constitute 
a crime if it took place upon judicial decision, upon decision from public 
prosecution, or by ‘competent authority’. Competent authority is not 
necessarily a judicial body, whereas it could be a security agency. Without 
a clear definition of moral and public order, the right of privacy is at risk 
of abuse. Lack of definition and legal criteria embody the state of legal 
uncertainty. The legal certainty principle as one of the rule of law indictors, 
simply refers to the fact that ‘enforcement of legal norms in a given situation 
to be predictable, the incident legal norm to be easily to establish, its 
recipients to be certain a legal provision corresponding offense is applied, 
and not another one, and that it will be interpreted in a uniform manner’ 
(Ciongaru 2016: 45). Sudan is not the only country that uses undefined words 
and reasons to justify and ‘legalise’ surveillance and breaches of the right to 
privacy. For example, article 25 of Egyptian cybercrime law No. 175/2018 uses 
the same strategy.   
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Communication and Post Regulation Law 2018
Without including a clear definition of ‘national security’ or what is 
considered a ‘high interest of Sudan’, article 6/J of the Communication and 
Post Regulation Law 2018 states that the purpose of the regulatory authority 
is to protect the national security and the high interest of Sudan in the field of 
ICT.
National Security Law 2010 
According to the National Security Law 2010, amended by law No. 12/2020 
(Republic of Sudan  2020), article 25 gives power to the National Security 
Agency to request any information, data or document and to retain it.  
Under a previous article, the National Security Agency has a right to 
collect information and exercise surveillance legally. Moreover, the law 
did not provide any sort of guarantees that ensure the right to privacy; 
national security officers are not required in advance to provide any sort of 
justification for collecting data and using surveillance. Moreover, the law did 
not require any previous judicial review for such a request. 
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4. How does Sudanese surveillance 
law compare with that in other 
countries in Africa/US/EU/UK? 
The previous sections give an overview of existing national laws that regulate 
surveillance practices, highlighting the key international conventions that 
Sudan is party to and has used to prohibit communications surveillance. 
This section uses the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information in Africa (hereafter the African Declaration) (African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2019) as a means to compare 
Sudanese law against a rights-based ideal approach in the practice of 
surveillance.
While principle 40 of the Africa Declaration states that ‘Everyone has the 
right to privacy, including the confidentiality of their communications and 
the protection of their personal information’, it also states that ‘Everyone 
has the right to communicate anonymously or use pseudonyms on the 
internet and to secure the confidentiality of their communications and 
personal information from access by third parties through the aid of digital 
technologies’. Although the Sudanese Constitution and the Cybercrimes 
Law emphasised the right to privacy, this is contradicted by article 25 of the 
National Security Law and Article 23/2 of the Cybercrimes Law, which enable 
the state to breach the right of privacy and permit surveillance practices. 
Therefore, Sudanese legislation is not in line with international standards 
that guarantee the right to privacy and the inviolability of personal life and 
communications.   
In addition, principle 41 adds that ‘States shall only engage in targeted 
communication surveillance that is authorized by law, that conforms with 
international human rights law and standards, and that is premised on 
specific and reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been or is 
being carried out or for any other legitimate aim’. In this regard, the African 
Declaration is aligned with the International Principles (EFF 2013). However, 
Sudanese legislation breaches the principle of legal certainty as it does not 
clearly stipulate the legitimate aims that allow the authorities to practice 
surveillance, and it does not set specific time periods for the validity of 
judicial orders and their expiry. 
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5. How does Sudanese surveillance 
law compare with the UN 
Draft Legal Instrument?
As addressed in previous sections, the principles of legality, legitimate aim, 
proportionality and transparency are key to ensure elimination of electronic 
surveillance. Article 4 of the UN Draft Legal Instrument set out principles 
to ensure that surveillance systems shall be authorised by law prior to use. 
The law shall identify the purposes and situations in which the surveillance 
system is to be used, and define the category of serious crimes and/or 
threats for which the surveillance system is to be used (legitimate aims). The 
principles argue that states should set up and promote procedures to ensure 
transparency about and accountability of surveillance data and non-
surveillance data for surveillance purposes. Sections 3, 4 and 9 of this report 
illustrate that Sudanese laws regarding surveillance are not in line with the 
UN Draft Legal Instrument, specifically in terms of identifying the purposes 
and situations where the surveillance system is to be used and defining the 
legitimate aims of surveillance. Moreover, applicability of the emergency law 
constitutes a permanent legal challenge against the right to privacy and 
undermines any attempts to combat surveillance practices. Therefore, one 
key recommendation of this report is to amend Sudan’s National Security 
Law to bring it in line with international standards.
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6. Does legislation provide adequate 
definitions of key legal terms?  
According to principle 2 of the International Principles (legitimate aims), 
‘Laws should only permit Communications Surveillance by specified State 
authorities to achieve a legitimate aim that corresponds to a predominantly 
important legal interest that is necessary in a democratic society. Any 
measure must not be applied in a manner that discriminates on the basis 
of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status’. Principle 3 (necessity) states 
that ‘Surveillance laws, regulations, activities, powers, or authorities must be 
limited to those which are strictly and demonstrably necessary to achieve a 
legitimate aim. Communications Surveillance must only be conducted when 
it is the only means of achieving a legitimate aim, or, when there are multiple 
means, it is the means least likely to infringe upon human rights’.
As already noted, existing surveillance laws in Sudan do not include 
definitions or explanations of key legal terms such as reasonable grounds or 
legitimate purpose. According to the Paradigm Initiative (2019), the Sudanese 
Cybercrimes Law ‘uses vaguely defined terms that help regulate the content 
produced and consumed online’. For instance, article 21 stipulates that it is 
considered a crime under this law to spread ideas, programmes, sayings or 
actions that breach ‘the moral and public order’. However, there is no legal 
definition of ‘moral and public order’ or which acts would be considered 
contravening that order, which leaves the law open to abuse.  Furthermore, 
article 23/1 amended by law No. 14/2020 stipulates that the state will punish 
(with up to four years in prison or a fine or both) anyone who spreads fake 
news. Again, there is no clear definition of what constitutes fake news, which 
gives ground for surveillance practices and undermines human freedoms, 
particularly freedom of expression and opinion. In the same context, without 
a clear definition of ‘national security’ or what is considered a ‘high interest 
of Sudan’, article 6/J of the Communication and Post Regulation Law 2018 
states that the purpose of the regulatory authority is to protect national 
security and the high interest of Sudan in the field of ICT.
Sudan Country Report
197Surveillance Law in Africa: a review of six countriesids.ac.uk
7. How do legal safeguards, checks 
and balances, and independent 
oversight operate in practice?
According to the EFF (2014), the International Principles stipulate that ‘States 
should enact legislation criminalising illegal communications surveillance 
by public or private actors. The law should provide sufficient and significant 
civil and criminal penalties...’ In addition, ‘States should also enact laws 
providing that, after material obtained through communications surveillance 
has been used for the purpose for which information was given, the material 
must be destroyed or returned to the individual’. Furthermore, the duty of 
governments to deter unlawful surveillance by way of criminal and civil 
sanctions reflects the requirements of international human rights law to 
protect individuals from breaches of their privacy, not only by the state but 
also by private individuals (EFF 2013).
Although Sudanese law prohibits surveillance except where authorised 
by judicial decision, and emphasises the right to privacy, and article 23/1 
(amended by law No.14/2020) prohibits the breach of the privacy of others, 
article 25 of the National Security Law gives national security officers 
the powers to use surveillance. It is difficult to assess legal safeguards in 
the context of surveillance because – according to article 25 – there is 
no requirement for judicial permission in advance. Moreover, the lack of 
clear criteria, list of reasons, justifications and cases that allow issuance 
of a judicial decision to permit surveillance reflects the fact that existing 
safeguards are not sufficient and have not eliminated surveillance practices. 
In addition, the lack of clear definitions of key terms, legal criteria and 
definitions of acts that would constitute a crime under the Cybercrimes Law 
make legal procedures and actions unpredictable.
In conclusion, the way of drafting Sudanese law, the included legal 
guarantees in Sudanese laws, and using ambiguous terms are not operating 
to ensure elimination of surveillance practices. 
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8. How effective are existing laws 
and practices in protecting privacy 
and limiting surveillance?
Although Sudan is party to the ICCPR and other human rights conventions 
that protect the right to privacy, the Sudanese legal framework lacks a 
specific law to protect and guarantee the right to privacy. Despite the 
Constitution prohibiting abuse of personal privacy, and the Cybercrimes 
Law clearly prohibiting abuse of an individual’s privacy (which is considered 
a crime), the Cybercrimes Law gives the investigating authority the 
right to issue orders that could abuse a person’s right to privacy without 
providing specific grounds for doing so. Moreover, as already noted, the 
National Security Law gives national security agencies the power to access 
information without judicial review and without oversight by an independent 
authority.    
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9. Are existing surveillance 
practices in Sudan ‘legal, 
necessary and proportionate’?
All surveillance is a violation of the right to privacy. However, some 
surveillance is legal. Legislation can define the legitimate aims of surveillance, 
such as the prevention of serious crimes. These legal boundaries refer to the 
legality of practices that constitute a restriction on human rights, and aim to 
protect human rights against arbitrary practices by the state (EFF 2013). 
The lack of specific criteria for justifying the issuance of a judicial order and 
thereby permission for surveillance constitutes a breach of privacy. Lack of 
clear definitions of ‘moral and public order’ as justifications for breaching 
the right to privacy and lack of reasons for authorised national security 
officers to collect personal information reflect the difficulties in assessing 
whether existing surveillance practices in Sudan are legal, necessary and 
proportionate. The Sudanese state has absolute discretionary power to 
assess the necessity and proportionality of surveillance practices without 
any sort of judicial review. 
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10. How has surveillance law 
played out in court in Sudan?
No surveillance law cases were identified by the literature search for this 
report. There was one court decision related to an internet shutdown, which 
is reviewed here because of its potential relevance to strategic litigation on 
surveillance within the Sudanese judicial system.
In 2019, the Court of Appeal in Khartoum, in its decision in the case recorded 
under No. (M1/ASM/520/2019-/520/2019 م س أ/1م), upheld the decision of 
the lower court and required the mobile internet service provider (El Zain) 
to reconnect the communication and internet services to the plaintiff. The 
appellant stated that the shutdown of internet and communication in 
Sudan was upon verbal request from the Telecommunication Regulatory 
Authority on the basis of threats to national security. The court stated that 
the internet shutdown occurred after the success of the Sudanese revolution, 
which led to removing Al-Bashir’s regime on 11 April 2019, successfully arguing 
that there was no national threat at that time. The court found that the 
internet shutdown was in breach of Article 39/1 of the suspended Sudanese 
Constitution, which stipulated that each citizen has the unrestricted right to 
freedom of expression and to receive and spread information.
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11. What is working? What gaps are 
there in existing policy, practice, 
knowledge and capacity?
Although Sudanese law includes basic effective legal provisions that could 
play a role in protecting the right to privacy, the same law includes other 
provisions that compromise its effectiveness.
The lack of personal data protection law in Sudan is a major gap in privacy 
protection. Moreover, article 25 of the National Security Law, which gives 
the National Security Agency the right to request personal data and keep a 
copy of it, opens the door to secret and arbitrary surveillance practices. 
Article 23/2 of the Cybercrimes Law does not specify the legitimate aims 
that allow the investigating authority or judicial bodies to breach privacy 
and carry out legitimate surveillance practices. This constitutes abuse of the 
principle of legal certainty.  
In light of Chapter 14 of the Cybercrimes Law, entitled Crimes Related to 
Moral and Public Order, definitional clarity is needed. The lack of a legal 
definition of what constitutes ‘fake news’ or ‘public and moral order’ leaves 
the law open to abuse.
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12. What recommendations arise 
for future legislation, practice, 
or further research?
Parliament and legislators 
• Amend article 23/2 of the Cybercrimes Law by specifying the 
‘legitimate aims’ that investigating agencies can use to request 
permission to conduct targeted surveillance.
• Ensure respect for the principle of legal certainty by clearly defining 
in law the parameters of national security, fake news and moral and 
public order.
• Require prior authorisation from a judicial authority for all surveillance. 
Require a judge to test requests for reasonable grounds, legality, 
necessity and proportionality.
• Amend the National Security Law and specify the cases that give the 
National Security Agency the right to collect information, which should 
be upon judicial order in advance.
• Adopt a data protection law.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
• Build the capacity of lawyers on digital rights to enable them to 
conduct strategic litigation in surveillance practices and right to 
privacy, and encouraging them to challenge surveillance motivation 
laws before constitutional courts.
• Establish a coalition between NGOs working on digital rights to 
engage in the policy-making process and communicate with 
decision-makers to advocate for improvements to existing laws and 
practices and bring them in line with the International Principles.
• Use international and regional human rights mechanisms to change 
existing policies, practices and laws. 
Academia and research centres
• Produce a policy paper focusing on surveillance legislation gaps and 
suggest changes required to ensure the right to privacy.
• Conduct comparative analysis of experiences of other countries in 
the region to explore applicable experience and solutions that could 
apply in Sudan.
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